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ABSTRACT
In the Preface to the Philosophy of Right, Hegel draws a favourable comparison between his project and Plato’s Republic, while making a critical comment about an example taken from Plato’s Laws. In this paper we investigate what Hegel’s assessment of Plato’s two texts in political philosophy illuminates about his conception of ethical education and the extent to which his own method allows a philosopher to contribute to the process of making people good. We show that although Hegel agrees with Plato that one becomes good by becoming “a citizen in a state with good laws” (PR §153), he believes that philosophy must remain faithful to its limited role in determining what these are going to be.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes
1 The reference is to sons rather than daughters. For Hegel, women’s education looks very different (PR §166A).
2 Even if being good is not reducible to simply being a law-abiding citizen of a state with good laws, the anecdote suggests that good laws are an enabling condition for the cultivation of individual goodness. This is a theme that we will identify in both Hegel and Plato.
3 The Pythagorean’s answer has sometimes been read as evidence that Hegel is neglecting the question of individual goodness. As Moyar, Hegel’s Value, 27–28. Although Hegel takes the question of ethical character seriously in its own right, he does identify individual goodness with rectitude (PR §150), which could give the impression that it is being reduced to law-abidingness (we return to rectitude in §3).
4 Hegel attributes the saying to Socrates at PR, 437; and notes that it had “also been attributed to others”, beyond the Pythagorean.
5 See Brooks, “Plato, Hegel, and Democracy”; Browning, “Plato and Hegel: Reason, Redemption, and Political Theory”; Inwood, “Hegel, Plato and Greek ‘Sittlichkeit’’; all focus on Hegel’s reading of the Republic.
6 Hegel’s reference to the ‘ethical life’ of the Greek city-state suggests that he is using the term in a broader sense from its technical meaning in PR. See also Hegel’s use of the term in the Phenomenology of Spirit (esp. ¶441).
7 PR contains notable disagreements with Plato’s position on social and political organization; in §46R, Hegel remarks that Plato’s proposed abolition of private property violates the right of personality; in §162A he comments on Plato’s disrespect for subjective freedom by assigning citizens their professional station from above; and in §185R he adds the abolition of the family as a further respect in which Plato attempted to exclude what he calls the “principle of self-sufficient particularity”.
8 Hegel implies that a state has to exist in order to count as actual: “For since the rational, which is synonymous with the Idea, becomes actual by entering into external existence [Existenz] … ” (PR, 20–21). He makes a similar point in Encyclopedia I §6.
9 There is a normative dimension to both PR and in Plato’s account of justice in the Republic. See 369c, where the interlocutors agree to “construct a hypothetical city” in a way that anticipates Hegel’s procedure.
10 It is worth noting that the Prussian state that Hegel is describing is not identical to the one he was often accused of justifying. See Avineri, Hegel’s Theory of the Modern State, 115–130. Hegel’s account of ethical life also includes institutions that were no longer in existence in the Prussia of his time, for example the “recently abolished” corporations (PR §255A).
11 As Hegel tells us in the next sentence, a commitment to the Doppelsatz is shared by every “ingenious consciousness as well as by philosophy”, so Hegel and Plato are not meant to be exceptional in this respect, although Hegel thinks that many of his contemporaries who call themselves philosophers do not subscribe to this principle.
12 Plato regularly turns his attention to alternative political arrangements of his time, especially to Sparta. See Schofield, Plato, especially chapter 1. In the Additions to PR, Hegel also draws occasional comparisons with other nation-states, for example France and England.
13 Translations from LHP are our own. Page references to the translation are also provided.
14 These terms are ambiguous in Hegel’s interpretation of Plato. Inwood, “Hegel, Plato, and Greek Sittlichkeit” argues that Hegel conflates acting on the basis of subjective convictions and of self-interest.
15 In LHP Hegel identifies Socrates’s philosophy and subjective freedom. See especially LHP 123, 108.
16 This is compatible with Hegel’s insistence throughout the Preface that ‘actuality’ is both the product of a historical development and that it needs to be understood as the achievement of a process. It is for this reason that many scholars favor an alternate version of the Doppelsatz (‘what is actual becomes rational and the rational becomes actual’). See for example Kervégan, The Actual and the Rational, xxvii, and Wood, Hegel’s Ethical Thought, 13.
17 “Plato demands philosophy of the rulers of people, and establishes the necessity of uniting philosophy and government” (LHP, 33, 24).
18 Hegel’s concept of the idea is a close kin of actuality, since the idea refers to the realized concept. In his Science of Logic, Hegel follows Plato in defining the ‘idea’ in objective terms and distinguishing it from a representation.
19 Thus in LHP, Hegel describes Frederick II as a modern-day version of a philosopher-king (LHP, 35, 26).
20 “The idea occurs [kommt zustande] in the world, it has no need there; it is not needed that those ruling have the idea” (LHP, 34, 24).
21 See Kervégan, The Actual and the Rational, xvii – xxxiii, for a summary of these disputes. Stern, “Hegel’s Doppelsatz” defends a ‘normatively neutral’ reading of ‘rationality’, according to which ‘rational’ means ‘intelligible’ (rather than ‘good’ or ‘justified’). We are here following the standard view that ‘rationality’ is a normative concept for Hegel.
22 Hegel states this explicitly in Encyclopedia I §6 by connecting the Doppelsatz to his account of actuality in the Science of Logic. This use of the term suggests that it can come in degrees, since various objects will differ in their level of success in meeting the relevant standard. For a recent discussion of actuality in the Logic see Ng, Hegel’s Concept of Life, 125–64.
23 Although our paper does not emphasize the free will as a normative basis of Hegel’s political philosophy, it is clear that it is central to his project and an important point of contrast with Plato. See Neuhouser, Foundations of Hegel’s Social Theory, and Browning, “Hegel and Plato: Reason, Redemption and Political Theory”.
24 According to Kervégan, Hegel is citing Plato in order to emphasize this divergence between the rational core and the historically specific shape in which it appears and in order to make the case that ethical life is always the result of a historical process (The Actual and the Rational, xxvii – xxx).
25 Hegel’s “Logic of Essence” indicates that concepts such as ‘actuality’ and ‘externality’, just like ‘essence’ and ‘appearance’, are to be understood as reflexive, which means that they cannot be determined independently of each other. So, in claiming that the state has a rational core which is its actuality proper, Hegel does not imply that this rational core exists as a determinate essence ‘behind’ its visible surface.
26 He means contemporaries like those who advocate ‘custom’ (Savigny) or ‘conscience’ (Fries) as alternatives to the law. See especially PR 13–18.
27 This situation could, for example, include the stage of rational development, which points in the direction of Hegel’s problematic ranking of nations and civilizations in his lectures on world history. For Hegel on positive law, see Moyar, Hegel’s Value, 284–299.
28 Here Hegel is using the term ‘idea’ in the subjective sense of a conscious representation.
29 In connection to Plato’s legal recommendation to the nurses, Hegel also mentions Fichte’s philosophical argument in favor of passport ‘photos’ (PR, 21), dismissing both on the same grounds.
30 This already indicates an important difference with Hegel’s account, since Hegel and Plato have different views about the constraints that nature places on the goals of ethical education.
31 The consensus that philosophers rule is neither rational nor spontaneous, but achieved by a complex propaganda machine Plato envisions as necessary for reshaping people’s natural inclinations to injustice. For fuller discussions, see C.C.W. Taylor, “Plato’s Totalitarianism”; Wardy, “The Platonic manufacture of ideology”; and Harte, “Plato’s politics of ignorance”.
32 For an argument for why philosophers are the only ones in the city fit to rule, see Rep. 5, 474b1–480a6. For the explanation of why philosophers must descend back into the cave to rule, even though their preference would be to continue contemplating their proper objects of study, see Rep. 519c3–521d1.
33 While there are no virtues associated uniquely with the producers, they do share in moderation and justice insofar as they are part of a harmoniously ordered whole (Rep. 431e7–432a5). For a fuller discussion with a good bibliography, see Jeon, “The Interaction between the Just City and its Citizens in Plato’s Republic”. See also fn. 38.
34 The point of the proposed constitution is to ensure the virtue of the citizens (Laws 705d3–706a4); and that the citizens live “supremely happy lives” (Laws 743c5–6). It is worth considering whether Socrates’ claim in the Republic that the goal in designing a city in thought is to ensure the happiness of the city as a whole, not of individual citizens (Rep. 420c1–4) is compatible with this stated goal of the Laws. The question is further complicated by the fact that the conditions for citizenship are specified differently in the two dialogues: while in the Republic, the class of producers is granted citizenship, in the Laws it is excluded from citizenship. The Magnesians are expected to dedicate all their energy and time to cultivating, maintaining, and restoring virtue (Laws 807c1–d5).
35 For an explanation of the double method, see Laws 718a4–720e6. For an informative discussion of the educational program of the Laws, see Annas, Virtue and Law in Plato.
36 This diverges from Hegel’s own interpretation of Plato, since Hegel reads Plato as not merely constructing an ideal state, but rather rendering his own time in thought.
37 For the single “smallest change that would enable our city to reach our sort of constitution”, see Rep. 5, 473c8–e4. For the argument about the impossibility of the long-term preservation of the constitution of Kallipolis and reasons for its deterioration, see Rep. 546a1–547a2. The pattern of deterioration is spelled out at Rep. 547a3–548d1. See also the recurrent admonition in the Laws that human individuals cannot exercise absolute power in the polis without becoming corrupt (691c-d, 713c-d, 875a).
38 In the Republic, spelling out the laws is deemed either futile or pointless at 427a1–b1 and 425d7–e1. The contrast between the rule of law and the rule of a philosopher is drawn most eloquently in the Statesman: “Now in a certain sense it is clear that the art of the legislator belongs to that of the king; but the best thing is not that the laws should prevail, but rather the kingly man who possesses wisdom. […] That law could never accurately embrace what is best and most just for all at the same time, and so prescribe what is best. For the dissimilarities between human beings and their actions, and the fact that practically nothing in human affairs ever remains stable, prevent any sort of expertise whatsoever from making any simple decision in any sphere that covers all cases and will last for all time” (294a3–b5). Like Plato, Hegel acknowledges that laws are not sufficiently sensitive to nuance, which is why judges are needed for their application (PR §214R).
39 For a critical discussion of the Magnesian constitution as an apparent compromise between the ideal and the realistically possible, see Schofield, “The Laws’ Two Projects”.
40 The dialogue opens with praise of Crete and Sparta which credit the invention of their legal codes to “gods rather than men” (Laws 624a). In the rest of the dialogue, the Athenian Stranger proceeds to articulate the content and philosophical reasoning behind the laws that would merit this characterization as ‘god-given’ or ‘divinely inspired’. It is in learning to follow this philosophical reasoning (including through their study of the Laws) that the citizens come to appreciate the laws as good and worth following as they grow up, and not as authoritarian external constraints on their behavior. We return to the connection between ‘god-given’ and ‘philosophically justifiable’ in §3. See also ft. 46.
41 He deliberately leaves matters underspecified in certain domains, e.g. in domestic affairs (807e5); and in religious practice and worship (738b5–d4).
42 The Laws discuss various constitutions, both historical and contemporary, with an attempt to analyse their failings and blind spots and identify their relative advantages. Set up as a dialogue between an Athenian, a Cretan, and a Spartan, it also allows for continuous evaluative comparison between these three cities’ norms, customs, and institutions, drawing on their lived experience in crafting the laws for Magnesia.
43 Correspondingly, overlooking any seemingly insignificant details may compromise the integrity of the whole system. The Athenian warns: “we must do our best not to omit anything, great or small, whether ‘laws’, ‘habits’ or ‘institutions’, because they are all needed to bind a state together, and the permanence of the one kind of norm depends on that of the other. So we ought not to be surprised to see a flood of apparently unimportant customs or usages making our legal code a bit on the long side” (Laws 793d1–6).
44 In addition to character training and theoretical studies, philosophers must also acquire fifteen years of practical experience in politics before they are fit to rule (Rep. 539e1–540b5).
45 In order not to distort the actual historical philosophers’ views, we use the masculine pronoun when referring to Hegel’s conception of a philosopher, and the feminine pronoun when referring to Plato’s. In both cities Plato describes (Kallipolis and Magnesia), women are either trained as philosophers or educated in the laws to the extent to which their natures allow.
46 Note that the philosophical education that the citizens receive is not explicitly designed to make them into full-fledged philosophers; its point is to educate the citizens about the grounds for the laws’ authority, making them capable of self-rule (see also Laws 643d4–644a1). For a reading that emphasizes a positive conception of freedom as a distinguishing feature of the Laws, see Schofield, Plato, especially chapter 2. For an argument that Plato’s position in the Laws incorporates non-philosophers into the city’s political life by assigning them a share of reason, and thus allowing for a considerable degree of autonomy, see Bobonich, Plato’s Utopia Recast, especially chapters 4 and 5.
47 Such people will play a somewhat different role in the city, as members of the Nocturnal Council, who will safeguard the laws (Laws 961a1–962e7) as well as supervise the reeducation of the impious and the recalcitrant (Laws 909a1–5).
48 For prominent examples, consider the detailed discussions of the transformed institution of marriage and child-rearing in Rep. V; and property ownership in Rep. III.
49 Hegel does note that Plato understands this ethical contribution differently than Hegel does: in Plato’s political philosophy, nature matters far more in justifying political arrangements than it does in Hegel’s. As Hegel puts it, “In this way he comes to his law as a determinate individuality alone … he belongs to the universal spirit and comes to his own universality only as a this”. (LHP, 119, 104). Here Hegel has in mind the allocation of social roles on the basis of what individuals are suited by nature to do, alluding once again to Plato’s Republic.
50 Although Hegel’s interpretation is controversial, such passages as the Rep. 469a7–b1 suggest that the achievement of individual justice is far more difficult in an unjust city. See also Laws 951b2–4 for an observation that in a well-run state, one does not need to be a genius to become good, but in a poorly-run state, one probably cannot become good without being a genius.
51 Apart from their gender (see fn 1).
52 For suggestions to this effect, see Laws 810a-811e and Laws 957c-d. For an informative discussion, see Nightingale “Plato’s Lawcode in Context”.
53 Cf. with the case of the seemingly virtuous soul in the Myth of Er, who having lived “under an orderly constitution, where he had participated in virtue through habit and without philosophy” (Rep. 619c6) chose the life of a tyrant for its next incarnation. For a thorough treatment of this distinction with a good bibliography, see, for example, Kraut, “Ordinary Virtue from the Phaedo to the Laws”.
54 In §215R Hegel disparages the practice (which he attributes to Dionysius the Tyrant) of hanging the law so high that no one can read it. His point is not just about the content of the law, but also about its application to individual cases: “just as one need not be a shoemaker to know whether one’s shoes fit, so is there no need to belong to a specific profession in order to know about matters of universal interest” (215A).
55 See also the “right of the subjective will” (PR §132), which includes a right of cognizance into the good.
56 “Education [Paedagogik] is the art of making human beings ethical: it considers them as natural beings and shows them how they can be reborn … so that this spirituality becomes habitual to them” (PR §151A). This passage suggests that habit is the goal of ethical education. There are also passages that connect habit and knowledge (PR §268). Hegel’s line of reasoning suggests that habit is itself an “experimental” method by which citizens test the validity of the law and determine its suitability for living well in a given state. See Novakovic, Hegel on Second Nature in Ethical Life, Chapter 1, as well as “Hegel's Real Habits”.
57 Otherwise Hegel would not have grounds for objecting to the advocates of customary right (PR §211 and §211R).
58 This feature of Hegel’s position could suggest a greater affinity with Aristotle than with Plato. Interestingly, Hegel mentions Aristotle rarely by name in his political writings. In LHP, Hegel claims that Plato already anticipated the significance of both habit [Gewohnheit] (p. 107) and education [Erziehung] (p. 121) for the just state.
59 Hegel does mention: “The truth concerning right, ethics, and the state is at any rate as old as its exposition and promulgation in public laws and in public morality and religion” (PR, 11). His point is that ethical content is already widely known because it is exposed and promulgated in “public laws”.
60 Hegel is critical of his contemporaries who sought to justify laws on the basis of purely historical considerations, but this is because Hegel thinks that merely historical arguments depend on the persistence of contingent circumstances and so cannot provide a justification for a law under different circumstances (PR §3R).