Descartes on the source of error: the Fourth Meditation and the Correspondence with Elisabeth

ABSTRACT

In the Fourth Meditation, Descartes famously treats the indifference of the will (roughly, ambivalence of reasons) as the source of error, which many read as oddly suggesting that the will judges arbitrarily. In his letter to Elisabeth dated 1st September 1645, however, he expressly takes passions to be the source of error, saying that passions move the will to judge erroneously by misrepresenting the value of objects. Although these two accounts focus on different kinds of error – theoretical and practical error, respectively – I argue that Descartes is best understood as extending the second account also to the source of theoretical error. On my reading, the first account does not imply that erroneous judgements are simply arbitrary, but it leaves out an explanation why we judge at the time we do, when we could (and should) continue to inquire insofar as we have not yet gathered sufficient evidence. The second account fills in this lacuna by giving an explanation in terms of passions. I further argue that the schematic nature of the first account is due partly to the structure of the Meditations, but mainly to the fact that Descartes has not yet systematically examined the nature of passions there.

KEYWORDS:

• Descartes
• Elisabeth
• error
• indifference
• passion

Acknowledgements

I would like to express my deep gratitude to Antonia LoLordo, Walter Ott, and Tad Schmaltz for their generous feedback on multiple versions of this paper. I would also like to thank Victor Caston, Tamer Nawar, Janum Sethi, Brian Weatherson, the two anonymous referees, and an associate editor of this journal for their super helpful comments, as well as my audience at the University of Michigan Graduate Student Working Group, who heard an earlier draft in January 2021.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1 So understood, error is stronger than a mere divergence from reality, which may be independent of the subject’s judgement. Descartes also distinguishes privation from mere negation. For example, the lack of sight in a rock is a mere negation rather than a privation, for sight is not something that should be in a rock. Furthermore, he takes error to be a privation of cognitio, not scientia. As Christofidou (“Descartes’ Dualism”, 220) notes, cognitio is subjectively true and certain and does not need the guarantee of God, while scientia is objectively true and certain and needs the guarantee of God. For example, an atheist can know that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles, but this knowledge is cognitio rather than scientia because, without the guarantee of God, it is possible for the atheist to be deceived even when things seem evident to him, although this doubt may never occur to him (AT VII 141/CSM II 101). For discussion, see also Williams, Descartes, especially Chapter 7. References to Descartes are in the following form: volume and page number in Adam and Tannery’s edition of Descartes’ works (“AT”)/volume and page number in the Cottingham, Stoothoff, and Murdoch translations (“CSM”) or in the Cottingham, Stoothoff, Murdoch, and Kenny translations (“CSMK”). My reference to Elisabeth’s letter to Descartes mentions volume and page number in Adam and Tannery’s edition of Descartes’ works (“AT”)/page number in Shapiro’s translation (“S”).

2 Obscure and confused ideas contrast with clear and distinct ideas. In the Meditations, Descartes does not define clear and distinct ideas. For my purposes, we just need to know that clear and distinct ideas provide conclusive evidence while obscure and confused ideas do not.

3 In what follows, I shall mean this letter when I mention “the Correspondence”. When I mention other letters, I will give their dates and addressees.

4 For discussion of the first account, see Carriero, Between Two Worlds; Curley, “the Ethics of Belief”; Rosenthal, “the Theory of Judgement”; Wilson, Descartes. For brief mentions of the second account, which do not explore its relation to the first account, see Dubouclez, “Descartes et les quarante passions”; Jayasekera, “the Passions of the Soul”.

5 See Curley, “the Ethics of Belief”, 177–8; Rosenthal, “the Theory of Judgement”, 407; and Wilson, Descartes, 127. See also n. 15.

6 I thank the anonymous referees and the associate editor for helping me frame the issue this way. I think this issue needs to be resolved independently of whether Descartes is treated as a libertarian or compatibilist about free will. The libertarian/compatibilist dispute concerns whether, for Descartes, the will always has a two-way power of action, which is commonly understood as the ability to do otherwise, or the freedom of the will is compatible with the fact that it is determined at least in some cases. This dispute tends to focus on cases of clear and distinct ideas. For a recent debate on this issue, see Lennon, “Descartes is Not a Libertarian”; Ragland, “Is Descartes a Libertarian”. I set aside this debate, since I am interested in cases of obscure and confused ideas, which can be put in a neutral way.

7 Descartes distinguishes these two by defining each in terms of its subject-matter: theoretical error is the sort of error that occurs in distinguishing speculative truth from falsehood, while practical error is the sort of error that occurs in pursuing good and avoiding evil (AT VII 15/CSM II 11). The second account clearly focuses on practical error, but whether the first account focuses only on theoretical error has been disputed. For more on this, see Section 2.

8 This does not mean that we can extend our will to judge about a thing when the thing is not displayed in the intellect at all. For more on this, see later this section and Section 4.

9 Descartes mentions similar arguments in Principles I, 33 and 35 (AT VIIIA18/CSM I 204–5). In the Rules, he states that we err because we take for granted poorly understood observations or lay down groundless judgements. Descartes does not treat human error as arising from faulty inference, which we today may tend to treat as a typical kind of human error. This is because he thinks “the deduction or pure inference of one thing from another can never be performed wrongly by an intellect which is in the least degree rational” (AT X 365/CSM I 12). On his view, we may err if we do not clearly perceive all the propositions and links in a chain.

10 As indicated in the following quote, there is the option to suspend judgements in cases of obscure and confused ideas, in which case we use the will properly.

11 I use ‘culpable error’ to refer to error involved in cases where we are culpable for falling in error. On Descartes’ view, we are culpable whenever we do not use our faculties correctly, even in the case of true judgement. As I will discuss in Section 2, this becomes less definitive when extending the will to obscure and confused ideas in practical cases (e.g. when we have to come to a decision under time pressure). Here, he seems to focus just on theoretical cases where we should (and could) postpone judgement, but we do not.

12 Descartes sometimes takes divine grace to lead us to affirm something that we do not fully grasp, e.g. the Trinity (AT VIIIA 14/CSM I 201). This seems to show that divinely produced dispositions can lead us to affirm obscure and confused ideas. Relatedly, Descartes claims that while faith concerns obscure matters, the obscurity only refers to the subject-matter that faith relates to; the formal reason that leads us to affirm matters of faith consists in an inner light from God, which is not obscure (AT VII 147–8/CSM II 105). But I do not think this is a problem because, on his view, we can have a clear and distinct idea of God (with respect to the things we know), although the idea does not fully represent everything in God (AT VIIIA 26/CSM I 211; AT VII 46/CSM II 31–2). Also, while what the dispositions lead us to affirm or deny is obscure and confused, the reasons for the affirmation or denial are clear and distinct insofar as they are grounded in the clear and distinct perception that dispositions from a perfect God always lead us to the truth.

13 In a letter to [Mesland] dated 9th February 1645, Descartes distinguishes two different senses of indifference: (1) a positive power of self-determination (roughly an ability to do otherwise) and (2) ambivalence of reasons (not having any more reason to affirm than to deny is a paradigm case of this sort of indifference, but Descartes suggests that having more reasons on one side while less on the other still counts as indifference in this sense) (AT IV 173/CSMK 245). The Fourth Meditation seems to focus on (2), as Descartes discusses it in his Sixth Set of Replies (AT VII 433/CSM II 292). For discussion, see Alanen, Descartes' Concept of Mind, 228–9; Beyssade, “Descartes' Doctrine of Freedom”, 193–6; Carriero, Between Two Worlds, 257–64; Lennon, “Descartes is Not a Libertarian”, 57–62; Ragland, “Is Descartes a Libertarian”, 88–90; Schmaltz, “Human Freedom”, 10–3; Shapiro, “Descartes' Account of Free Will”, 35–7.

14 Given the previous note about the sense of indifference in the present context, the reader might immediately find Wilson’s reading suspicious: it does not cover the cases in which some insufficient reasons enable erroneous judgements. I will return to this point shortly.

15 Wilson (Descartes, 127) claims that she is following Curley (“the Ethics of Belief”, 177–8; cf. 176), who takes judgement in cases of obscure and confused ideas to be a bare act of the will for Descartes. Similarly, Rosenthal (“the Theory of Judgement”, 407) takes Descartes to mean that the wanton use of the will in these cases causes error.

16 Descartes later eliminates cases of complete indifference when addressing an objection from Gassendi. I will discuss this shift in Section 4, as it is related to how Descartes resolves a remaining issue that I will mention shortly.

17 Alternatively, one might appeal to some external explanation, saying that we judge in the absence of sufficient evidence due to practical demands upon life. As we will see in Section 2, Descartes considers practical contingencies and just requires moral certainty for judgements in practical cases, but he does not think the same applies to purely theoretical cases.

18 For example, when we watch a performance, on the one hand, the watching experience stimulates the spirits and may lead to feelings of joy, anger, and the like. These feelings are the passions caused by the body. On the other, we may also enjoy feeling these feelings, and this sort of joy is an intellectual joy, which belongs to the passions caused by the mind.

19 I clarify Descartes’ account of passions by citing the Passions, but basically the same account is mentioned in his letter to Elisabeth dated 6th October 1645, where he distinguishes different kinds of passions and states that the passions referred to the mind are properly called “passions” (AT IV 309–12/CSMK 270–1).

20 In what follows, if I do not note otherwise, I will simply use ‘passions’ to refer to the passions referred to the mind. But note, again, that these passions, despite being so referred, are subsumed under the category of the passions caused by the body and are associated with the mind–body union.

21 He focuses on practical cases here because Elisabeth asks him a question about how to strengthen the intellect in order to judge the best in all the actions of life (AT IV 280/S 106). To address this question, Descartes finds it necessary to teach Elisabeth how error arises in the conduct of life and how to avoid practical error (AT IV 284–7/CMSK 263–5).

22 I will explain how exactly passions move the will in Section 3.

23 Descartes further suggests that if we have done what we judged the best at the time we did, we have no reason to regret even in cases where we later realize that we made a mistake (AT IV 307/CMSK 269).

24 This is supported by the denial that the Meditations deals with sin in the Synopsis (AT VII 15/CSM II 11). For discussion, see Cunning, Argument and Persuasion, 125 n. 7; Latzer, “Descartes' Theodicy of Error”, 36; Ragland, The Will to Reason, 46.

25 This is not to say that Descartes did not know the different criteria for culpability when he wrote the Fourth Meditation. Rather, he simply sets aside the complexities involved in practical cases and focuses on theoretical cases. For in both the Discourses and the Second Set of Replies, he mentions the same point about practical error that he develops in the Correspondence (AT VI 24–5/CSM I 123 and AT VII 149/CSM II 106). I will explain in Section 4 why he sets aside practical error in the Fourth Meditation.

26 Descartes has in mind a distinction between theoretical and practical action. A theoretical action is the one to distinguish truth from falsehood, while a practical action is the one to pursue good and avoid evil. While both kinds of actions involve doxastic attitudes (i.e. affirmation, denial, or suspension of judgement), only the latter results in bodily action. Practical action is also more than bodily action: for Descartes, whereas practical action involves doxastic attitudes and therefore contributions from the soul, it is possible for bodily action simply to result from movements of the spirits, with no contribution from the soul (AT XI 358/CSM I 343).

27 Moral certainty is the certainty involved in matters with respect to the conduct of life that we never normally doubt or are sufficient for regulating actions, although we know, absolutely speaking, they might be false (AT VI 37–9/CSM I 130 and AT IXB 327/CSM I 289 n. 2).

28 One might think that we can even go beyond this and argue that if the broad notion of practical error goes through, then there seems to be no pure theoretical error at all, because practical concerns lie everywhere. But alternatively, we can accept the existence of pure theoretical errors, while it is up to us to decide whether we consider practical concerns when we deal with theoretical matters. In addition, there are other borderline cases in which our well-informed practical judgements involve theoretical knowledge. For example, to make a well-informed judgement about whether I should eat this apple in front of me, I need to understand that this apple is beneficial for me to eat, while doing so requires me to have at least some theoretical knowledge concerning the nature of this apple or apples in general.

29 Whereas Descartes talks about different first causes of all the passions at the beginning of Part Two of the Passions, he means to distinguish different types of the passions caused by the body, given that he takes all of the passions under discussion to share the same proximate cause, namely the agitation by which the spirits move the pineal gland. By contrast, we know that, on his view, the passions caused by the mind are independent of the movements of the spirits.

30 See Alanen, Descartes’ Concept of Mind, 190; Brown, the Passionate Mind, 25; Clark, Descartes’ Theory of Mind, 134; Dubouclez, “Descartes et les quarante passions”, 50; Hatfield, “a Jamesian Theory of the Emotions”, 424–5; “Descartes’ Machine Psychology”, 11; Hoffman, Essays on Descartes, 188–9, 263–4; James, Passion and Action, 103–8; Jayasekera, “the Passions of the Soul”, 81–2; Kisner, “the Ethical Reliability of the Passions”, 46–9; Schmitter, “Passions and Functional Explanation”, 435–6; Shapiro, “the Union of Mind and Body”, 221; Simmons, “Are Cartesian Sensations Representational”, 354–61; Williston, “Akrasia and the Passions”, 37–42. For alternative readings, see e.g. Brassfield, “the Role of the Passions”, 461–9; Greenberg, “Descartes on the Passions”, 715.

31 Some might object that there is no mention of passions being representational in this passage. Indeed, as Brassfield (“the Role of the Passions”, 463) notes, when Descartes discusses, in articles 40, 52, 74, and 137 of the Passions, the function, or effect, or use of passions, he seems never to mention that passions are representational. Jayasekera (“the Passions of the Soul”, 76–7) replies that Descartes repeatedly claims that passions “represent [représenter]” things (I will cite one of these shortly).

32 Some scholars take the three different kinds of representations rather than just the first two to be important for Descartes to classify different sorts of passions. I set aside these complexities. For discussion, see Alanen, Descartes’ Concept of Mind, 190–1; Dubouclez, “Descartes et les quarante passions”, 49–50.

33 Hoffman (Essays on Descartes, 190) argues that Descartes’ view here is problematic: if passions can only move the will through the desires they produce, then not all passions can directly move the will, while this seems to undermine his distinction between passions and sensations. I agree that both passions (except the passion of desire) and sensations move the will indirectly, but I maintain that Descartes can still distinguish these two by saying that passions are those which we feel that they are in the soul while sensations are those which we refer to external objects (AT XI 346–8/CSM I 337–8). Hoffman further argues that Descartes sometimes seems to equivocate between the passion of desire and volition (AT VIIIA 17/CSM I 204; AT XI 406–7/CSM I 365), which undermines the fundamental distinction between passion and volition in his metaphysics. On this point there might be a change in Descartes’ position between the Principles, where he takes desire to be volitional, and the Passions, where he is explicit that desire is a passion. I will discuss this shift further in Section 4.

34 He also points to the weakness of spirits: “weak spirits are liable to sin by excess … often pass very rapidly from extreme impiety to superstition, and then from superstition back to impiety, so that there is no vice or disorder of the mind of which they are not capable” (AT XI 456/CSM I 389).

35 For a discussion of this kind of case, see also Marion, Descartes’ Passive Thought, 224.

36 Our habit can play some role here, but the mere habit is not enough: if we otherwise have the desire to cancel our previous judgements, then we may be inclined to resist or stop persisting with our habit.

37 For a helpful discussion of these explanations, see Carriero, Between Two Worlds, 267.

38 See n. 33 for a discussion of this matter.

39 Parallel to his discussion of the desire to retain previous judgements, he also mentions childhood opinions as a factor that contribute to the occurrence of errors (AT VII 83/CSM II 57).