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ABSTRACT
At the turn of the twentieth century, Helm and Ostwald were the most prominent supporters of so-called ‘energetics’, which aimed to unify all physics by employing the sole concept of energy, without relying on mechanical models. This paper argues that Cassirer's interest in the history of the energy principle and the energetic controversy is entangled with the main themes of his philosophy of physics up to the 1920s: the opposition between the a priori and the a posteriori and the substance-concept and the function-concept. These interwoven motifs are not always easy to disentangle. The paper suggests that Cassirer's interpretation of the energy principle can serve as a guiding thread that runs through Cassirer's philosophy of physics up to the 1920s.
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No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes
1 Dühring, Kritische Geschichte; Helm, Lehre von der Energie; Mach, Die Geschichte; Planck, Das Princip.
2 See Hiebert, Historical Roots for a similar interpretation.
3 Joule, “On the Mechanical Equivalent of Heat.”.
4 A common analogy is climbing a mountain: the change in height from the base to the summit is independent of the path.
5 It is worth noting that Cassirer seems to miss Planck's point. For Planck (Das Princip, 244ff.) It was advantageous to treat energy as a substance in the case of electromagnetic phenomena, where a flux of energy (Poynting vector) analogous to the flow of a fluid is defined. However, as (Untersuchungen, note 31) objected, energy parcels lack individuality; thus, energy cannot be a substance. The Planck-Hertz debate may serve as a more subtle example of the dialectic between substance-concept and function-concept then the Ostwald-Helm controversy.
6 See also Cassirer, Gesammelte Werke, Vol. 4, Doc. I; fragment of 13/6/1922.