Systems integration theory and fundamentals

Figures & data

Figure 1. The number of internal and external integration failures are higher in the early implementation phase.

Figure 2. Safe integration influences the acceptance of new innovations or technologies.

Figure 3. Different levels of integration for passenger transport.

Figure 4. Three different views of the relationship between the human, the system under consideration and the environment. (a) Railway RAMS approach. (b) Systems engineering. (c) Safety management approach.

Figure 5. Three different views of the human, the technical system and the environment.

Figure 6. Six sides of the Safety Cube.

Figure 7. Visualisation of the Safety Cube: six fundamental aspects of safe integration are presented on the six faces of the Safety Cube for Human-System-Environment (HSE).

Table 1. The elements of the Safety Cube for safe integration.

	Human	System	Environment
Human	Users, direct/ indirect stakeholders, operators	Human input for the system, intended use or misuse scenarios	Human input for the environment or its system of systems, use or misuse scenarios
System	System inputs, functions, malfunctions, or services for human	System of interest, its structure, functions, procedures, etc.	System input for the environment, intended use or misuse scenarios
Environment	Environmental inputs, functions, malfunctions, or services for human	Environmental inputs, functions, malfunctions, or services for the system	Cooperating or competing systems, physical environment, policy, regulations

Table 2. The fundamental elements of integration across different disciplines.

Discipline	Human	Technology	Environment	References
Social science	Social	Technical	Environmental	(Collier, Lambert, & Linkov, 2018)
TOE framework	Organisational	Technical	Environmental	(Bosch-Rekveldt, Jongkind, Mooi, Bakker, & Verbraeck, 2011)
HSE framework	Human	System	Environment	(Rajablinejad, 2019a)
Systems engineering	Human	System of interest	Related environment	(ISO/IEC/IEEE, 2015)
Railways	Human	System under consideration	Environment	(EN., 2015)
Aviation	Liveware	Soft/hard ware	Environment	(ICAO, 2013)
Machinery	People	Product	Environment	(ISO, 2010)
Management science	Knowledge	Technical system	Managerial system	(Leonard-Barton, 1992)
Asset management	Staff	Assets	Infrastructure	(van Dongen, Frunt, & Rajabalinejad, 2019)

Figure 8. Visualisation of the Safety Cube for (a) the sociotechnical environment (TSE) and (b) assets, staff, infrastructure (ASI).

Table 3. The elements of a safety cube for the safe integration of bicycles.

	Human	System	Environment
Human	Cyclist, other road users, regulators, service providers	Traffic rules, quality & condition control, human-power input, steering	Driving culture of e-bikes, cars, motorcycles, or other road users
System	Safe, comfortable, economic, healthy, and enjoyable personal transport	Bicycle	Visibility in day light, night, or in rain
Environment	Traffic regulations, and traffic management system, climate requirements	Bicycle (or safe) path, spare parts, fallen trees, snow or ice on the path, fallen trees or bushes	Road, signs, curbs, markings, other road-vehicles, crossing, parking, climate, policy, regulations

Table 4. Grades of automation (GoA) in automatic train operation (ATO).

Grade of automation	Train control	Door handling	Stop	Train control in case of disruption
GoA 0
On-sight train operation	Driving without controlling the train	Train driver or train attendant	Train driver	Train driver
GoA 1
Manual train operation	Driving with train control	Train driver or train attendant	Train driver (eventually braking system)	Train driver
GoA 2
Semi-automatic train operation (STO)	Automatic control with train driver	Train driver or train attendant	Automatic	Train driver
GoA 3
Driverless train operation (DTO)	Automatic control without train driver	Train attendant	Automatic	Train attendant
GoA 4
Unattended train operation (UTO)	Automatic control without staff	Automatic	Automatic	Automatic

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