De-Stalinisation? Grassroots Responses to the XXth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in France's ‘Var rouge’

Abstract

The XXth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in February 1956 was one of the most extraordinary events in the history of the communist movement, taking the world by surprise by its ‘revolutionary’ content and non-confrontational overtones. The occasion served as a platform for Nikita Khrushchev's de-Stalinisation programme, which was to underpin fundamental reforms in Soviet domestic and foreign policy. Reactions to the Congress on the part of communists in the West have hitherto been analysed at macro levels, with focus on the strategic responses of political and geographical elites, whereas those of the largely ‘Stalinist’ party-base have been for all intents and purposes ignored. This article draws for the first time on the testimonies of 25 informants active in 1956 at all levels of the French Communist Party Var Federation to provide a grassroots perspective on the issues. It allows us to consider key questions from new angles and, as a result, to reconsider our overall interpretation of the ways in which ordinary communists responded to this pivotal event.

Le XX Congrès du Parti communiste de l'Union soviétique en février 1956 fut l'un des événements les plus extraordinaires de l'historie du mouvement communiste, en prenant le monde au dépourvu par son contenu ‘révolutionnaire’ et ses accents non conflictuels. L'occasion servit de tremplin pour le programme de déstalinisation de Nikita Khrouchtchev, une démarche qui devait étayer des reformes fondamentales dans la politique intérieure et étrangère de l'URSS. Les réactions au Congres de la part de communistes en dehors du bloc soviétique ont été analysées jusqu'à présent au niveau macro, en focalisant sur les réponses stratégiques des élites politiques et géographiques, tandis que celles de la base « stalinienne » du parti ont été pratiquement ignorées. Cet article exploite pour la première fois les témoignages de 25 informateurs actifs en 1956 à tous les niveaux de la Fédération du PCF du Var, pour en tirer une perspective de base sur les problématiques. L'article nous permet d'examiner les questions clés sous de nouveaux angles et, par conséquent, de revoir notre interprétation globale de la façon dont les communistes ordinaires ont répondu à cet événement-charnière.

Notes

^[1] In The French Communists: Profile of a People (1972, 357–364), Kreigel makes concessions to different dimensions of French communism, which did not, however, take away from the fundamental analysis.

^[2] The term Var rouge refers to the insurrection that took place in that department in defense of the Republic and against the coup d'état by Napoleon Bonaparte 3rd in 1851. The term ‘rouge’ in the French political context has its roots in references to socialist tendencies in the revolutions of 1848. General reference is also made to Le Midi rouge.

^[3] Police intelligence (Information) documents such as those emanating from the Ministère de l'Intérieur, Renseignements Généraux, Sûreté Nationale etc. have a relatively high level of credibility in the French historical context owing to their importance to national security and a widely shared commitment to the Republic that crossed political tendencies (Haig 2011, 89).

^[4] For an in-depth account of the methodological approaches used in this research including those of oral history, see Haig (2011, 51–71).

^[5] After the war Le Petit Varois la Marseillaise, published in Toulon, became the regional (departmental) edition of La Marseillaise, published in Marseille. Both were Communist Party organs.

^[6] The term intellectual here is used in its wider sense as used in France (and especially in this context at this time in order to distinguish between proletarian and non-proletarian elements) to include professionals and white-collar workers.

^[7] Bechet goes on to discuss the French communists' instinctive and unquestioning defense of the Republic during the Resistance in the Second World War, giving the lie to the accusations of treachery in connection to the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact in 1939; and as they would by not pressing home the advantage at the Liberation (in line with Moscow directives) to effect a communist insurrection.

^[8] The Poznan Riots in June had gone largely unnoticed in this community, both at the time and at the instatement of Gomulka that October, such was the marginalisation of these events by the PCF.

^[9] The Henri Martin affair played out in Toulon between March 1950 and September 1953. It was the first political trial relating to France's war in Indochina and the decision on the part of the French state to incarcerate the man who symbolised the fight against it became deeply significant, highly controversial and ultimately counter-productive. In response to his sentence, the PCFFV instigated the intensive and high-profile Libérez Henri Martin! campaign at local, regional and national levels. The affair contributed greatly to the radicalisation of a generation of post-war communists who had not participated personally or directly in the Resistance, and clearly not least in the case-community in question.

^[10] Palmiro Togliatti, however, realising that his strategy of avoidance had become untenable, broke his silence on the matter by giving a high-profile interview in the influential literary magazine Nuovi Argomenti on 17 June, in which he managed not only to cast much of the blame for the situation facing all communists at that point on the incumbent Soviet regime but shift the focus of attention away from awkward questions regarding his own party and towards his own political agenda of polycentrism.

^[11] The first position is based on an interpretation of the XXth Congress as having constituted a landmark on the road to social democracy and the second as having engendered a dangerous ideological backlash to Soviet orthodoxy, theoretical rigour and party discipline (Hirsh 1982, 84–86, 171–172; Dosse 1998, 158, 160–165).

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by The Economic and Social Research Council [grant number 1011646].