Climate adaptation management and institutional erosion: insights from a major Canadian port

Figures & data

Table 2. Summarised version of the analytical matrix.

No.	Principle	Evidence
(1)	Clearly defined boundaries	• Table 1 shows the scale hierarchy. Clear responsibilities for certain traditional infrastructure investments. • No national or regional organisation has responsibility for adaptation. • National guidance in place for port mitigation but not for adaptation. • Lack of clear staff responsibility for climate change adaptation at PMV.
(2)	Equal and fair (re-)distribution of risks, benefits and costs	• PMV is located in high risk area, therefore they are motivated to take action. • Terminal operators less motivated as they might not benefit due to time-limited concessions. • Federal and BC Provincial Governments funded flood management capital works, but municipalities had to pay for rights of way and maintenance. • Municipalities do not have sufficient funds to unlock the rest of the funds from the Federal and BC Provincial Governments. • Individuals and firms incentivised to focus on short-term strategy and certain rewards. • The main resource committed by all stakeholders is staff time.
(3)	Collective choice arrangements	• Non-profit charitable organisation takes the lead but cannot force compliance. • PMV focuses on regional collaboration due to limited resources. • PMV participated in two projects led by others and contributed some funding. • Short electoral cycles incentivise lack of development of new arrangements.
(4)	Monitoring and evaluation of the process	• PMV has only begun to give consideration to adaptation in last 2–3 years. Adaptation plan is still not developed. • No clear targets or monitoring in place at any level, therefore lack of urgency.
(5)	Conflict prevention and resolution mechanisms	• The established informal network is fragmented and each actor pursues their own interests rather than producing a single coherent vision. • Objectives and visions of different stakeholders are not synthesised. • This network-based voluntary approach fails to provide a resolution to the problem of uncertainty. • It is easy for all stakeholders to appear to agree as long as no responsibility or resource beyond staff time is needed, hence the inertia.
(6)	Nested enterprises/polycentric governance	• Table 1 shows the scale hierarchy. Clear responsibilities for certain tasks, but difficult to allocate formal responsibility for this new challenge, hence the growth of informal networks. • Emerging polycentric model impeded by path dependence of traditional federalist model. • Federalist governance works for traditional infrastructure planning, but not for this new challenge.
(7)	Robust and flexible process	• Scenarios seem broadly accepted, but this has not led to agreement of objectives or actions. • Focus on traditional plan of dike improvement, but no paradigm shift. • Private organisations can participate in the stakeholder engagement to be seen to be doing something without committing resources. • PMV is inexperienced at adaptation, therefore proceeding slowly.
(8)	Policy learning	• Table 1 shows the scale hierarchy. Fairly clear rules of the game in terms of traditional infrastructure investment, but this new challenge requires new rules so different actors are currently still jockeying for power. • The current equilibrium is a stalemate; it is not clear which actor has the incentive and ability to break it. • It is not so much the formal structures preventing policy innovation, but lack of incentive among actors due to strategic considerations and short-term thinking. The fact that it is a new challenge makes it easy for existing organisations to avoid responsibility.

Figure 1. Governance structure of port of Vancouver.

Table 1. Responsibility for climate adaption management at different institutional scales.

Hierarchy	Organisation(s)	Action(s)
National	Canadian Federal Government	Major capital investment in flood management works, but required local payment for rights of way and maintenance.
Provincial	BC Provincial Government	Major capital investment in flood management works, but required local payment for rights of way and maintenance. Conducted study and planning for dikes in the province. Funded the development of regional flood action plans.
Regional	Fraser Basin Council	Led “Lower mainland flood strategy” 2014.
Municipal	City of Vancouver	Led “Coastal flood risk project” 2012–2016.
		Recommended new Flood Construction Levels (FCLs)
Port authority	Port Metro Vancouver (PMV)	Participated in these two projects as a funding partner
Port terminals	Several private operators	No official contributions