Christian Democracy is Dead; Long Live the Union Parties: Explaining CDU/CSU Dominance within the German Party System

Abstract

Since 1949, the CDU/CSU has been the dominant party grouping in the German party system yet has rarely occupied the political centre ground, as represented by the so-called median legislator within the Bundestag. This article seeks to explain the paradox of how a right of centre party faction came to dominate what has historically been seen as a consensual and centrist party system by drawing upon the conceptual tools of (1) formal coalition theory and (2) the notions of path-dependence, rules, norms, beliefs and standard operating procedures. The article argues there is little reason to believe that the pattern of dominance established over the last six decades is in any immediate danger.

Notes

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