Making Democracy Work in a Federal System

Abstract

Elections shape the type of democracy. However, rules of elections, election behaviour, and consequences of elections are also affected by the institutions and patterns of democracy. In federal systems, elected governments exert divided powers or share powers, with significant consequences for the way democracy works. The effects of federal organisation on democracy are, however, unclear. Whereas research on federalism tends to suggest that both forms are complementary and mutually supportive, research on democracy points out negative implications of multilevel structures and interlocking politics. This article presents an analytical perspective and attempts to clarify under what conditions federalism and democracy are compatible or in conflict. Understanding these relations is essential to assess the relevance and effects of elections in federalism. In a comparative perspective, it also sheds light on the particular features of democracy and federalism in Germany.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

An earlier German version of this article was published in Politische Vierteljahres-schrift 50 (1). I thank the publisher for permitting the publication of a significantly revised English version. I also thank Erna Anderl-Fröhlich for translating the original version of the German text.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Arthur Benz is professor of political science at the Technische Universität Darmstadt, Germany. Multilevel governance and comparative federalism are at the centre his research. His recent publications include Federal Dynamics. Continuity, Change and the Varieties of Federalism Democracy (2013, ed. with Jörg Broschek) and Changing Federal Constitutions. Lessons from International Comparison (2012, ed. with Felix Knüpling). In several articles, published, for example, in Publius, West European Politics, Regional and Federal Studies and German Politics, he has contributed to empirical and theoretical research on effectiveness and legitimacy in federal states and European multilevel governance.

Notes

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5. Ibid., pp.208–9.

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24. For a more detailed reasoning: Benz, Politik in Mehrebenensystemen, pp.210–29.

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29. In particular: Breton, Competitive Governments.

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31. Benz, Politik in Mehrebenensystemen, p.89.

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34. Salmon, ‘Decentralisation as an Incentive Scheme’, p.32.

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38. See also Richard Simeon, Federal-Provincial Diplomacy. The Making of Recent Policy in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2006), pp.228–55; Jörg Broschek, Der kanadische Föderalismus. Eine historisch-institutionalistische Analyse (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2009); Thomas O. Hueglin, ‘Federalism and Democracy: A Critical Reassessment’, in G. Skogstad et al. (eds), The Global Promise of Federalism (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2013), pp.17–42.

39. Simone Burkhart, Blockierte Politik. Ursachen und Folgen von ‘Divided Government’ in Deutschland (Frankfurt a.M./New York: Campus, 2008), pp.127–60.

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41. Kerstin Völkl, Reine Landtagswahlen oder regionale Bundestagswahlen? Eine Untersuchung des Abstimmungsverhaltens bei Landtagswahlen 1990–2006 (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2009).

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43. Manfred G. Schmidt, ‘Germany: The Grand Coalition State’, in J.M. Colomar (ed.), Political Institutions in Europe (London: Routledge, 1996), pp.62–98.