Party Positions about European Integration in Germany: An Electoral Quandary?

Abstract

Given the rise of EU-scepticism in Germany and elsewhere, spatial models suggest that the SPD and the CDU/CSU have incentives to move towards a more critical position about integration. However, mainstream parties have developed a pro-integration reputation over several decades so it is difficult for them to adopt a stance reflecting outright opposition to Europe's integration. A comparison of party positions in 2008 and 2013 shows that the SPD hardly changed its policy stances on EU issues, whereas the CDU/CSU moved noticeably to a more EU-critical stance. However, situating German parties within the West European universe of party families shows that both remain quite positive about integration. The upshot of this is to illustrate the ‘blind corner’ of party representation on integration issues in the German party system which created electoral opportunities for the Euro-sceptic AfD.

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Robert Rohrschneider is Sir Robert Worcester Professor of Public Opinion and Survey Research at the University of Kansas. He is interested in comparative public opinion, political parties and democratic representation in West and Central-Eastern Europe. His monographs include Learning Democracy: Democratic and Economic Values in Unified Germany (Oxford University Press, 1999), which won the ECPR's 1998 Stein Rokkan prize; and, with Stephen Whitefield, The Strain of Representation: How Parties Represent Diverse Voters in Western and Eastern Europe (Oxford University Press, 2012).

Stephen Whitefield is a Professor of Politics in the Department of Politics and International Relations, and Rhodes-Pelczynski Fellow in Politics in Pembroke College, University of Oxford. His research has focused on public opinion in post-Communist Europe and, with Robert Rohrschneider, on party competition across Europe as a whole.

Notes

1 A. Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper & Row, 1957); A. Westholm, ‘Distance versus Direction: The Illusory Defeat of the Proximithy Theory of Electoral Choice’, American Political Science Review 91 (1997), pp.865–83.

2 L. Hooghe and G. Marks, ‘A Postfunctionlist Theory of European Integration: From Permissive Consensus to Constraining Dissensus’, British Journal of Political Science 39 (2008), pp.1–23; L.N. Lindberg and S.A. Scheingold (eds), Regional Integration: Theory and Research (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970).

3 W.E. Paterson, ‘Does Germany Still Have a European Vocation?’, German Politics 19/1 (2010), pp.41–52.

4 For a detailed discussion of the expert surveys conducted in 27 European countries, see Robert Rohrschneider and Stephen Whitefield, The Strain of Representation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).

5 Hooghe and Marks, ‘A Postfunctionlist Theory’.

6 M. Maier et al., ‘The Impact of Identity and Economic Cues on Citizens’ EU Support: An Experimental Study on the Effects of Party Communication in the Run-Up to the 2009 European Parliament Elections’, European Union Politics 13/4 (2012), pp.580–603; M. Marsh, ‘European Parliament Elections and Losses by Governing Parties’, in W. Van der Brug and C. v. d. Eijk (eds), European Elections and Domestic Politics (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame, 2005), pp.51–72.

7 See, for example, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Stability_Mechanism (accessed 30 June 2015) which shows that Germany committed over 190 billion Euros to the European Stability Mechanism. As a reference point, this is over half of its 2015 annual budget.

8 F. Roth et al., ‘Crisis and Trust in National and European Union Institutions – Panel Evidence for the EU, 1999–2012’, RSCAS Working Papers (Florence: European University Institute, 2013), 2013/31.

9 M.M. Bechtel et al., ‘Preferences for International Redistribution: The Divide over the Eurozone Bailouts’, American Journal of Political Science 58/4 (2014), pp.835–56.

10 This discussion relies on the theoretical account developed in Robert Rohrschneider and Stephen Whitefield, ‘Responding to Growing European Union-Skepticism? The Stances of Political Parties toward European Integration in Western and Eastern Europe Following the Financial Crisis’, European Union Politics 17/1 (2016), pp.138–61.

11 A. Wimmel and E.E. Edwards, ‘The Return of “Social Europe”: Ideas and Positions of German Parties towards the Future of European Integration’, German Politics 20/2 (2011), pp.293–314.

12 F.U. Pappi and P.W. Thurner, ‘Die deutschen Waehler und der Euro: Auswirkungen auf die Bundestagswahl 1998’, Politische Vierteljahresschrift 41/3 (2000), pp.435–65; W.E. Paterson, ‘Does Germany Still Have a European Vocation?’, German Politics 19/1 (2010), pp.41–52.

13 I. Budge, ‘A New Spatial Theory of Party Competition: Uncertainty, Ideology and Policy Equilibria Viewed Comparatively and Temporally’, British Journal of Political Science 24/4 (1994), pp.443–67.

14 P. Doerschler and L.A. Banaszak, ‘Voter Support for the German PDS over Time: Dissatisfaction, Ideology, Losers, and East Identity’, Electoral Studies 87/2 (2007), pp.359–70; M.I. Vail and B. Bowyer, ‘Poverty and Parisanship: Social and Economic Sources of Support for the Far Left in Contemporary Germany’, Comparative European Politics 10/4 (2012), pp.505–24.

15 M. Wagner, ‘Defining and Measuring Niche Parties’, Party Politics 18/6 (2012), pp.845–64; J. Rovny, ‘Who Emphasizes and Who Blurs? Party Strategies in Multidimensional Competition’, European Union Politics 13/2 (2012), pp.269–92.

16 N. Berbuir, M. Lewandowsky and J. Siri, ‘The AfD and Its Sympathisers: Finally a Right-Wing Populist Movement in Germany?’, German Politics 24/2 (2015), pp.154–78.

17 F.U. Pappi, ‘Sozialstruktur, gesellschaftliche Wertorientierungen und Wahlabsicht. Ergebnisse eines Zeitvergleichs des deutschen Elektorats 1953 und 1976’, Politische Vierteljahresschrift 18 (1977), pp.195–229; M. Debus and J. Müller, ‘The Programmatic Development of CDU and CSU since Reunification: Incentives and Constraints for Changing Policy Positions in the German Multi-Level System’, German Politics 22/1–2 (2013), pp.151–71.

18 S. Roβteutscher, ‘Die konfessionell-religiöse, Konfliktlinie zwischen Säkularisierung und Mobilisierung’, in R. Schmitt-Beck (ed.), Wählen in Deutschland (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2012), pp.111–33.

19 W. Müller and M. Klein, ‘Die Klassenbasis in der Parteipräferenz des deutschen Wählers. Erosion oder Wandel?’, in Schmitt-Beck (ed.), Wählen in Deutschland, pp.85–110; F.U. Pappi and J. Brandenburg, ‘Die Politikvorschlaege der Bundestagsparteien aus Wählersicht: Zur Konstruierbarkeit von Politikräumen für das deutsche Parteiensystem’, in Schmitt-Beck (ed.), Wählen in Deutschland, pp.276–301.

20 W. v. d. Brug and J. v. Spanje, ‘Immigration, Europe, and the Cultural Dimension’, European Journal of Political Research 48 (2009), pp.309–34; H. Kriesi, ‘The Role of European Integration in National Election Campaigns’, European Union Politics 8/1 (2007), pp.83–108.

21 The expert survey was conducted by the authors in 2007/08 and repeated in 2013 with an identical questionnaire in 24 European democracies for about 200 parties. Experts were chosen on the basis of their prior publication record which stipulated that they had to have published a book or article on their party system in the past 10 years. We aimed to have 10 completed questionnaires per country; a goal we met for Germany at both time points. See Rohrschneider and Whitefield, Strain of Representation and the appendix for a description of the study.

22 For West European parties in our data (N = 108), alpha = .90.

23 J. Thomassen, ‘The Blind Corner of Political Representation’, Representation 41/1 (2012), pp.13–27.

24 A. Wimmel and E.E. Edwards, ‘The Return of “Social Europe”: Ideas and Positions of German Parties towards the Future of European Integration’, German Politics 20/2 (2011), pp.293–314.

25 Of course, it may be that it has moved more on domestic divisions given that Europe's integration does not constitute the most important cleavage. Additional analyses, however, indicate that the SPD has not changed its domestic issue stances by much either.