Reflective, Hegemonic, Geo-economic, Civilian … ? The Puzzle of German Power^†

† This paper is an output of the project ‘Germany’s Eastern Challenge: A “Hybrid Ostpolitik” in the Making?’ of the Institute of International Relations Prague and it was supported from the institutional funding provided by the Government of the Czech Republic.

Abstract

Can German foreign policy still be understood as one approximating the foreign policy of an ideal type of civilian power? This article discusses recent efforts to offer alternative characterisations, such as ‘reflective’, ‘shaping’, or ‘geo-economic’ power and concludes that ‘civilian power’ may still offer the best fit to understand German foreign policy. Its problem may not consist so much in a shift towards a different trajectory and destination but the hollowing out of its existing foreign policy role concept.

DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Prof. Dr. Hanns W. Maull is Senior Distinguished Fellow at the German Institute for Foreign and Security Affairs, Senior Policy Fellow at the Mercator Institute for China Studies, and Adjunct Professor for International Relations and Strategic Studies at the Johns Hopkins University School for Advanced International Studies Europe.

Notes

† This paper is an output of the project ‘Germany’s Eastern Challenge: A “Hybrid Ostpolitik” in the Making?’ of the Institute of International Relations Prague and it was supported from the institutional funding provided by the Government of the Czech Republic.

1 Max Weber defined power as the ability to get what one wants and control the behaviour of others against opposition and obstacles. See Max Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, Grundriss der verstehenden Soziologie (Frankfurt/M.: Zweitausendeins, 1921/2008), p.38. This definition, interestingly, assumes resistance by the object of the exercise of power: not a very ‘soft’ definition of power!

2 Hans-Peter Schwarz, Die gezähmten Deutschen, Von der Machtbesessenheit zur Machtvergessenheit (Stuttgart: Dt. Verlagsanstalt, 1985).

3 Ulrich Roos has already shown the importance of that concept in government discourses on German foreign policy during the 1990s. See Ulrich Roos, Deutsche Außenpolitik: Eine Rekonstruktion der grundlegenden Handlungsregeln (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag, 2010), pp.169–76.

4 For two comprehensive recent surveys of the concept see Hanns W. Maull, ‘From “Civilian Power” to “Trading State”?’, in Sarah Colvin (ed.), Routledge Handbook of German Politics and Culture (Abingdon: Routledge, 2014), pp.409–24, and Hanns W. Maull, ‚‘“Zivilmacht”, Ursprünge und Entwicklungspfade eines umstrittenen Konzeptes’, in Sebastian Harnisch and Joachim Schild (eds), Deutsche Außenpolitik und internationale Führung, Ressourcen, Praktiken und Politiken in einer veränderten Europäischen Union (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2014), pp.121–47.

5 Hanns W. Maull, ‘Deutsche Außenpolitik: Verantwortung und Macht’, Zeitschrift für Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik 8/1 (2015), pp.213–37.

6 At the time when this article was finalised (Jan. 2018), the CDU/CSU/SPD government formed by Angela Merkel in 2013 was still in office in a caretaker function; negotiations were ongoing to form a new government after the September 2017 elections.

7 See Deutschlands Zukunft gestalten, Koalitionsvertrag zwischen CDU, CSU und SPD, 18. Legislaturperiode (CDU/CSU/SPD Coalition Treaty, 27 Nov. 2013).

8 See the famous, clearly co-ordinated contributions to the Munich Security Conference 2014 by President Joachim Gauck, Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier and Defence Minister Ursula von der Leyen. President Joachim Gauck, ‘Germany’s Role in the World: Reflections on Responsibility, Norms and Alliances’, Statement at the ‘Munich Security Conference’, Munich, 31 Jan. 2014; Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier’s Statement at the ‘Munich Security Conference’, Munich, 1 Feb. 2014; Defence Minister Ursula von der Leyen’s Statement at the ‘Munich Security Conference’, Munich, 31 Jan. 2014; available from https://www.securityconference.de/en/activities/munich-security-conference/msc-2014/speeches/ (accessed 15 Sept. 2016).

9 See, for example, Adrian Hyde-Price, ‘The “Sleep-walking Giant” Awakes: Resetting German Foreign and Security Policy’, European Security 24/4 (2015), pp.600–616; Elizabeth Pond, ‘Germany’s Real Role in the Ukraine Crisis’, Foreign Affairs 94/2 (March 2015), pp.173–6; Hans Kundnani, ‘Kundnani Replies’, Foreign Affairs 94/2 (March 2015), pp.176–7; Liana Fix, ‘Leadership in the Ukraine Conflict: A German Moment’, in Niklas Helwig (ed.), Europe’s New Political Engine, Germany’s Role in the EU’s Foreign and Security Policy (Helsinki: The Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 2016), pp.111–31; Matthias Matthijs, ‘The Three Faces of German Leadership’, Survival 58/2 (April–May 2016), pp.135–54.

10 Maull, ‘From “Civilian Power” to “Trading State”?’.

11 For general background on role theory see Sebastian Harnisch, Cornelia Frank and Hanns W. Maull (eds), Role Theory in International Relations, Approaches and Analyses (Abingdon: Routledge, 2011).

12 William E. Paterson, ‘The Reluctant Hegemon? Germany Moves Centre Stage in the European Union’, Journal of Common Market Studies 49 (2011), pp.57–75. The Economist later took this phrase up in a cover story, see ‘Germany and Europe: The Reluctant Hegemon’, The Economist, 15 June 2013, available from http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21579456-if-europes-economies-are-recover-germany-must-start-lead-reluctant-hegemon (accessed 16 Sept. 2016).

13 Martin Sandbu, Europe’s Orphan, The Future of the Euro and the Politics of Debt (Princeton , NJ: Princeton University Press, 2015), Ch.3 and passim; Joseph E. Stieglitz, The Euro and its Threat to the Future of Europe (London: Allen Lane, 2016).

14 Siegfried Schieder, ‘Führung und Solidarität in der deutschen Europapolitik’, in Sebastian Harnisch and Joachim Schild (eds), Deutsche Außenpolitik und internationale Führung, Ressourcen, Praktiken und Politiken in einer veränderten Europäischen Union (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2014), pp.56–9.

15 Mark Landler, ‘Trump, the Insurgent, Breaks with 70 Years of American Foreign Policy’, The New York Times, 28 Dec. 2017.

16 Hans Kundnani, The United States in German Foreign Policy (GMF Policy), Essay No. 119, 14 April 2016.

17 Dietmar Bartsch, ‘Mehr Waffen gleich mehr Sicherheit” ist ein Trugschluss’, The European, 5 Aug. 2017, available from http://www.theeuropean.de/dietmar-bartsch/12574-statt-hohem-ruestungsetat-mehr-entwicklungshilfe (accessed 2 Jan. 2018).

18 Bastian Giegerich and Christoph Schwegmann, ‘Sustaining Europe’s Security’, Survival 56/4 (Aug./Sept. 2014), pp.39–50.

19 See also Paterson, ‘The Reluctant Hegemon?’

20 Koalitionsvertrag (CDU/CSU/SPD Coalition Treaty, 2013).

21 This qualification reflects the fact that this is an article by the foreign minister, not by the German government. Even with Minister Steinmeier, German foreign policy is ultimately shaped by the chancellor, and Angela Merkel might interpret Germany’s foreign policy role concept somewhat differently. This applies to the fine print, however, not to the basic orientations laid down in this essay.

22 Frank-Walter Steinmeier, ‘Germany’s New Global Role – Berlin Steps Up’, Foreign Affairs 95/4 (July/Aug. 2016), available from http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/DE/Infoservice/Presse/Interviews/2016/160615_BM_ForeignAffairs.html?n (accessed 19 Sept. 2016).

23 Ibid.

24 Hanns W. Maull, ‘From “Civilian Power” to “Trading State”?’, pp.409–24.

25 Steinmeier, ‘Germany’s New Global Role’.

26 Ibid.

27 Ibid.

28 Ibid.

29 Ibid.

30 Wolfgang Hager, ‘Germany as an Extraordinary Trader’, in Wilfried Kohl and Giorgio Basevi (eds), West Germany – A European and Global Power (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1980), pp.3–43; Michael Staack, Handelsstaat Deutschland, Deutsche Außenpolitik in einem neuen internationalen System (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2000).

31 Constanze Stelzenmüller, ‘Germany, Between Power and Responsibility’, in William A Hitchcock, Melvyn Leffler and Jeffrey A. Legro (eds), Shaper Nations: Strategies for a Changing World (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2016), pp.53–69 (Ch.3). Constanze Stelzenmüller was one of the lead authors in the influential report Germany: New Power, New Responsibilities. See Constanze Stelzenmüller, New Power, New Responsibility: Elements of a German Foreign and Security Policy for a Changing World (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP)/German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF), Berlin: SWP/GMF, 2013), available from http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/projekt_papiere/GermanForeignSecurityPolicy_SWP_GMF_2013.pdf (accessed 16 September 2016).

32 Adrian Hyde-Price, ‘The “Sleep-walking Giant” Awakes’.

33 See Shaping Globalization – Expanding Partnerships – Sharing Responsibility, A Strategy Paper by the German Government (Berlin: Die Bundesregierung, 2012), available from https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/blob/610644/49a58b5ecfd5a78862b051d94465afb6/gestaltungsmaechtekonzept-engl-data.pdf (accessed 16 Sept. 2016); Auswärtiges Amt, Review 2014, Crisis – Order – Europe (final report), (Berlin: Die Bundesregierung, AA 2015), available from http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/cae/servlet/contentblob/699442/publicationFile/202986/Schlussbericht.pdf (accessed 16 Sept. 2016).

34 Karl W. Deutsch made this subtle but important point: Karl W. Deutsch, Analyse internationaler Beziehungen, Konzeptionen und Probleme der Friedensforschung (Frankfurt/M.: Europäische Verlagsanstalt, 1968), p.40.

35 On the alleged powerlessness of Germany before unification, it is worth remembering that the epic foreign policy battles between Helmut Schmidt and Jimmy Carter (that Carter in his memoirs described as some of the most unpleasant discussions he ever had as president with a foreign leader) also took place in that period of West German foreign policy ‘under occupation’.

36 Edward N. Luttwak, ‘Towards Post-Heroic Warfare, The Obsolescence of Total War’, Foreign Affairs 74/3 (May/June 1995), pp.109–22.

37 Robert Kagan, Macht und Ohnmacht: Amerika und Europa in der neuen Weltordnung (Berlin: Siedler, 2003) (original title: Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order (New York: Knopf, 2003)). The argument appeared originally in an essay: Robert Kagan, ‘Power and Weakness’, Policy Review No. 113 (June/July 2002), available from http://www.ies.be/files/documents/JMCdepository/Robert%20Kagan%2C%20Power%20and%20Weakness%2C%20Policy%20Review%2C%20No.%20113.pdf (accessed 15 Sept. 2016).

38 James Sheehan, The Monopoly of Violence: Why Europeans Hate Going to War (London: Faber & Faber, 2007).

39 See Bagehot, ‘Syria Will Not Fight’, The Economist, 30 Aug. 2013, available from http://www.economist.com/blogs/blighty/2013/08/intervention-syria (accessed 15 Sept. 2016).

40 See ‘The President’s Thankless Burden: The More François Hollande Does on the World Stage, the Less He Excites His Voters’, The Economist, 25 July 2015, available from http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21659742-more-fran-ois-hollande-does-world-stage-less-he-excites-his-voters-presidents (accessed 15 Sept. 2016).

41 The definitive study on this is still Nina Philippi, Bundeswehr-Auslandseinsätze als außen- und sicherheitspolitisches Problem des geeinten Deutschland (Frankfurt/M.: Lang, 1996).

42 Ulf von Krause, Die Afghanistaneinsätze der Bundeswehr, Politischer Entscheidungsprozess mit Eskalationsdynamik (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2011).

43 Richard Rosecrance, The Rise of the Trading State: Commerce and Conquest in the Modern World (New York: Basic Books, 1986).

44 Edward N. Luttwak, ‘From Geopolitics to Geo-Ecoomics: Logic of Conflict, Grammar of Commerce’, The National Interest 20 (1990), pp.17–23.

45 Hans Kundnani, ‘Business, As Usual’, Berlin Policy Journal (May/June 2016), available from http://berlinpolicyjournal.com/business-as-usual/ (accessed 16 Sept. 2016).

46 Stephen F. Szabo, Germany, Russia and the Rise of Geo-Economics (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2015).

47 William E. Paterson, ‘Does Germany Still Have a European Vocation?’, German Politics 19/1 (March 2010), pp.41–52.

48 In fact, he flatly predicts: ‘Defence spending will not be increased’. Stephen F. Szabo, ‘Germany’s Commercial Realism and the Russia Problem’, Survival 56/5 (Oct./Nov. 2014), p.120.

49 Kenneth Dyson, States, Debt, and Power: ‘Saints’ and ‘Sinners’ in History and European Integration (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), p.630.

50 See the analysis in the following authoritative accounts of the Eurocrisis: Dyson, States, Debt, and Power, pp.622–30; Sandbu, Europe’s Orphan, pp.48–79.

51 The use of financial incentives has often been derided as ‘chequebook diplomacy’. For a spirited defence of this form of West German diplomacy, see Amit Das Gupta, ‘Lob der Schwäche – heroische Rhetorik zum Untergang der Scheckbuchdiplomatie’, in Duitsland Instituut Universiteit van Amsterdam (ed.), Forschungsberichte 1/1 (2004), pp.40–48. One important early example for this approach was the Hallstein doctrine that threatened states (mostly those in the Third World) that would recognise the GDR with the cessation of diplomatic relations and the loss of development aid.

52 See Harald Müller, ‘Diplomatie als Instrument der deutschen Außenpolitik’, Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte 66/28–9 (11 July 2016), pp.26–31.

53 Two classic yet still highly relevant studies on economic statecraft are Klaus Knorr, The Power of Nations: The Political Economy of International Relations (New York: Basic Books, 1975), and David A. Baldwin, Economic Statecraft (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985).

54 See Hanns W. Maull, ‘Deutschland als Zivilmacht’, in Siegmar Schmidt, Gunther Hellmann and Reinhard Wolf (eds), Handbuch zur deutschen Außenpolitik (Opladen: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2007), pp.73–84.

55 Dieter Senghaas, Abschreckung und Frieden: Studien zur Kritik organisierter Friedlosigkeit (Frankfurt/M.: Europ. Verlagsanstalt, 1969), p.176.

56 To construct the use of this metaphor as an implicit discrimination against people suffering from the psychological condition of autism is therefore in my view misleading and, in the final analysis, corrosive to the process of scientific inquiry. There may be good reasons for objecting to the use of this metaphor in the context of comparative foreign policy analysis, but this is not one of them. See Stephen Michael Christian, ‘Autism in International Relations, A Critical Assessment of International Relations’ Autism Metaphors’, European Journal of International Relations (17 March 2017), available from https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066117698030 (accessed 2 Jan. 2018).

57 Hanns W. Maull, ‘Deutsche Außenpolitik: Orientierungslos’, Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft 21/1 (2011), pp.95–120.

58 See Sebastian Harnisch, Internationale Politik und Verfassung. Zur Domestizierung des sicherheits- und europapolitischen Prozesses der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 2006).

59 See the Review 2014 website, available from http://www.aussenpolitik-weiter-denken.de/de/themen.html (accessed 16 Sept. 2016).

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by the Institute of International Relations Prague.