The Austrian-German Relationship in EMU Reform: From Asymmetric Partnership to Increased Independence

Figures & data

Figure 1. Attachment to the EU in Austria and Germany 2002–2019.

Source: Eurobarometer, own calculation and presentation.

Figure 2. Unemployment in Austria, Germany and the Euro area, 2008–2019.

Source: Eurostat, own presentation.

Table 1. Summary of findings.

	Convergence / Divergence of Preferences between Austria and Germany	Austrian Strategy and Interaction with Germany	Explanation	Evidence Confirming / Disconfirming Propositions
Fiscal Integration and Governance	Preferences largely aligned throughout the fast-burning crisis period (2010–2012)	Fence-sitting: no explicit strategy needed given shared preferences	Both countries are ‘creditor states’ and profit from status quo in EMU; Austria can thus free ride on Germany’s negotiation efforts	Confirms expectation 1
	After Meseberg (2018), Germany deviates slightly from the common opposition to fiscal capacity-building in EMU	‘Soft’ foot-dragging: Going public, arguing, framing (but no counter-coalition building)	Diverging preferences, but constant asymmetry in power and thick institutional fabric Previous fence-sitting challenged by increasingly constraining dissensus in Austria	Confirms expectations1 and 2
	After the outbreak of the Corona crisis (2020), Germany deviates significantly from the common position to fiscal capacity-building in EMU	Foot-dragging: Active counter-coalition building, going public, arguing, framing	Diverging preferences, domestic politics	Confirms expectation 1; disconfirms expectation 3
Financial Integration and Supervision	First, similar positions against the centralisation of financial governance; in the slow-burning crisis period (2012–2015), Austria deviated towards a more moderate position (e.g. on banking supervision)	Fence-sitting and ‘light’ co-shaping through arguing (and minor instances of ‘public shaming’)	Preferences correspond with structure and size of national banking sector	Confirms expectations 2 and 3
	Germany opposes centralised risk-sharing in financial governance, esp. EDIS Austria advances proposals despite German resistance	Co-shaping: Acting as a broker, arguing	Preferences correspond with interests of national banking sector	Confirms expectations 1 and 2; partly disconfirms expectation 3