Advocating for animals equally from within a liberal paradigm

Abstract

Orthodox liberal thought rejects the notion that (some) non-human animals should be allocated justice on the same basis as humans. Extending human protection to animals would break down the human/animal divide. It would also have the effect of rendering many current animal uses morally illegitimate. However, the application of one set of standards to humans and another to animals is not the only way in which current animal protection trends harm animals. Even within the group ‘non-human animal’, different standards are applied. Inconsistencies mean that animal protection legislation safeguards some animals more strongly than others. Given that, this article asserts that if animal protection theorists wish to advocate positively on behalf of animals, without offending those who subscribe to a mainstream liberal point of view, a way forward is to address inconsistencies between different types of animals, and not challenge inconsistencies between humans and animals.

Notes

1. For examples, see Garner (2003).

2. Many liberal philosophers agree that the way animals are treated is a moral issue, despite the unwillingness of such philosophers to include animals when considering rights or matters of justice (Midgley, 1983: 47). Also see Nozick (1997: ch. 18).

3. For a discussion of the psychological basis of the human preference for the human species, see Midgley (1983).

4. Peter Singer's moral philosophy also relies heavily on the assertion that the moral consideration afforded humans should be expanded to include some animals. For example, see Singer (1995).

5. The term ‘speciesism’ was coined by Richard D. Ryder who argued that ‘species alone is not a valid criterion for cruel discrimination’ (Ryder, 1989: 6–7).

6. Rawls' position on this matter appears to have changed over time. For a discussion of how Rawls addressed the issue of marginal humans, see Garner (2005).

7. For a discussion of some of the legal implications of the external inconsistency, see Francione (1996) and Wise (2000).

8. For details of the manner in which battery hens are farmed, see Mason and Singer (1990).

9. For an argument by an animal researcher that the welfare standards for researchers are too high in relation to pig farmers, see Hellekant (2006).

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Siobhan O'Sullivan

I would like to thank Dr. Lyn Carson for her support and comments. I would also like to thank Len Cantrill, Kathy O'Sullivan, Dan O'Sullivan, Julie Carlill, Claire O'Rourke and the anonymous referees for their insightful comments.