Why populism may facilitate non-state actors’ access to international environmental institutions

Figures & data

Table 1. Descriptive statistics.

	Obs.	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Non-State Access	408	0.353	0.478	0	1
Populism Score	408	0.257	0.178	0.034	0.993
GDP	408	1.914	1.946	−3.675	6.384
GDP per capita	408	0.744	1.139	−2.613	2.477
Polity Score	408	6.765	5.274	−10	10
Trade Openness	408	−0.929	0.791	−3.262	1.551
Pollution	408	0.181	0.386	0	1

Figure 1. Substantive effects of populism score.

Notes. Graph displays predicted probabilities of Non-State Access (based on Model 3). The dashed lines are 90% confidence intervals.

Figure 2. Simulated predicted probabilities.

Notes. Graph displays distribution of simulated predicted probabilities of Non-State Access (N = 1,000 simulations). Horizontal bars capture simulated probabilities’ point estimates and 90% confidence intervals. Values are calculated for Model 3 while holding all other covariates constant at medians.

Figure 3. First difference estimates.

Notes. Graph displays first differences and 90% confidence intervals. Calculations based on Model 3 and done when changing a variable from its 25^th percentile to its 75^th percentile (minimum to maximum for Pollution). All other variables held constant at medians. First difference of 0 marked by red vertical line.

Table 2. Institutionalized non-state actors’ access to IEAs and populism.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Populism Score	1.375**		1.235**
	(0.606)		(0.626)
GDP		−0.150*	−0.149**
		(0.077)	(0.076)
GDP per capita		0.068	0.099
		(0.158)	(0.156)
Polity Score		0.025	0.015
		(0.024)	(0.024)
Trade Openness		−0.336*	−0.260
		(0.174)	(0.170)
Pollution		0.446	0.486*
		(0.293)	(0.296)
Constant	−0.966***	−0.943***	−1.162***
	(0.171)	(0.293)	(0.257)
Observations	408	408	408
Log Pseudolikelihood	−262.042	−260.329	−258.310
Prob > χ^2	0.023	0.106	0.011

Table entries are coefficients; robust standard errors clustered at the country level in parentheses.

* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 (two-tailed).