Incentives for Democratisation? Effects of EU Conditionality on Democracy in Bosnia & Hercegovina

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Notes

On effectiveness of conditionality see: Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2005), Schimmelfenning (2008), Kubicek (2003), Grabbe (2006), Kelley (2004), Haughton (2007) and Hughes et al. (2004).

On state-building processes and problems in Bosnia see: Bieber (2006), Chandler (1999, 2006) and Gromes (2007).

Using entity veto right instead of constitutionally foreseen protection of vital national interest has become a more effective tool in blocking decisions at the state level and the legislative procedure on the state level by entity politicians. This is due to the fact that entity veto is not subject to constitutional court scrutiny.

‘Sarkozy: No Enlargement Without Lisbon’, B92, 1 July 2008, available at: http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics-article.php?yyyy=2008&mm=07&dd=01&nav_id=51533, last accessed 23 March 2010; ‘EU must Consolidate before Further Enlargement’, euobserver, 17 March 2009, available at: http://euobserver.com/9/27784, last accessed 23 March 2010.

These non-democratic ‘reserved domains’ obtain their strength thanks to historical and symbolic references to the ‘national question’ and thereby hinder the further development of democracy itself (Pavlović & Antonić 2007). Well-known examples of the effects of ‘reserved domains’ are the demonstrations in Croatia against the arrest for war crimes of Ante Gotovina, a former Lieutenant General in the Croatian Army, and the harsh public reaction in Serbia and the Republika Srpska (RS) after Kosovo declared independence. Other kinds of ‘reserved domains’ are certain areas of political institutions such as parts of the security forces in the police or in the army not fully controlled by the elected government. The best-known example is the Serbian police's long-term, apparent unwillingness to actively seek out and arrest the indicted war criminal Radovan Karadžić, regardless of the fact that his arrest was a precondition for further integration of Serbia into the European Union.

See also Schimmelfennig (2008, p. 32) who shows this using the examples of Croatia and Turkey.

‘Situacija nakon izbora u BiH promijeniće se’, Radio Slobodna Evropa, 13 November 2010, available at: http://www.slobodnaevropa.org/content/intervju_asim_mujkic_bih_politika/2218660.html, last accessed 13 November 2010.

‘Stranke RS nezadovoljne Inckovom odlukom’, Radio Slobodna Evropa, 20 June 2009, available at: http://www.slobodnaevropa.org/content/inckoreakcije/1758882.html, last accessed 8 August 2011.

The interethnic stability index is part of the periodic UNDP Early Warning System, based on a public survey on social distance between ethnic groups in BiH as well as the analysis of political, social and economic developments in the country.

‘O ustavnim promjenama ispočetka’, Radio Slobodna Evropa, 2 August 2007, available at: http://www.danas.org/content/article/1188455.html, accessed 23 March 2010.

Although a specific state structure cannot be a prerequisite of joining the EU, a future member state must be able—at the state level—to develop a position on how to implement the acquis communitaire, to mediate between the entities and monitor the implementation of the acquis communitaire. In the wording of the 2009 Conclusion of the Progress Reports on Bosnia and Herzegovina: ‘The reform of Bosnia and Herzegovina's constitutional framework to permit its institutions to function effectively is necessary before the Commission can recommend the granting of candidate status’ (European Commission 2009).

‘Inzko says BiH's Prud Process Basically Dead’, SETimes, 20 July 2009, available at: http://www.setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en_GB/newsbriefs/setimes/newsbriefs/2009/07/20/nb-06, accessed 4 August 2011.

Survey Data Gallup for 2010, available at: http://www.balkan-monitor.eu/index.php/dashboard, last accessed 23 November 2010.

With regard to the state-level institutions, the UNDP Early Warning System provides data on the approval of the BiH Presidency, the State Parliament as well as the Council of Ministers. In Figure 1 the data on the approval of the Council of Ministers are used, due to the CoM's role as the executive branch, however data on the other institutions indicate the same trend with almost equal approval rates.

On 26 February 2007, the International Court of Justice ruled in case 91, Bosnia & Hercegovina against Serbia and Montenegro on the Application of the Convention of the Prevention and Punishment against the Crime of Genocide, that genocide had taken place at the Srebrenica massacre during the war in Bosnia & Hercegovina. The court, however, did not find evidence of the intentional destruction of an ethnic, national, religious or racial group during the whole course of the war, from 1992 to 1995.

Survey Data Gallup, available at: http://www.balkan-monitor.eu/index.php/dashboard, accessed 24 March 2010.

Danas, 12 October 2009.

While Croatian membership negotiations were concluded in June 2011 and it is set to become the latest member of the EU in 2013, Serbia plans to request full candidate status in winter 2011 and start official negotiations for full membership in the EU.

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Angela Wieser

This essay draws on material from the authors' project on ‘Transformation and Democratisation in the Balkans: Shaped by Tensions between Europeanisation and Building Nation-States’ at the Department of Political Science, University of Vienna.