Abstract
When Gorbachev came to power he inherited not simply a system in crisis, but a structure of symbols that was embedded within the broader political system and which was also in crisis. Given the ideocratic nature of the Soviet system, any change to that system would require symbolic change as well. This essay charts how Gorbachev sought to come to grips with this problem, investing some symbols with new meaning while rejecting others. It shows how ultimately he was unable to produce a new, coherent narrative.
Notes
1 Pravda, 14 February 1987.
2 See Hahn (Citation1988, pp. 434–47); for results, see Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR 26, (1987, pp. 500–5); also comments in Sovetskaya Rossiya, 9 August 1987.
3 Partiinaya zhizn', 11 June 1988, p. 15.
4 Pravda, 30 September 1987.
5 Izvestiya, 13 February 1990.
6 Initially raised in Gorbachev (Citation1987c).
7 Pravda, 3 July 1990.
8 On the fate of Lenin see Scherrer (Citation1990), Smart (Citation1990) and Gooding (Citation1992).
9 For some figures, see Gill (Citation1994, pp. 153–55).