German Foreign Policy towards Russia in the Aftermath of the Ukraine Crisis: A New Ostpolitik?

Abstract

This essay investigates the shift in Germany’s Ostpolitik approach to Russia as a result of the latter’s increasing domestic authoritarianism and assertive foreign policy, particularly its violations of international law in the Ukraine crisis. This prompted Germany to take the initiative in formulating EU sanctions against Russia. However, Germany has attempted to reconcile the sanctions policy with a diplomatic approach to resolving the Ukraine crisis by seeking ways of engaging Moscow on broader security and economic issues, as Russia is considered an essential factor in European and global security and a key energy supplier. Thus, Ostpolitik has not been abandoned altogether; it continues to play a role and shapes the long-term objectives of Germany’s Russia policy.

Notes

¹ The agreement included a ceasefire between the Ukrainian army and the pro-Russian rebels fighting in Eastern Ukraine, the holding of elections in the regions of Donets’k and Luhans’k, the return of these regions to full Ukrainian government control and the decentralisation of powers in Ukraine through a constitutional reform that would recognise the special status of the Donets’k and Luhans’k regions. The full text is available at: http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/21b8f98e-b2a5-11e4-b234-00144feab7de.html#axzz42PSUGUCw, accessed 10 March 2016.

² Anonymous interview with official, Division for Russia, Belarus, Moldova and Eastern Partnership, at the Federal Foreign Office of Germany, Berlin, 28 October 2015.

³ In defence policy, German leaders tend to consider the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) as complementary to the transatlantic alliance; the CSDP is the preferred framework for civilian operations, whereas NATO is favoured for robust military engagement. However, due to the widespread opposition of the German public opinion to the use of military force, the civilian instruments of the CSDP are often seen as offering a more palatable option for German policy makers (Würzer 2013, pp. 28–9).

⁴ See, ‘Time for a German–Russian Modernization Partnership’, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs, at the Department of International Relations of the Urals State University in Eekaterinburg, 13 May 2008, available at: http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/EN/Infoservice/Presse/Reden/2008/080513-BM-Russland.html, accessed 10 March 2016.

⁵ ‘Meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Club’, The Kremlin, 24 October 2014, available at: http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/46860, accessed 4 February 2016.

⁶ Deutsche Welle, 3 April 2014, available at: http://www.dw.com/en/russia-protests-sch%C3%A4uble-comments-on-crimea-sudetenland-with-german-ambassador/a-17542060, accessed 3 February 2016.

⁷ ‘Economic War with Russia: A High Price for German Business’, Spiegel Online, 17 March 2014, available at: http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/germany-to-play-central-but-expensive-role-in-sanctions-against-russia-a-959019.html, accessed 11 January 2016.

⁸ Richard Sakwa argues that, following Russia’s annexation of Crimea, ‘German foreign policy lost some of its independence and swung behind Washington’ (Sakwa 2015, p. 225).

⁹ ‘Ukraine Conflict: US “May Supply Arms to Ukraine”’, BBC News, 9 February 2015, available at: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-31279621, accessed 11 January 2016.

¹⁰ ‘Zunehmende Entfremdung’, FAZ-Monatsberichte, 16 April 2014, available at: http://www.ifd-allensbach.de/uploads/tx_reportsndocs/FAZ_April_2014_Russland.pdf, accessed 3 February 2016.

¹¹ ‘Yanvar’skie reitingi odobreniya i doveriya’, Levada Centre, 27 January 2016, available at: http://www.levada.ru/2016/01/27/yanvarskie-rejtingi-odobreniya-i-doveriya-4/, accessed 3 February 2016.

¹² Anonymous interview with official, Division for Russia, Belarus, Moldova and Eastern Partnership, Federal Foreign Office of Germany, Berlin, 28 October 2015.

¹³ ‘UPDATE 2-Gazprom, European Partners Sign Nord Stream-2 Deal’, Reuters, 4 September 2015, available at: http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/09/04/russia-forum-nord-stream-idUSL5N11A0G420150904, accessed 11 January 2016.

¹⁴ Anonymous interview with official, Division for Russia, Belarus, Moldova and Eastern Partnership, Federal Foreign Office of Germany, Berlin, 28 October 2015.

¹⁵ ‘Meeting with Vice-Chancellor and Minister of Economic Affairs and Energy of Germany Sigmar Gabriel’, The Kremlin, 28 October 2015, available at: http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/50582, accessed 4 February 2016.

¹⁶ ‘Seven EU Countries Oppose Nord Stream’, Euractiv, 30 November 2015, available at: http://www.euractiv.com/sections/energy/seven-eu-countries-oppose-nord-stream-319933, accessed 4 February 2016.

¹⁷ Gazprom estimates that this would cost nearly $20 billion. See ‘Ukraine, Gazprom and Transit Issues—Factsheet’, Gazprom, 20 March 2015, available at: http://www.gazpromukrainefacts.com/ukraine-natural-gas-facts/ukraine-gazprom-and-transit-issues-%E2%80%93-factsheet, accessed 4 February 2016.

¹⁸ ‘Bilateral Relations: Russian Federation’, Federal Foreign Office, April 2015, available at: http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/EN/Aussenpolitik/Laender/Laenderinfos/01-Nodes/RussischeFoederation_node.html, accessed 5 February 2016.

¹⁹ Anonymous interview with senior manager, press and communication office, Ost-Ausschuss der Deutschen Wirtschaft, Berlin, 29 October 2015.

²⁰ ‘Wolfgang Büchele ist neuer Vorsitzender des Ost-Ausschusses der Deutschen Wirtschaft’, Ost-Ausschuss der Deutschen Wirtschaft, 11 November 2015, available at: http://www.ost-ausschuss.de/node/1008, accessed 11 January 2016.

²¹ Anonymous interview with official, Division for Russia, Belarus, Moldova and Eastern Partnership, Federal Foreign Office of Germany, Berlin, 28 October 2015.

²² Anonymous interview with senior official, Task Force for the 2016 OSCE Chairmanship, Federal Foreign Office of Germany, Berlin, 28 October 2015; see also ‘German OSCE Chairmanship 2016’, Ständige Vertretung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland bei der OSZE Wien, available at: http://www.wien-osze.diplo.de/Vertretung/wienosce/en/01a/DEU_20Vorsitz_202016.html, accessed 11 January 2016. The vote to entrust Berlin with the OSCE Chairmanship took place in December 2014; in the following weeks, Merkel took up a leading role in the negotiation of the Minsk-2 agreement.

²³ At a meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Club, Putin stated that ‘even now, in trying to resolve the crisis in southeast Ukraine, the OSCE is playing a very positive role’. See ‘Meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Club’, The Kremlin, 24 October 2014, available at: http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/46860, accessed 5 February 2016.

²⁴ Anonymous interview with executive board member, German–Russian Forum, Berlin, 29 October 2015; see also, Deutsch–Russisches Forum—Tätigkeitsbereiche, available at: http://www.deutsch-russisches-forum.de/index.php?id=taetigkeitsbereiche, accessed 11 January 2016.

²⁵ ‘Meeting with Vice-Chancellor and Minister of Economic Affairs and Energy of Germany Sigmar Gabriel’, The Kremlin, 28 October 2015, available at: http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/50582, accessed 4 February 2016.

²⁶ Anonymous interview with official, Division for Russia, Belarus, Moldova and Eastern Partnership, Federal Foreign Office of Germany, Berlin, 28 October 2015.

²⁷ ‘Steinmeier stellt Russland G-8-Rückkerhr in Aussicht’, Die Welt, 22 November 2015, available at: http://www.welt.de/politik/ausland/article149119201/Steinmeier-stellt-Russland-G-8-Rueckkehr-in-Aussicht.html, accessed 11 January 2016.