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Abstract
During the years of the war between the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany, the Stalinist system of rule changed. Under the extreme circumstances of war, the practices of collective leadership expanded at the highest levels of power, while regional governance and state ministries were decentralised. An important aspect of this process of change was the revision of Stalin’s relationship with the military leadership. This article examines three interrelated phenomena central to the reconstruction of Stalin’s trust in his generals. The first is the evolution of the policy of repression from arrests and executions to demotions. The second is the relaxation of political control together with the elevation of the status of the army command. The third is a shift in strategies for addressing the dictator’s dilemma, that is, the contradictions between the growing influence of those who carry out orders (in this case, military leaders) and the further consolidation of Stalin’s sole authority.
Acknowledgement
I am grateful to Isabelle Kaplan for translating the article. This article was prepared within the framework of the HSE University Basic Research Program at the National Research University Higher School of Economics.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes
1 Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv sotsial'no-politicheskoi istorii (hereafter RGASPI), f. 558, op. 11, d. 348, l. 80.
2 On Stalin’s trust as an important mechanism of the dictatorship, see Rigby (Citation1986).
3 RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 181, ll. 90–5.
4 RGASPI, f. 644, op. 2, d. 5, ll. 136–41.
5 This number includes generals arrested just before the war and executed at its start.
6 SVG Directive No. 002206 of 21 September 1941, to the troop commander of the Leningrad Front regarding changes in command personnel (Zolotarev Citation1996a, р. 196).
7 RGASPI, f. 644, op. 2, d. 5, ll. 196–99.
8 After the war, Kulik again fell into disgrace and was shot in 1950 (Mel’chin et al. Citation1991, p. 219).
9 This harsh formulation was included in Zhukov’s draft report, which he sent to Khrushchev in May 1956 (Kievskaia et al. Citation1995, p. 149). In his memoirs, which appeared at a different historical moment, Zhukov included the episode but softened Stalin’s statement (‘Do not waste time, we’ll manage here somehow’) (Zhukov Citation2002, p. 268).
10 Draft directive, edited by Stalin. See RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 478, ll. 144–53.
11 All the generals disciplined for the failure of the Crimean operation remained at command posts and were later promoted, advancing through the ranks.
12 RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 1045, ll. 2, 8.
13 RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 1045, l. 27.
14 RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 1045, l. 60.
15 On the stabilisation of the General Staff in 1943, see Erickson (Citation1983, pp. 74–7).
16 RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 1045, l. 55.
17 RGASPI, f. 644, op. 2, d. 102, l. 13.
18 We do not have Krutikov’s letter, but its contents can be deduced from a memorandum verifying his statement (Khaustov Citation2006, pp. 377, 383).
19 RGASPI, f. 17, op. 167, d. 65, l. 3.
20 RGASPI, f. 17, op. 167, d. 65, l. 3.
21 RGASPI, f. 17, op. 167, d. 65, l. 3.
22 RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 441, ll. 36–8.
23 Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii (hereafter GARF), f. R-5446, op. 1, d. 213, l. 289.
24 RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 1046, ll. 40, 65.
25 RGASPI, f. 83, op. 1, d. 30, l. 77; Korotkov et al. (Citation1996, p. 143). Data are for the Red Army only, excluding the navy, NKVD, NKGB and other departments.
26 GARF, f. R-5446, op. 106s, d. 80, ll. 110–15. For comparison, the average wage in the USSR in 1945 was R442 per month. The monthly average for industrial workers was R473; for employees of government departments, R504 (Zubkova Citation2003, pp. 501–2).
27 GARF, f. R-5446, op. 1, d. 213, ll. 288–89.
28 GARF, f. R-5446, op. 106s, d. 91, l. 375.
29 GARF, f. R-5446, op. 1, d. 226, ll. 1–3.
30 GARF, f. R-5446, op. 46, d. 4, ll. 27, 28, 35, 36.
31 RGASPI, f. 644, op. 2, d. 347, ll. 76–83.
32 RGASPI, f. 83, op. 1, d. 30, l. 88; Korotkov et al. (Citation1996, p. 139). Data are for Red Army generals, excluding navy, NKVD, NKGB and other commissariats.
33 RGASPI, f. 83, op. 1, d. 30, ll. 95–6; Korotkov et al. (Citation1996, pp. 137–38).
34 RGASPI, f. 83, op. 1, d. 30, l. Л. 99.
35 RGASPI, f. 84, op. 1, d. 96, ll. 102–7.
36 RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 762, ll. 6–8; d. 66, ll. 52–4.
37 RGASPI, f. 644, op. 2, d. 310, ll. 152–79.
38 RGASPI, f. 644, op. 2, d. 165, l. 87; d. 173, ll. 44–50.
39 GARF, f. R-5446, op. 106s, d. 63, l. 198.
40 RGASPI, f. 644, op. 2, d. 310, ll. 174–75.
41 RGASPI, f. 17, op. 121, d. 296, l. 7.
42 RGASPI, f. 17, op. 121, d. 296, ll. 7–9.
43 RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 1051, l. 44. The post of Commissar for Defence was held jointly with Stalin himself.
44 RGASPI, f. 644, op. 2, d. 453, l. 74.
45 In his memoirs, Sergei Shtemenko referred to a discussion of this issue with members of the Politburo (Shtemenko Citation1981, pp. 285–86). Most probably, a discussion took place in Stalin’s office on 6 December 1944. According to the record of visitors to Stalin’s office, Bulganin, First Deputy Chief of the General Staff Alexei Antonov, Chief of the Operational Department of the General Staff Sergei Shtemenko, People’s Commissar of the Navy Nikolai Kuznetsov, Chief Marshal of Artillery Nikolai Voronov and Head of the Main Artillery Directorate Nikolai Yakovlev were there at the same time on the evening of 6 December. Contrary to Shtemenko’s claims, however, the record indicates that members of the Politburo were not present at this time. Marshal Zhukov, who was at the front, did not attend the meeting (Chernobaev Citation2008, p. 445).
46 RGASPI, f. 644, op. 2, d. 420, ll. 86–90.
47 RGASPI, f. 644, op. 2, d. 420, l. 87.
Additional information
Notes on contributors
Oleg Khlevniuk
Oleg Khlevniuk, Professor and Chief Research Fellow at the Institute for Advanced Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies, HSE University, Staraya Basmannaya, 21/4, Moscow, 105066, Russian Federation. Email: [email protected]