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Abstract
Drawing on the example of constraints on protest music in Belarus and Russia, the article discusses the political economy of censorship in the everyday functioning of contemporary authoritarianism. Combining the ‘new censorship’ paradigm of critical sociology and studies of post-Soviet authoritarian regimes, this study identifies and discusses structural, invisible or constitutive censorship. While the visible, formal and openly repressive mechanisms of political censorship are formally prohibited and play a minor role, actual constraints on the expression of protest take different shapes.
This work was supported by the School of Advanced Studies in the Social Sciences (EHESS, Paris) under research project ‘Gouverner la dissidence: sociologie de la censure sous régime autoritaire contemporain’ and by the Maison Interuniversitaire des Sciences de l’Homme d’Alsace (MISHA) and the Excellence Initiative of the University of Strasbourg. The author would like to thank the reviewers appointed by Europe-Asia Studies for their attentive reading and stimulating comments.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes
1 For an overview of the Belarusian case, see Bigday and Kryzhanouski (Citation2015), Kryzhanouski (Citation2015, Citation2017).
2 Article 29.5 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, available at: https://rm.coe.int/constitution-of-the-russian-federation-en/1680a1a237, accessed 16 December 2021; Article 33 of the Constitution of the Republic of Belarus, available at: https://president.gov.by/en/gosudarstvo/constitution, accessed 16 December 2021.
3 At the time of writing, this now closed agency was called General Directorate for the Protection of State Secrets in the Media (Glavnoe upravlenie po okhrane gosudarstvennykh tain v pechati i drugikh sredstvakh massovoi informatsii).
4 The total is higher than 59 because interviewed actors frequently fill more than one role; for example, a musician may also be a producer and a critic may also organise concerts.
5 Based on the analysis of media and previous interviews, the author selected musicians and concert organisers who had to face constraints allegedly for their direct or indirect political criticism, major musical critics and journalists.
6 On Western punk rock see: Purdue et al. (Citation1997), McKay (Citation1998), O’Connor (Citation2008).
7 As Alexei Yurchak recalled, while analysing the Soviet ideological system, ‘for Bakhtin, authoritative discourse coheres around a strict external idea or dogma (whether religious, political or otherwise) and occupies a particular position within the discursive regime of a period. … Regardless of whether this demarcated and fixed authoritative discourse is successful in persuading its authors and audiences, they experience it as immutable and therefore unquestionable’ (Yurchak Citation2006, pp. 14–5).
8 The ‘national revival’ movement of the 1980s–1990s provided a foundation for anti-Lukashenka opposition after his election in 1994 (Goujon Citation1999; Marples Citation1999).
9 Supporting the authorities and advocating, even through violence, for the preservation of so-called ‘traditional values’, these groups—ranging from Cossack-inspired groups and orthodox fundamentalists to communist conservatives—have been particularly active since the late 2000s.
10 For example, interviews: B40, Franak Vyachorka, Strasbourg, 26 June 2011; B39, Yury Tsybin, Minsk, 11 February 2013; R15, Artemy Troitsky, Tallinn, 27 May 2016; R3, Anton Chernin, Moscow, 22 May 2017. For the full list of interviewees see the Appendix.
11 Order of the Council of Ministers No. 277, Section 3.1, 28 February 2002.
12 Interview B9, Ales’ Dzyanisaŭ, Hrodna, 6 August 2016.
13 Festivals are understood as open-air shows or events organised in places not initially intended for such performances, such as industrial buildings.
14 Interview R4, Maksim Dinkevich, Moscow, 19 May 2017.
15 The seven-day Kubana in 2013 was attended by 200,000 people.
16 Interview R10, Il’ya Ostrovskii, Moscow, 26 May 2017.
17 Interview B18, Slava Koran’, telephone, 17 January 2012.
18 Interview R1, Maria Alyokhina, Moscow, 21 May 2017.
19 Interview R3, Anton Chernin, Moscow, 22 May 2017.
20 Only one leading oligarch, Mikhail Prokhorov, continued to invite the band to ‘corporates’. Interview R3, Anton Chernin, Moscow, 22 May 2017.
21 Interview R4, Maksim Dinkevich, Moscow, 19 May 2017.
22 Interview B20, Yura ‘Karas’ Laktyenaŭ, Hrodna, 20 August 2007.
23 Non-registered political party established in 2010 by the members of the banned National Bolshevik Party (Natsional-bol’shevistskaya Partiya). Since the annexation of Crimea, Drugaya Rossiya has supported the government’s foreign policy.
24 Nationalist conservative political movement established in 2012 to ‘restore the sovereignty of Russia’.
25 Afisha was launched in 1999 as a lifestyle and cultural magazine that, eventually, began to touch upon social and political issues. Since 2002 it has organised one of the biggest annual Russian music festivals Piknik Afishi. In 2015, when it was acquired by ‘oligarchs who did not like politics very much’ (Interview R12, Yurii Saprykin, Moscow, 22 May 2017), the whole editorial staff, including former and current editors-in-chief close to liberal opposition Yurii Saprykin and Aleksandr Gorbachev, left the magazine; in 2016, the print edition was discontinued. Since then the web magazine afisha.ru focuses exclusively on entertainment.
26 Interviews: R6, Aleksandr Gorbachev, Moscow, 20 May 2017; R12, Yurii Saprykin, Moscow, 22 May 2017.
27 A former member of the 1980–2000s band Agatha Christie, Vadim Samoilov has expressed public support of President Putin and is a close friend of longstanding presidential aide Vladislav Surkov. According to several Russian music journalists, the Rock-hero/RockLab project is financially supported by public authorities. It is also worth noting that Rock-hero was launched following Surkov’s April 2005 meeting with several Russian rock musicians, in the aftermath of Ukraine’s 2004–2005 Orange Revolution. The meeting was brokered by Samoilov. One of its objectives was to ensure that Russian major rock musicians would not support large protest movements, as had been the case in Ukraine. Interviews: R15, Artemy Troitsky, Tallinn, 27 May 2016; R12, Yurii Saprykin, Moscow, 22 May 2017; R2, Andrei Burlaka, St Petersburg, 29 May 2017.
28 According to the media, a fee for a short performance at the celebration of the annual Moscow City Day could amount to more than US$7,000, paid from the city budget or by private sponsors. ‘Vlasti Moskvy ne zaplatyat gruppe Aerosmith za vystuplenie na dne goroda’, Rosbalt, 1 September 2015, available at: http://www.rosbalt.ru/moscow/2015/09/01/1435700.html, accessed 2 May 2020.
29 Interview R3, Anton Chernin, Moscow, 22 May 2017.
30 ‘Vlasti zapretili kontsert Vasi Oblomova v Den’ Rossii’, Svoboda, 9 June 2016, available at: https://www.svoboda.org/a/27788787.html, accessed 16 December 2021.
31 Interviews: B43, Lavon Volski, Minsk, 23 July 2010; B12, Kasya Kamoskaya, Minsk, 16 July 2010; B15, Aleg Khamenka, Minsk, 17 February 2009.
32 For example, ‘V gorode Gantsevichi na kontsert po raznaryadke gorispolkoma’, Hantsavitski chas, 13 June 2013, available at: http://www.ganc-chas.by/by/page/news/3044, accessed 16 December 2021.
33 In 1995, a large company, Dainova, funded the purchase of new instruments by Krama’s musicians. In 1996, the same company, following a request from members of Ulis, NRM and Novaje Nieba, bought a portable recording studio for their shared use (Dzyatlikovich Citation2005, pp. 162–64).
34 For example, interviews: B44, Maksim Zhbankoŭ, Minsk, 11 February 2009; B4, Dmitrii Bezkaravainyi, Minsk, 28 October 2011; B14, Nikolai Khalezin, Strasbourg, 6 October 2011; R15, Artemy Troitsky, Tallinn, 27 May 2016; R2, Andrei Burlaka, St Petersburg, 29 May 2017.
35 Lyapis Trubetskoi (a literary character), Palac, Krama, NRM, Neuro Dubel (Neuro Plug), Krambambulia (traditional alcoholic beverage), Naka and Zmicier Vajciuskievic.
36 With one exception: in November 2013, Neuro Dubel’s Alyaksandr Kullinkovich became a blogger for the website of SB: Belarus segodnya, a newspaper owned by the presidential administration.
37 Interview R14, Vaslili Shumov, Moscow, 24 May 2017.
38 ‘Deputaty khotyat lishit’ Makarevicha gosudarstvennykh nagrad’, Svoboda, 18 August 2014, available at: https://www.svoboda.org/a/26535713.html, accessed 16 December 2021.
39 ‘Deputat Gosdumy vycherknul Grebenshchikova iz istorii Rossii’, lenta.ru, 3 August 2015, available at: https://lenta.ru/news/2015/08/03/bg/?t, accessed 16 December 2021.
40 ‘Grebenshchikov, s’’esh’ svoi galstuk!’, MK.RU, 5 August 2015, available at: https://spb.mk.ru/articles/2015/08/05/grebenshhikov-sesh-svoy-galstuk.html, accessed 16 December 2021.
41 ‘Novoe napadenie na Pussy Riot: Alekhina poluchila sotryasenie golovnogo mozga’, RBK, 6 March 2014, available at: https://www.rbc.ru/society/06/03/2014/570418e49a794761c0ce78b1, accessed 16 December 2021.
42 Interview B13, Paŭlyuk Kanaval’chyk, Minsk, 12 August 2016.
43 ‘Zakon № 114-F3 “O protivodeistvii ekstremistskoi deyatel’nosti”’, adopted 27 June 2002, available at: https://docs.cntd.ru/document/901823502, accessed 16 December 2021.
44 Interviews: R15, Artemy Troitsky, Tallinn, 27 May 2016; R8, Aleksandr Litoi, telephone, 25 May 2017.
45 ‘Court in Russia Bans Video Clips of Pussy Riot Online’, BBC, 29 November 2012, available at: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-20539819, accessed 17 December 2021.
46 ‘Priznany ekstremistskimi roliki gruppy “Ansambl’ Khrista Spasitelya i Mat’ syra zemlya”’, SOVA Center for Information and Analysis, 27 August 2015, available at: https://www.sova-center.ru/misuse/news/persecution/2015/08/d32657/, accessed 17 December 2021.
47 ‘Minyust priznal ekstremistskoi pesnyu “Ubivai Kosmonavtov”’, Svoboda, 9 January 2018, available at: https://www.svoboda.org/a/28965246.html, accessed 17 December 2021.
48 ‘Delo piterskoi Drugoi Rossii’, Memorial Human Rights Centre, available at: https://memohrc.org/ru/special-projects/delo-piterskoy-drugoy-rossii, accessed 17 December 2021.
49 Interview R4, Maksim Dinkevich, Moscow, 19 May 2017.
50 For example, in 2015, the Minister of Culture Barys Svyatloŭ stated: ‘I repeat again that blacklists do not exist in Belarus’ (Malinoŭski Citation2015).
51 Most interviewees spoke about such censorship dynamics, including: R15, Artemy Troitsky, Tallinn, 27 May 2016; R3, Anton Chernin, Moscow, 22 May 2017; R12, Yuri Saprykin, Moscow, 22 May 2017; R14, Vasilii Shumov, Moscow, 24 May 2017; R7, Boris Grebenshchikov, St Petersburg, 31 May 2017.
52 Interview R9, Kirill ‘George’ Mikhailov, Moscow, 21 May 2017.
53 See for example, ‘Russia: Censorship of Younger Generation’s Music’, Human Rights Watch, 28 February 2019, available at: https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/02/28/russia-censorship-younger-generations-music, accessed 17 December 2021.
54 For example, interviews: B9, Ales’ Dzyanisaû, Hrodna, 6 August 2016; B27, Stas Pachobut, St Petersburg, 28 May 2017; R9, Kirill ‘George’ Mikhailov, Moscow, 21 May 2017; R4, Maksim Dinkevich, Moscow, 19 May 2017; R5, Evgenii ‘Slon’ Faizulin, St Petersburg, 30 and 31 May 2017; confirmed by media analysis.
55 Interview R7, Boris Grebenshchikov, St Petersburg, 31 May 2017.
56 Interview R10, Il’ya Ostrovskii, Moscow, 26 May 2017.
57 For example, interviews: B27, Stas Pachobut, St Petersburg, 28 May 2017; R4, Maksim Dinkevich, Moscow, 19 May 2017; R9, Kirill ‘George’ Mikhailov, Moscow, 21 May 2017; R8, Aleksandr Litoi, telephone, 25 May 2017; R5, Evgenii ‘Slon’ Faizulin, St Petersburg, 30 and 31 May 2017.
58 Interviews: B27, Stas Pachobut, St Petersburg, 28 May 2017; R8, Aleksandr Litoi, telephone, 25 May 2017; R5, Evgenii ‘Slon’ Faizulin, St Petersburg, 30 and 31 May 2017.
59 Interviews: R11, Oleg Pshenichnyi, Moscow, 20 May 2017; R1, Maria Alyokhina, Moscow, 21 May 2017; R12, Yurii Saprykin, Moscow, 22 May 2017; R10, Il’ya Ostrovskii, Moscow, 26 May 2017.
60 Interviews: R4, Maksim Dinkevich, Moscow, 19 May 2017; R12, Yurii Saprykin, Moscow, 22 May 2017.
61 Interview R11, Oleg Pshenichnyi, Moscow, 20 May 2017.
62 Interviews: R15, Artemy Troitsky, Tallinn, 27 May 2016; R4, Maksim Dinkevich, Moscow, 19 May 2017; R3, Anton Chernin, Moscow, 22 May 2017; R14, Vasilii Shumov, Moscow, 24 May 2017; R10, Il’ya Ostrovskii, Moscow, 26 May 2017.
63 Interview R12, Yurii Saprykin, Moscow, 22 May 2017.
64 Among others, as Russian festival organiser Il’ya Ostrovskii confesses: ‘It started to be hard for me living in this self-censorship, living in fear and thinking, I can do this [invite certain musicians to perform], but I cannot do that, and what will they say … . It is absurd’ (Interview R10, Il’ya Ostrovskii, Moscow, 26 May 2017).
65 Many underground punk musicians, however, have denounced such ‘political compromise’, especially in Belarus. See, for example, interviews: B9, Ales’ Dzyanisaû, Hrodna, 6 August 2007; B24, Zhenia ‘Masal’’ Masal’ski, Hrodna, 17 August 2007; B27, Stas Pachobut, Hrodna, 18 August 2007; B2, Anton, Minsk, 14 February 2009; B25, Misha, Minsk, 15 February 2009; B17, Igar Konik, Minsk, 27 October 2011; R9, Kirill ‘George’ Mikhailov, Moscow, 21 May 2017.
66 During the Orange Revolution in Ukraine in 2004–2005, a show called Piterskii Maidan (St Petersburg’s Maidan) in support of protesters, featuring Russian and Ukrainian rock bands and scheduled for 3 April 2005, was cancelled by the organisers following threats by unidentified persons, but such constraints seem to have been exceptional at the time.
67 For example, interviews: B29, Alyaksandr Pamidoraŭ, Minsk, 14 February 2009; B15, Aleg Khamenka, Minsk, 17 February 2009; B19, Aleksandr Kullinkovich, Minsk, 17 February 2009; B35, Syargei ‘Skrypa’ Skrypnichenka, Minsk, 26 October 2011; R7, Boris Grebenshchikov, St Petersburg, 31 May 2017.
68 Interview R3, Anton Chernin, Moscow, 22 May 2017.
69 Interviews: R6, Aleksandr Gorbachev, Moscow, 20 May 2017; R3, Anton Chernin, Moscow, 22 May 2017.
70 For a critique of this approach see Stiglitz (Citation2002), Milner and Mukerjee (Citation2009).
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Yauheni Kryzhanouski
Yauheni Kryzhanouski, Post-doctoral Researcher, Institute of Political Studies, University of Strasbourg (SAGE), EHESS (CERCEC), France. Email: [email protected]