The End of Adaptive Authoritarianism in Belarus?

Figures & data

TABLE 1 Framework of Belarusian Adaptive Authoritarianism

Personalist rule	The regime is hierarchical with Lukashenka at the top. Until 2016 even the Independent Institute of Socio-Economic and Political Studies (IISEPS) polling firm argued that Lukashenka still had the support of one third of the population (Manaev cited in Wilson 2021, pp. 305–6). However, Lukashenka is a great survivor and while his image has undoubtedly been tainted by mass protests in 2017 and 2020–2021, he would still have supporters among the electorate. Free and fair elections are unlikely and short of a coup, further mass protest or removal by external forces, Lukashenka will remain president as the regime retains a highly repressive capacity.
Neopatrimonialism	Close allies are appointed for loyalty rather than competence.
Performance legitimacy	Economic growth, stability, guaranteed jobs and healthcare give the regime legitimacy. A fluid ideology allows the regime to adapt when necessary.
Managed pluralism	Control of the political system allows the regime to control elections with ‘opposition’ candidates, thereby giving the regime some legitimacy. ‘Opponents’ are managed by the regime and can change depending on the situation.
Coercive capacity	The regime retains significant coercive capacity, using a full repressive repertoire or targeted repression to divide the opposition.

TABLE 2 Belarusian Adaptive Authoritarianism in 2021—The End of a Model?

Personalist rule	Lukashenka still heads the regime, but his inner circle are increasingly independent. People close to Lukashenka withhold information, leading to the breakdown of communication channels within the regime and between the authorities and the people. Lukashenka’s Sovietised rhetoric no longer resonates.
Neopatrimonialism	The regime remains stable with few defections, but competition between silaviki and technocrats has resulted in a silaviki victory, for now.
Performance legitimacy	The regime had legitimacy by guaranteeing jobs, wages and health care. With the economy state-controlled, the authorities could offer subsidies, good pensions, student loans and holidays in state sanatoria. The regime just about managed to maintain this economic support. However, three recessions in six years drastically reduced the money available to the regime to maintain this support. A decade of stagnation left many Belarusians feeling increasingly poor and the state was unable to reverse this trend. Policies, such as the ‘social parasite’ legislation, were poorly thought through and the regime’s rhetoric of ‘scroungers’ alienated many. This was made worse by the mishandling of the pandemic.
Managed pluralism	From 2001 to 2015 the authorities used the 1 + 3 electoral formula, which made elections appear competitive. At the 2015 presidential election Tatsiana Karatkevich was allowed to campaign without hindrance. At the 2016 parliamentary elections two opposition candidates were elected. This created the perception that the regime was allowing some competition. However, this was dispelled in the 2019 parliamentary elections when all 110 parliamentarians were pro-regime. This situation worsened with the 2020 presidential election, which was clearly rigged in Lukashenka’s favour.
Coercive capacity	The regime’s repressive repertoire is immense and has not decreased. The security forces, at least for now, remain loyal and are willing to use violence against protesters. However, those self-same protesters appear more willing to continue demonstrating and face state violence.

Wilson, A. (2021) Belarus: The Last European Dictatorship (2nd edn) (New Haven, CT, & London, Yale University Press).

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