Relativism, Standards and Aesthetic Judgements

Abstract

This paper explores the various available forms of relativism concerning aesthetic judgement and contrasts them with aesthetic absolutism. Two important distinctions are drawn. The first is between subjectivism (which relativizes judgements to an individual’s sentiments or feelings) and the relativization of aesthetic judgements to intersubjective standards. The other is between relativism about aesthetic properties and relativism about the truth‐values of aesthetic judgements. Several plausible forms of relativism about aesthetic properties are on offer, but relativism about the truth‐values of aesthetic judgements is more elusive. In particular, John MacFarlane’s approach to relativism is shown not to result in relativism about the truth‐values of aesthetic judgements.

Keywords:

• relativism
• aesthetics
• judgements
• truth
• subjectivism
• standards

Notes

1 I am grateful to two anonymous referees for their helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper. The paper originated as an invited contribution to a session on relativism and aesthetic judgements held at the American Society for Aesthetics Group Meeting, American Philosophical Association Pacific Division Conference, San Francisco, 7 April 2007. I thank Aaron Meskin for the opportunity to participate in that session.