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Acknowledgements
I thank Carl Baker, Rafe McGregor and Joshua Tepley for useful comments on earlier versions of this paper.
Notes
1 See Tepley, Citation2014, pp. 462–63.
2 Tepley cites Carman (Citation2003, p. 200), Mullhall (Citation1996, p. 9), Dreyfus (Citation1991, p. 257), McDaniel (Citation2009, p. 302) and Olafson (Citation1987, pp. 135–6) as being amongst those who explicitly deny that Heidegger viewed kinds of being as properties of the entities that have those kinds of being.
3 Though he does, correctly in my opinion, suggest (Tepley Citation2014, p. 477) that the account he offers ‘is significant in its own right – regardless of what Heidegger himself really believed’.
4 For some discussion as to why such a view is attractive see Zimmerman, Citation2004, pp. xiv–xv.
5 As Tepley (Citation2014, p. 475) notes, Heidegger sometimes expresses scepticism regarding metaphysics but it is clear that Heidegger is using ‘metaphysics’ here in a rather idiosyncratic sense. Contrawise it should be noted that while Ladyman and Ross advocate a certain revisionary kind of metaphysics it is one which is markedly different from metaphysics as practiced either by Heidegger or by the vast majority of analytic metaphysicians.