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Abstract
A standard interpretation of Hume’s naturalism is that it paved the way for a scientistic and ‘disenchanted’ conception of the world. My aim in this paper is to show that this is a restrictive reading of Hume, and it obscures a different and profitable interpretation of what Humean naturalism amounts to. The standard interpretation implies that Hume’s ‘science of human nature’ was a reductive investigation into our psychology. But, as Hume explains, the subject matter of this science is not restricted to introspectively accessible mental content and incorporates our social nature and interpersonal experience. Illuminating the science of human nature has implications for how we understand what Hume means by ‘experience’ and thus how we understand the context of his epistemological investigations. I examine these in turn and argue overall that Hume’s naturalism and his science of man do not simply anticipate a disenchanted conception of the world.
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Acknowledgements
An earlier version of this paper was presented at the University of Johannesburg in 2014 as part of the ‘Phenomenology and Naturalism’ conference, organised by Rafael Winkler, Catherine Botha, Abraham Olivier, Andrea Hurst and Marianna Oelofsen. Many thanks to them and to the other participants for a number of very helpful discussions and to an anonymous referee for their comments on a previous version. Thanks also to colleagues at Durham University especially Matthew Ratcliffe, Nathan Shannon, Andy Hamilton and Simon P. James.
Disclosure Statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes
1 In characterizing philosophical naturalism it is usual to distinguish between interrelating ontological, epistemological and methodological aspects. What unifies these aspects, if anything, is a matter of continuing dispute. But an overarching thesis is that natural science is to have priority in giving us an account of what exists and that philosophical inquiry is to be guided by, if not become part of, natural scientific investigation. A proper treatment would need to distinguish the subcategories within each of these aspects, also interrelating with each other and other subcategories. For ontological versions see, for example, Maddy Citation2007; Papineau Citation1993. For examples of naturalism’s epistemological aspects see Quine Citation1969; Kornblith Citation2002.
2 See also Stroud Citation2006, 342. ‘Naturalist’ readings of Hume include Norman Kemp Smith Citation1905a, Citation1905b, Citation1941; Stroud Citation1977; Fogelin Citation1985; Mounce Citation1999. Perhaps the most famous ‘sceptical’ interpretation is presented in Kant Citation1998. More recent versions include Strawson Citation1985. Williams also suggests a ‘critical’ reading such as that found in Ayer (Citation1980) and Bennett (Citation1971).
3 For a characterization of the ‘placement problem’ in the context of contemporary accounts of naturalism see Price Citation2011.
4 Such remarks suggest that Hume himself had a ‘scientistic’ conception of the world, but McDowell emphasizes that Hume was innocent of the historical explanation of the modern disenchanted view of the world. Stroud (Citation1977, 223) also remarks that ‘scientism’ was alien to Hume’s thought and to the eighteenth century more generally.
5 See also the ‘Abstract’.
6 Traiger distinguishes between four senses of experience in Hume: (1) evidence of sense and memory; (2) common life and conversation; (3) testimony of history; (4) the fidelity of ‘printers and copists’. See Traiger Citation1994, 253.
7 In Book I of the Treatise Hume also uses enlargement to explain how the repetition of experiences (in the narrow sense) can in some cases not just ‘multiply’ our ideas but ‘enlarge’ them; that is, that we come to form new ideas on the basis of multiplicity, but which not to have their direct source in any instance of experience. See Hume Citation1978, 163).
8 See Fogelin (Citation2009, 6–7) for a characterization of the different ‘voices’ to be found in Hume and a warning that the standpoint of common life can be easily overlooked.
9 The ‘Oxford view’ refers to the interpretation described by Duncan Forbes as ‘the Locke-Berkeley-epistemology-only Hume’. See Forbes’s (Citation1970, 9) introduction to Hume’s History of England. I learned this from R.W. Connon’s (Citation1979) essay ‘The Naturalism of Hume Revisited’: see his footnote 4 for further details and explanation.
10 Although ‘satisfaction’ is not a form of terminus. See Rouse Citation2005, 43.
11 See also Husserl Citation1999.
12 Recent accounts of Hume’s theory of belief emphasize the role of ‘stability’. See, for example, Loeb Citation2002.
13 See, for example, the essays collected in Schear Citation2013.
14 See Allison (Citation2008) for a discussion of the relation between Hume’s account of experience and belief and how Sellars characterizes the ‘logical space of reasons’.
15 On Hume’s impoverished conception of experience, see Bell and McGinn Citation1990, and Stroud Citation2006.
16 Note how in both this passage, and the one slightly earlier in the conclusion of Book I where Hume describes himself as a ‘strange uncouth monster’, the role of other people is fundamental. Firstly, in the fragmentation of interpersonal relations (‘utterly abandon’d and disconsolate ... no one will hearken to me. Every one keeps at a distance...’) and then, secondly, as part of what restores a more agreeable state.
17 As Baier (Citation1991, 3) puts it, throughout Part 4 of Book 1 of the Treatise Hume had ‘sailed a one-person ship, albeit in an ocean where other manned ships were clearly visible’.
18 Baier (Citation1991, 298, n.18) cites Gilles Deleuze’s work as suggesting this kind of view in his work from 1953, translated as Empiricism as Subjectivity: An Essay on Hume’s Theory of Human Nature: ‘Hume is a moralist and a sociologist, before being a psychologist’ (Deleuze Citation1991).
19 At the start of the first Enquiry, Hume (Citation1975, 5) identities the science of human nature with ‘moral philosophy’ as opposed to ‘natural philosophy’.
20 See De Caro and McArthur Citation2010, 9.
21 Although, writing in 1929, Husserl wrote of Hume’s unrecognized ‘greatness’ since, according to Husserl (Citation1969, 256), Hume was ‘the first to grasp the concrete problem of transcendental philosophy’. See also Salmon Citation1929.