The Normative Underpinnings of Democracy and the Balance between Morality and Legitimacy

ABSTRACT

Jürgen Habermas’s political philosophy incorporates the view that legitimacy is immanent to law, even though it makes morality a central component of democratic legitimacy. Taking this as a starting point, the article examines one criticism that applies to Habermas’s political theory, insofar as he puts morality at the centre of his reconstruction of the concept of legitimacy. Habermas claims that the moral point of view justifies only those norms that embody universalizable interests and rules out those that embody particular interests. Therefore, the objection is that particular citizens will have no reason to endorse these norms and act according to them because these norms do not incorporate their interests. The article goes on to show that Habermas can successfully answer this objection by means of the principle of discourse. The principle performs this function, inasmuch as it has a post-Kantian nature. On the one hand, it incorporates Kantian autonomy. And on the other, the Hegelian insight that autonomy has to be actualized through modern institutions and practices.

KEYWORDS:

• Habermas
• morality
• legitimacy
• rational discourse
• democracy
• post-Kantian

Acknowledgments

I am thankful to Allex Elliott, Amy Allen, John Christman, Eduardo Mendieta, Karen Riquelme, Dante Martínez, Amalia Martínez, Rainer Forst, and two anonymous referees of International Journal of Philosophical Studies for helpful comments on the earlier drafts of this paper.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.