Excuses, Exemptions, and the Challenges to Social Naturalism

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Notes

1. References to Hieronymi’s book, including its reprint of Strawson’s ‘Freedom and Resentment’, will simply be by page number.

2. Although Hieronymi makes this claim in a (lengthy) footnote, I think it is important to discuss it given that it has consequences (see section 3) for her overall evaluation of Strawson’s argumentative strategy. In general, Hieronymi too often makes important philosophical claims in footnotes. They should have been discussed more elaborately in the main body of the text.

3. Note as well that there is an ordinary sense of talking about ‘excuse’ which does not presuppose that one is mistaken about an agent’s quality of will at all in excusing their behavior. One might excuse an agent without ever having made a mistake concerning that agent’s will. Thanks to Jim O’Shea for suggesting this further point (O’Shea questions whether Strawson’s text either states or implies that excusing agents for their actions normally follows upon having made any such initial ‘mistake’).

4. This research was funded by the Irish Research Council (IRC) and Research Foundation Flanders (FWO). I would like to thank Benjamin De Mesel and Jim O’Shea for helpful feedback.