Transgenerational Frontiers: The Capabilities Approach And the New Challenge of Justice

ABSTRACT

The aim of the paper is to confront some challenges raised by intergenerational justice from the perspective of Martha Nussbaum’s capabilities approach. After having sketched her account, the essay deals with some objections to it from an environmental perspective, arguing that, contrary to some critics, it can be a valuable basis for reflecting on our duties towards future generations. More precisely, I focus on how the CA provides promising insights to address two central problems of intergenerational ethics: 1) the so-called ‘circumstances of justice;’ 2) the problem of the asymmetry between present and future generations. In both cases, I argue that the philosophical anthropology underlying the CA is better suited than the contractualist one to include future generations into the realm of justice and ground our motivation to care for them. After underlining the potential of the CA, in the concluding remarks I will underline a potential flaw of this theory, i.e. the lack of guidance when it comes to the trade-offs between our rights and well-being and those of the unborn.

KEYWORDS:

• Future generations
• capabilities approach
• intergenerational justice
• circumstances of justice
• martha nussbaum

Acknowledgments

This publication is part of the PRIN 2022 project ‘Next Generation Ita. Increasing Trust, Making Future Generations Possible.’ I also want to express my gratitude to Fondazione 1563 for their previous support. I am indebted to Tiziana Andina for her valuable mentorship and constant encouragement. For insightful discussions on transgenerationality, I am grateful to Maurizio Ferraris, Fausto Corvino, Gregorio Fracchia and Davide Pala as well.

Disclosure Statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1. One of the few exceptions is Breena Holland (2008), who argued that Martha Nussbaum’s CA is a useful basis for reflecting on ecological problems, taking into account the instrumental role of the environment for the growth and full expression of human capabilities. However, in my article I will confront this paradigm with more general challenges related to justice towards future generations. In a following paper, Holland (2014) used the CA to assess the global inequalities that arise in the interaction between economic growth (linked to industrialization) and ecological damage (which may affect people who are not benefited by economic development). However, she looks much more concerned with the problems and inequalities of actual people rather than future ones. For another interesting way to use the CA to evaluate environmental damage, see (Corvino et al. 2021). For an analysis of the role of wonder in Nussbaum’s CA and an attempt to use that emotion to address environmental issues, cf. Bendik-Keymer (2020).

2. Following Tiziana Andina’s (2021) ontological analysis, I will use the term ‘transgenerationality’ as a synonym of ‘intergenerationality,’ to mean our relationship with future generations. She prefers to use the first label to underline that the first bond between different generations is biological and psychological. (Indeed, the first to speak of transgenerationality was the social psychologist Anne Schützenberger, who widely studied the cases when a trauma is ‘inherited’ from one generations to another.) For better readability, I will use both the words as synonyms. For a more in-depth analysis of the concept of transgenerationality, see Andina (2020; 2021). It is important not to confuse this concept of transgenerational justice with that of ‘intra-generational’ justice, by which we mean issues of fair distribution between contemporaries, which raises completely different problems (cf. Gutwald et al. 2014).

3. Similarly, Leßmann and Rauschmayer (2013) analyze how Sen’s ideas can be applied to the concept of sustainable development (SD), underlining that his suggestion to simply replace the concept of needs (used in the Brundtland definition of SD) with that of capabilities is not easy.

4. My perspective will be purely philosophical, and I will confront intergenerational issues from an ethical rather than economic point of view.

5. Similarly, Kenneth Shockley (2014) has argued that Sen’s CA is a valuable means to define the concepts of flourishing and well-being in an age of environmental instability, where the background conditions of our happiness can change rapidly and radically.

6. For a systematic account of such a paradigm, and a more in-depth analysis of the differences between Nussbaum, Sen, and other scholars perspectives, see Robeyns (2017). She labels the general, open and unspecified paradigm as capability approach, while calling the specific uses of it for philosophical or economical purposes as capability theories.

7. An important distinction in Nussbaum’s (2000a, 84–85) account is that between basic, internal and combined capabilities. With basic capabilities, she refers to people’s innate equipment, which is the basis for developing more advanced capabilities. Internal capabilities are one’s developed powers, i.e. what a person is able to do given their inner development, usually achieved in interaction with the social, economic, and political environment: an adult who has no language disorder has the internal capability to freely express their thoughts. However, in order to have real freedom of speech, internal capabilities are not enough. One must also enjoy external conditions that allow them to exercise their faculties. When both these criteria are met (i.e. when one has both the internal capabilities and the external conditions to express them), one is said to have a combined capability. The items on Nussbaum’s list should be conceived of as combined capabilities.

8. In his Treatise on Human Nature, Hume (1978, 496) talks about ‘circumstances of mankind’ which make justice useful for the flourishing of human beings in society.

9. In a way that is (paradoxically) akin to Aristotle, Hume is aware that ‘[h]uman nature cannot, by any means, subsist, without the association of individuals’ (Hume and Beauchamp 1998, 28; cf. also; Hume and Nidditch 1978, 492–493).

10. For an analysis of the consequences of the circumstances of justice on animal and ecological justice, see Wienhues (2020, 56–62).

11. It is worth noting that even Hume (1998, 42–43), while insisting on the circumstances of justice, harshly criticizes those who portray human beings as uniquely selfish and argues that, other things being equal (i.e. at least as long as this does not conflict with others of our goals), we are led by sympathy to prefer the happiness of others rather than their unhappiness. In the last paragraph I will discuss some potential problems related to the expression ‘other things being equal that is, at least as long as this does not conflict with others of our goals.’

12. For an in-depth analysis of the role of emotions (especially compassion) in the metaethical justification of the CA, see Sacco (2024). For a ‘Nussbaumian’ account of morality grounded in wonder, cf. Bendik-Keymer (2023).

13. Carola Barbero (2024) has recently confronted the problem of our emotions towards objects that we know do not exist, asking herself if we could speak of a ‘paradox of the future,’ akin to the paradox of fiction. For a more in-depth analysis of the emotional grounds of intergenerational justice, see Andina and Sacco (2024).

14. For instance, Watene (2014) suggests to combine the capability approach with a form of consequential evaluation (which takes into account the value of the capabilities at risk and the cost we would pay to preserve them) taking up Tim Mulgan’s proposal. Holland (2014) suggests to combine the concept of a minimum threshold of capabilities with that of ‘capability ceilings’. According to her, when the free development of a capability (e.g. that of polluting) weakens other capabilities (such as that of enjoying a healthy life in a non-spoiled environment), it is necessary to set a maximum level beyond which it would be wrong to protect the harmful capability.

Additional information

Funding

The work was supported by the Ministero dell’Università e della Ricerca [PRIN 2022 ‘Next Generation Ita’].