The reregulation of capital flows in Latin America: assessing the impact of post-neoliberal governments

Figures & data

Table 1. Governments led by members of the São Paulo Forum – 1995–2017.

Country	Political party	Period
Argentina	Front for Victory	2003–2015
Bolivia	Movement for Socialism	2006–2020
Brazil	Workers' Party	2003–2016
Chile	Socialist Party	2006–2010; 2014–2018
Cuba	Communist Party of Cuba	1959–
Dominican Republic	Dominican Liberation Party	1996–2000; 2004–
Dominican Republic	Dominican Revolutionary Party	2000–2004
Ecuador	Proud and Sovereign Homeland	2007–2021
El Salvador	Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front	2009–2019
Nicaragua	Sandinista National Liberation Front	2007–
Panama	Democratic Revolutionary Party	1994–1999; 2004–2009
Paraguay	Guasú Front	2008–2012
Peru	Peruvian Nationalist Party	2011–2016
Uruguay	Broad Front	2005–2020
Venezuela	United Socialist Party of Venezuela	1998–

Source: the author; São Paulo Forum.

Figure 1. Normalized level of capital controls – Latin America – unweighted country shares – 1995–2017.

Source: the author based on Fernandez et al. (2016); Chinn and Ito (2006, 2008).

Table 2. Descriptive statistics.

Variable	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
FSP	391	0.3581	0.4800	0.0000	1.0000
ECI	389	−0.2037	0.5083	−1.3429	1.1604
CRED	388	35.9284	21.5317	8.7718	110.6498
DEM	391	7.7980	1.9618	−3.0000	10.0000
CCRISIS	391	0.1432	0.3507	0.0000	1.0000
GDPPC	391	9.3846	4.5455	2.6154	23.5445
TO	391	61.0732	27.6505	15.6356	166.6986
GOVEXP	391	14.3615	4.4478	5.3160	34.3212
TT	391	98.7534	6.1616	66.8737	110.0975
INFLOWS	391	2.5600	5.4646	−23.5535	63.9388

Table 3. Baseline model.

	Model 1	Model 2
	CCI	CCI
FSP	0.1878**	0.2123***
	(0.0726)	(0.0731)
ECI		−0.1237
		(0.0960)
CRED		−0.0031
		(0.0039)
DEM		−0.0400***
		(0.0139)
CCRISIS		−0.0845
		(0.0553)
TT		0.0074
		(0.0076)
INFLOWS		0.0041**
		(0.0019)
GDPPC		0.0010
		(0.0277)
TO		−0.0037**
		(0.0018)
GOVEXP		0.0165
		(0.0112)
Constant	0.7831**	0.2960
	(0.3941)	(0.8330)
N	391	388
Country	17	17
R^2	0.5678	0.6521
Waldchi^2	1317.53	27385.37
Prob > chi^2	0.0000	0.0000

Notes: OLS with panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses.

AR 1 correction, country fixed effects, and year fixed effects are not shown.

All right-hand-side variables are lagged one period.

* Significant at 10%; two-tailed tests.

** Significant at 5%; two-tailed tests.

*** Significant at 1%; two-tailed tests.

Table 4. Model with the interaction between post-neoliberal governments and economic interests.

	Model 3	Model 4
	CCI	CCI
FSP	0.5207***	0.2417***
	(0.1414)	(0.0781)
ECI	−0.1347	−0.1936*
	(0.1000)	(0.1009)
CRED	−0.0008	−0.0031
	(0.0036)	(0.0039)
DEM	−0.0373**	−0.0422***
	(0.0146)	(0.0139)
CCRISIS	−0.0667	−0.0815
	(0.0541)	(0.0555)
TT	0.0056	0.0083
	(0.0075)	(0.0077)
INFLOWS	0.0035*	0.0043**
	(0.0019)	(0.0019)
GDPPC	0.0088	−0.0011
	(0.0279)	(0.0276)
TO	−0.0033*	−0.0034*
	(0.0018)	(0.0019)
GOVEXP	0.0179	0.0159
	(0.0114)	(0.0112)
FSP*CRED	−0.0066**
	(0.0031)
FSP*ECI		0.1509
		(0.1105)
Constant	0.2157	0.2299
	(0.8353)	(0.8383)
N	388	388
Country	17	17
R^2	0.6593	0.6535
Waldchi^2	18840.65	24596.35
Prob > chi^2	0.0000	0.0000

Notes: OLS with panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses.

AR 1 correction, country fixed effects, and year fixed effects are not shown.

All right-hand-side variables are lagged one period.

* Significant at 10%; two-tailed tests.

** Significant at 5%; two-tailed tests.

*** Significant at 1%; two-tailed tests.

Table 5. Model with the duration of post-neoliberal governments.

	Model 5	Model 6
	CCI	CCI
AFSP	0.0720***	0.0722***
	(0.0129)	(0.0139)
ECI		−0.0360
		(0.0915)
CRED		−0.0011
		(0.0038)
DEM		−0.0236*
		(0.0125)
CCRISIS		−0.0923*
		(0.0511)
TT		0.0041
		(0.0077)
INFLOWS		0.0039**
		(0.0019)
GDPPC		0.0011
		(0.0275)
TO		−0.0033*
		(0.0019)
GOVEXP		0.0212*
		(0.0121)
Constant	0.6767*	0.2877
	(0.3845)	(0.8548)
N	391	388
Country	17	17
R^2	0.5463	0.6270
Waldchi^2	1543.39	27955.50
Prob > chi^2	0.0000	0.0000

Notes: OLS with panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses.

Country fixed effects, AR1 correction and year fixed effects are not shown.

All right-hand-side variables are lagged one period.

* Significant at 10%; two-tailed tests.

** Significant at 5%; two-tailed tests.

*** Significant at 1%; two-tailed tests.

Table 6. Model with governments led by members of the socialist international.

	Model 7	Model 8
	CCI	CCI
SI	−0.1381**	−0.1070*
	(0.0621)	(0.0584)
ECI		−0.1538*
		(0.0916)
CRED		−0.0039
		(0.0038)
DEM		−0.0376***
		(0.0133)
CCRISIS		−0.0909
		(0.0560)
TT		0.0067
		(0.0073)
INFLOWS		0.0015
		(0.0019)
GDPPC		0.0008
		(0.0274)
TO		−0.0021
		(0.0019)
GOVEXP		0.0080
		(0.0105)
Constant	0.8498**	0.5081
	(0.3766)	(0.8069)
N	391	388
Country	17	17
R^2	0.6064	0.6549
Waldchi^2	2.91E + 16	79442.31
Prob > chi^2	0.0000	0.0000

Notes: OLS with panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses.

AR 1 correction, country fixed effects, and year fixed effects are not shown.

All right-hand-side variables are lagged one period.

* Significant at 10%; two-tailed tests.

** Significant at 5%; two-tailed tests.

*** Significant at 1%; two-tailed tests.

Fernandez, A., Klein, M., Rebucci, A., Schindler, M., & Uribe, M. (2016). Capital control measures: A new dataset. IMF Economic Review, 64(3), 548–574. https://doi.org/10.1057/imfer.2016.11

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Data availability statement

The author confirms that the data supporting the findings of this study are available within the article or its supplementary materials.