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Research Article

Partisanship, protection, and punishment: how governments affect the distributional consequences of International Monetary Fund programs

Bernhard Reinsberga University of Glasgow, Glasgow, UK;b Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, UKCorrespondence[email protected]

https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7382-413X View further author information

M. Rodwan Abouharbc University College London, London, UK

https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4181-7060 View further author information

Figures & data

Table 1. Partisanship and pocketbook evaluations comparing program countries and non-program countries.

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Figure 1. Partisan allegiance, public-sector employment, and IMF SAP assessments.

Notes: Sample includes only IMF program countries and individuals who are aware of the IMF SAP.

Table 2. Partisanship, public-sector employment, and pocketbook evaluations in program countries.

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Table 3. Partisanship and pocketbook evaluations in program countries at different levels of government discretion.

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Table 4. Partisanship and deprivation comparing program countries and non-program countries.

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Data availability statement

Replication material for this article is available on Harvard Dataverse (https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/INTTLH).

Partisanship, protection, and punishment: how governments affect the distributional consequences of International Monetary Fund programs

Table 1. Partisanship and pocketbook evaluations comparing program countries and non-program countries.

Table 2. Partisanship, public-sector employment, and pocketbook evaluations in program countries.

Table 3. Partisanship and pocketbook evaluations in program countries at different levels of government discretion.

Table 4. Partisanship and deprivation comparing program countries and non-program countries.

Supplemental Material

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Partisanship, protection, and punishment: how governments affect the distributional consequences of International Monetary Fund programs

Figures & data

Table 1. Partisanship and pocketbook evaluations comparing program countries and non-program countries.

Table 2. Partisanship, public-sector employment, and pocketbook evaluations in program countries.

Table 3. Partisanship and pocketbook evaluations in program countries at different levels of government discretion.

Table 4. Partisanship and deprivation comparing program countries and non-program countries.

Supplemental Material

Data availability statement

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