Representation and presentation

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Notes

Anthony Uhlmann

School of Humanities

University of Western Sydney

Locked Bag 1797

Penrith South DC, NSW 1797

Australia

E‐mail: [email protected]

Beckett, Image 168.

Notably Rodowick (ed.) and Flaxman (ed.).

For a discussion of this point see Eric Alliez. On the indivisibility of movement in Bergson (and that there are no instants), see Bergson, Matter 188–92.

A number of philosophers, however, including Nietzsche, Bergson and Michèle Le Doeuff, have demonstrated how important the image is within philosophical thinking.

This complex process, implied in Bergson's theories, is discussed elsewhere in Deleuze's work in relation to Spinoza; see Deleuze, “On the Difference.”

For discussions of this identification, see Jean‐Clet Martin and François Zourabichvili.

Though this seems difficult; see Deleuze, Cinema 1 214–15.

See Uhlmann, chapter 2, on this point.

This is apparent in a much earlier (c.1873) definition of the “sign”: “A sign is an object which stands for another to some mind” (Peirce 141).

The affection‐image, the action‐image and the relation‐image, which correspond to Peirce's categories of Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness (Deleuze, Cinema 2 31)

This process of reflex recognition is related to systems that are socially determined and be‐long to groups (such as language), developed through experience, or that work directly through stimulus response as true reflex.

Peirce spends a good deal of time critiquing the notion of “intuition” and arguing that it is impossible. It should be noted that he is not directly confronting Bergson here; rather, he is critiquing a notion of intuition as a direct kind of conceptual knowledge, such as Descartes's “clear and distinct” idea which Peirce sees as being put forth as occurring without any prior interpretation. I would argue that Bergson's intuition is a more complex concept, one which does not give one access to clear concepts; rather, the intuition carries with it the imperative that one seeks to express it, but it can never be contained adequately either by concepts or images (see Bergson, “Philosophical”). From this point of view Peirce's critiques might be said to be directed at a different conception of intuition from that found in Bergson. This is not, by any means, to claim they would have been in complete agreement.

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anthony uhlmann

Anthony Uhlmann School of Humanities University of Western Sydney Locked Bag 1797 Penrith South DC, NSW 1797 Australia E‐mail: [email protected]