The military and democratisation in post-Mugabe Zimbabwe

ABSTRACT

This article discusses the continued dominance of the Zimbabwean military in the political developments in the country. It is the product of data collected through review of available literature and interviews with officials in both the public and private sectors. The article argues that the recent military intervention in electoral politics, the continuing factional wars within ZANU-PF, and the veto of parliamentary resolutions by Zimbabwe’s military largely demonstrate a regression of democracy in which the military elite’s narrow interests are cloaked in the national interest. It establishes that President Emmerson Mnangagwa assumed power in 2017 following the departure of President Robert Mugabe mostly due to pressure from the military, a force that remains the key determinant factor in who rules Zimbabwe. Consequently, the analysis concludes, the Zimbabwean military is likely to continue hamstringing democratisation as long as it remains embedded in the country’s partisan politics.

KEYWORDS:

• Zimbabwe
• military
• democracy
• Mugabe
• Mnangagwa

Acknowledgements

This paper was presented at a joint postgraduate students’ conference on International Relations and African Affairs, hosted by the University of Johannesburg and the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, in December 2019, under the auspices of the Department of Politics and International Relations and the SARChI Chair in African Diplomacy and Foreign Policy at the University of Johannesburg. I would like to thank the organisers and participants of that conference for affording me the opportunity to present my ideas and for giving insightful feedback. I also extend my profound gratitude to my supervisors, Dr Fritz Nganje and Prof Anne Barbara Chikwanha, the South African Journal of International Affairs editor, Dr Martha Bridgman and two anonymous reviewers for their insightful comments and criticisms.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Note on contributor

Enock Ndawana is a PhD student in the Department of Politics and International Relations at the University of Johannesburg, South Africa and a temporary-full time lecturer in the War and Strategic Studies Section of the Department of History at the University of Zimbabwe. His research interests include: African security, human security, gender and conflict, conflict resolution and transformation. More recently, his work has been published in refereed journals that include Africa Review, African Security Review, African Security, Migration and Development, Jadavpur Journal of International Relations, Journal of African Military History, the International Journal of Military History and Historiography and Small Wars and Insurgencies.

Notes

1 See for instance, D Kuehn, ‘Midwives or Gravediggers of Democracy? The Military’s Impact on Democratic Development,’ Democratization 24, no. 5 (2017): 783–800; Z Barany, ‘Comparing the Arab Revolts: The Role of the Military,’ Journal of Democracy 22, no. 4 (2011): 28–39.

2 I use the term ‘military’ in this article for the sake of consistency to refer to the broader security services sector, that is: the army, police, prison service and Central Intelligence Organisation as these organisations were mostly involved together in the militarisation processes in Zimbabwe although the army was dominant in most of the cases.

3 See for instance, B-M Tendi, ‘Ideology, Civilian Authority and the Zimbabwean Military,’ Journal of Southern African Studies 39, no. 4 (2013): 829–43; B-M Tendi, The Army and Politics in Zimbabwe: Mujuru, the Liberation Fighter and Kingmaker (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020); C Mangongera, ‘The Military vs. Democracy,’ Journal of Democracy 25, no. 2 (2014): 67–76; G Maringira, Soldiers and the State in Zimbabwe (London and New York: Routledge, 2019); S Ndlovu-Gatsheni, ‘Nationalist-Military Alliance and the Fate of Democracy in Zimbabwe,’ African Journal of Conflict Resolution 6, no. 1 (2006): 49–80. On the other hand, the nascent scholarship discussing how the military ended Mugabe’s rule include: SR Dorman, ‘The End of the Mugabe Era in Zimbabwe,’ Current History 117, no. 799 (2018): 163–8; D Moore, ‘A Very Zimbabwean Coup: November 13–24, 2017,’ Transformation 97 (2018): 1–29; R Southall, ‘Bob’s Out, the Croc Is In: Continuity or Change in Zimbabwe?’ Africa Spectrum 52, no. 3 (2017): 81–94; E Ndawana, ‘The Military and Democratization: A Comparison of the Egyptian and Zimbabwean experiences,’ African Security 11, no. 2 (2018): 127–59; B-M Tendi, ‘The Motivations and Dynamics of Zimbabwe’s 2017 Military Coup,’ African Affairs 119, no. 474 (2020): 39–67.

4 A Schedler, ‘Authoritarianism's Last Line of Defense,’ Journal of Democracy 21, no. 1 (2010): 69.

5 These include: N Beardsworth, N Cheeseman, and S Tinhu, ‘Zimbabwe: The Coup that Never was, and the Election that Could Have been,’ African Affairs 118, no. 472 (2019): 580–96; M Hove, ‘When a Political Party Turns against Its Cadres: ZANU-PF Factional Infightings 2004–2017,’ African Security 12, no. 2 (2019): 200–33.

6 The MDC split several times (2005, 2014 and 2018) since its formation but in this article the term MDC is used for consistency’s sake to refer to the main faction that remained vibrant with the founding leader, Morgan Tsvangirai until his death in mid-February 2018. He was succeeded by Nelson Chamisa who contested the 2018 elections under the MDC Alliance banner. As a result, where the other factions are mentioned an effort is made to distinguish them.

7 G O'Donnell and PC Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986); A Przeworski and F Limongi, ‘Modernization: Theories and Facts,’ World Politics 49, no. 2 (1997): 155–83.

8 L Rakner, AR Menocal, and V Fritz, ‘Democratisation’s Third Wave and the Challenges of Democratic Deepening: Assessing International Democracy Assistance and Lessons Learned’, Good Governance, Aid Modalities and Poverty Reduction: Linkages to the Millennium Development Goals and Implications for Irish Aid (Working Paper 1, Westminster: Overseas Development Institute, 2007), 12.

9 Rakner, Menocal, and Fritz, ‘Democratisation’s Third Wave and the Challenges of Democratic Deepening,’ 7.

10 Rakner, Menocal , and Fritz, ‘Democratisation’s Third Wave and the Challenges of Democratic Deepening,’ 7.

11 G O'Donnell and PC Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule; JJ Linz and A Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America and Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996); A Przeworski, Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991).

12 L Rakner, AR Menocal, and V Fritz, ‘Democratisation’s Third Wave and the Challenges of Democratic Deepening: Assessing International Democracy Assistance and Lessons Learned’, Good Governance, Aid Modalities and Poverty Reduction: Linkages to the Millennium Development Goals and Implications for Irish Aid (Working Paper 1, Westminster: Overseas Development Institute, 2007), 8.

13 M Ottaway, Democracy Challenged: The Rise of Semi-Authoritarianism (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2003).

14 Przeworski, Democracy and the Market.

15 SJ Hood, Political Development and Democratic Theory: Rethinking Comparative Politics (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2004), 92–3.

16 R Woodward, KN Jenkings, and AJ Williams, ‘Militarisation, Universities and the University Armed Service Units,’ Political Geography 60 (2017): 204.

17 P Dixon, Warrior Nation: War, Militarisation and British Democracy (London: Forces Watch, 2018), 9.

18 R Luckham, ‘The Military, Militarization and Democratization in Africa: A Survey of Literature and Issues,’ African Studies Review 37, no. 2 (1994): 24; J Uyangoda, ‘Introduction,’ in Militarising State, Society and Culture in Asia: Critical Perspectives, ed. J Uyangoda (Kowloon: Asian Regional Exchange for New Alternatives, 2005), 1–3.

19 R Woodward, KN Jenkings, and AJ Williams, ‘Militarisation, Universities and the University Armed Service Units,’ 204.

20 G Maringira, ‘When the Military Became Militarised: Accounts of Zimbabwean National Army Deserters in Exile in South Africa,’ African Security Review 25, no. 1 (2016): 22.

21 K Bowman, ‘The Public Battles over Militarisation and Democracy in Honduras, 1954–1963,’ Journal of Latin American Studies 33, no. 3 (2001): 541.

22 PD Feaver, ‘Civil-Military Relations,’ Annual Review of Political Science, 2, no. 1 (1999): 218.

23 M Lowy, E Sader, and S Gorman, ‘Militarization of the State in Latin America,’ Latin American Perspectives, 12, no. 4 (1985): 8.

24 Lowy, Sader, and Gorman, ‘Militarization of the State in Latin America,’ 9.

25 See for example, S Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1957); SE Finer, The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics (London: Pall Mall, 1962).

26 Lowy, Sader, and Gorman, ‘Militarization of the State in Latin America,’ 8–9.

27 See for example, KS Bowman, Militarization, Democracy, and Development: The Perils of Praetorianism in Latin America (Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania University Press, 2002); JS Fitch, The Armed Forces and Democracy in Latin America (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000); P Silva, ed., The Soldier and the State in South America: Essays in Civil-Military Relations (New York: Palgrave Publishers, 2001); RJ May and V Selochan, eds., The Military and Democracy in Asia and the Pacific (Canberra: The Australian National University, 2004); J Uyangoda, ed., Militarising State, Society and Culture in Asia: Critical Perspectives (Kowloon: Asian Regional Exchange for New Alternatives, 2005).

28 M Abutudu, ‘Human Security in Africa: Challenges and Prospects’ (2005): 109, http://bibliotecavirtual.clacso.org.ar/clacso/sur-sur/20100711021155/9_Abutudu.pdf; L Nathan, ‘Good Governance, Security and Disarmament in Africa,’ African Journal of Political Science 3, no. 2 (1998): 69–79.

29 RJ May and V Selochan, eds., The Military and Democracy in Asia and the Pacific (Canberra: The Australian National University, 2004); J Uyangoda, ed., Militarising State, Society and Culture in Asia: Critical Perspectives (Kowloon: Asian Regional Exchange for New Alternatives, 2005).

30 See for instance, EA Nordlinger, Soldiers in Politics. Military Coups and Governments (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1977), 65; G O'Donnell and PC Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, 62; D Kuehn, ‘Midwives or Gravediggers of Democracy?,’ 791–3.

31 A Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics, Brazil and the Southern Cone (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988), xi; HB Nassif, ‘Coups and Nascent Democracies: The Military and Egypt's Failed Consolidation,’ Democratization 24, no. 1 (2017): 159; S Decalo, ‘Military Coups and Military regimes in Africa,’ The Journal of Modern African Studies 11, no. 1 (1973): 109.

32 RJ May, ‘Government and the Military in Papua New Guinea,’ in The Military and Democracy in Asia and the Pacific, ed. R May and V Selochan (Canberra: The Australian National University, 2004), 174–5.

33 R Luckham, ‘Armaments, Underdevelopment and Demilitarisation in Africa,’ Alternatives 6 (1980): 179.

34 For several case studies in Africa, see, R Bereketeab, ed., National Liberation Movements as Governments in Africa (London: Routledge, 2018).

35 See for example, R Luckham, ‘The Military, Militarization and Democratization in Africa,’ 13–75.

36 K Matlosa and DD Zounmenou, ‘The Tension between Militarisation and Democratisation in West Africa: A Comparative Analysis between Niger and Guinea,’ Journal of African Elections 10, no. 2, (2011): 95.

37 A Omara-Otunnu, ‘The Struggle for Democracy in Uganda,’ The Journal of Modern African Studies 30, no. 3 (1992): 445.

38 J Uyangoda, ‘Introduction,’ in Militarising State, Society and Culture in Asia: Critical Perspectives, ed. J Uyangoda (Kowloon: Asian Regional Exchange for New Alternatives, 2005), 3.

39 N Tian, A Fleurant, A Kuimova, PD Wezeman, and ST Wezeman, Trends in World Military Expenditure, 2017, 2018, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/sipri_fs_1805_milex_2017.pd.

40 JP Smaldone, ‘African Military Spending: Defence versus Development,’ African Security Review 15, no. 4 (2006): 17–32.

41 I de Soysa, T Jackson, and CM Ormhaug, ‘Tools of the Torturer? Small Arms Imports and Repression of Human Rights, 1992–2004,’ The International Journal of Human Rights 14, no. 3 (2010): 378–93.

42 UNDP, Human Development Report 1994: New Dimensions of Human Security (New York: United Nations Development Programme, 1994), 33.

43 See, JS Fitch, The Armed Forces and Democracy in Latin America, xv–xvii; IL Horowitz, ‘Military Origins of Third World Dictatorship and Democracy,’ Third World Quarterly 3, no. 1 (1981): 39–41; RJ May and V Selochan, eds., The Military and Democracy in Asia and the Pacific (Canberra: The Australian National University, 2004), 7.

44 For example see, A El-Battahani, ‘The Sudan Armed Forces and the Prospects of Change,’ CMI Insight, April 2016, no. 03, https://www.cmi.no/publications/file/5790-the-sudan-armed-forces-and-prospects-of-change.pdf; AH Adam, ‘The Political Calculations of Sudan’s Military Regime,’ Aljazeera, April 20, 2019, https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/political-calculations-sudan-military-regime-190420090754507.html; E Hussein and C De Martino, ‘Egypt’s Military Post-2011: Playing Politics without Internal Cracks,’ Contemporary Arab Affairs 12, no. 1 (2019): 55–74; E Ndawana, ‘The Military and Democratization,’ 127–59.

45 See, AH Adam, ‘The Political Calculations of Sudan’s Military Regime,’ Aljazeera, April 20, 2019, https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/political-calculations-sudan-military-regime-190420090754507.html; E Hussein and C De Martino, ‘Egypt’s Military Post-2011,’ 55–74.

46 D Pion-Berlin, ‘Military Autonomy and Emerging Democracies in South America,’ Comparative Politics 25, no. 1 (1992): 83.

47 R Williams, ‘Towards the Creation of an African Civil-Military Relations Tradition,’ African Journal of Political Science 3, no. 1 (1998): 20–41.

48 F Vrey, ‘Strategic Culture of the Southern African Development Community: Militarised Pathways to Security?’ African Journal on Conflict Resolution 9, no. 1 (2009): 67.

49 SJ Ndlovu-Gatsheni, ‘Dynamics of the Zimbabwe Crisis in the 21st Century,’ African Journal on Conflict Resolution 3, no.1 (2003): 104–105.

50 See, Sections 208 and 211 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No. 20) Act, 2013, http://www.zhrc.org.zw/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/Constitution-of-Zimbabwe.pdf; Defence Act [Chapter 11:02], https://parlzim.gov.zw/acts-list/download/684_ef93ac5a9f6aa1351c7dbb3536294330; Police Act [Chapter 11:10], https://zimlii.org/zw/legislation/num-act/1995/2/Police%20Act%20Chapter%2011%2010.pdf; Prisons Act [Chapter 7:11], http://www.icla.up.ac.za/images/un/use-of-force/africa/Zimbabwe/Prisons%20Act.pdf.

51 S Ndlovu-Gatsheni, ‘Nationalist-Military Alliance,’ 51.

52 EV Masunungure, ‘Zimbabwe’s Militarized, Electoral Authoritarianism,’ Journal of International Affairs 65, no. 1 (2011): 55.

53 SJ Hood, Political Development and Democratic Theory, 92–3.

54 See for example, M Hove and E Ndawana, ‘Regime Change Agenda: the Egyptian Experience from 2011 to 2015,’ Contemporary Arab Affairs 10, no. 1 (2017): 32–50; DB Ottaway, The Arab World Upended: Revolution and Its Aftermath in Tunisia and Egypt (Boulder: Lynnne Rienner Publishers, 2017); R Springborg, ‘The Rewards of Failure: Persisting Military Rule in Egypt,’ British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 44, no. 4 (2017): 478–96.

55 EB Tsigo and E Ndawana, ‘Unsung Heroes?: The Rhodesian Defence Regiment and Counterinsurgency, 1973–80,’ International Journal of Military History and Historiography 39, no. 1 (2019); 96.

56 A Alao, ‘The Metamorphosis of the “Unorthodox”: The Integration and Early Development of the Zimbabwe National Army,’ in Soldiers in Zimbabwe’s Liberation War, ed. N Bhebe and T Ranger (London: James Currey, 1995), 104–117; NJ Kriger, Guerrilla Veterans in Post-war Zimbabwe: Symbolic and Violent Politics 1980–1987 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

57 ET Young, ‘Chefs and Worried Soldiers: Authority and Power in the Zimbabwe National Army,’ Armed Forces & Society 24, no. 1 (1997): 133–49.

58 For details, see Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Zimbabwe and the Legal Resources Foundation, Breaking the Silence Building True Peace: A Report on the Disturbances in Matabeleland and the Midlands 1980-1988 (Harare: Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Zimbabwe and the Legal Resources Foundation, 1997).

59 P Jackson, ‘The Civil War Roots of Military Domination in Zimbabwe: The Integration Process Following the Rhodesian War and the Road to ZANLA Dominance,’ Civil Wars 13, no. 4 (2011): 385–86; B-M Tendi, ‘State Intelligence and the Politics of Zimbabwe’s Presidential Succession,’ African Affair, 115, no. 459 (2016): 211–12.

60 Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Zimbabwe and the Legal Resources Foundation, Breaking the Silence Building True Peace: A Report on the Disturbances in Matabeleland and the Midlands 1980–1988 (Harare: Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Zimbabwe and the Legal Resources Foundation, 1997).

61 J Muzondidya, ‘From Buoyancy to Crisis, 1980–1997,’ in Becoming Zimbabwe: A History from the Precolonial Period to 2008, ed. B Raftopoulos and A Mlambo (Harare: Weaver Press, 2009), 167–200.

62 EV Masunungure, ‘Zimbabwe’s Militarized, Electoral Authoritarianism,’ Journal of International Affairs 65, no. 1 (2011): 47–64.

63 J Alexander, ‘Militarisation and State Institutions: “Professionals” and “Soldiers” inside the Zimbabwe Prison Service,’ Journal of Southern African Studies 39, no. 4 (2013): 811–12.

64 M Rupiya, ‘Zimbabwe: Governance through Military Operations,’ African Security Review,14, no. 3 (2005): 117.

65 W Mhanda, Dzino: Memories of a Freedom Fighter (Harare: Weaver Press, 2011), 235. The major state-sponsored military-style operations after 2000 include operation Murambatsvina, (Restore Order), operation Garikai/Hlalani Kuhle (Live Well), operation Taguta (We Have Eaten), operation Dzikisa Mitengo (Reduce Prices), operation Chikorokoza Chapera (No more Illegal Mining), operation Hakudzokwi (No Return); operation Makavhotera Papi (Who did you vote for?) and operation Dzikisai Madhishi (Remove Your Television Satellite Dishes). All these government by operations emphasise militarisation in that military solutions were prioritised in dealing with every real or perceived security threat.

66 Personal interview, I (pseudonym), senior University of Zimbabwe academic, Harare, 17 September 2019.

67 K Chitiyo and M Rupiya, ‘Tracking Zimbabwe’s Political History: The Zimbabwe Defence Forces from 1980–2005,’ in Evolutions and Revolutions: A Contemporary History of Militaries in Southern Africa, ed. M Rupiya (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2005), 359–60; LM Sachikonye, When a State Turns on its Citizens: 60 years of Institutionalised Violence in Zimbabwe (Oxford: African Books Collective, 2011), 35.

68 Personal interview, GV (pseudonym), MDC senior official, Harare, 11 September 2019; Personal interview, G (pseudonym), senior University of Zimbabwe academic, Harare, 29 August 2019.

69 One of the scholars making such a blunder is C Dendere, ‘Zimbabwe: The Opposition’s Urban Voter Problem,’ African Arguments, July 27, 2017, https://africanarguments.org/2017/07/27/zimbabwe-the-oppositions-urban-voter-problem/. The military has maintained a permanent presence in the rural areas instilling fear and campaigning for ZANU-PF under the guise of various government-initiated programmes such as those linked to agriculture from operation Taguta and Champion Farmer to Command Agriculture. See for example S Nkala, ‘Credible Polls in Doubt: Dabengwa … Claims Military, CIO Deployed in Rural Areas,’ Newsday, June 1, 2018; A Kunambura, ‘Poll Ghost Haunts President,’ Zimbabwe Independent, August 23, 2019; Zimbabwe Institute, ‘The Security-Military Business Complex and the Transition in Zimbabwe,’ Zimbabwe Institute Discussion Paper, June 2008, http://archive.kubatana.net/docs/demgg/ziminst_security_military_business_080630.pdf. Most of my informants also shared the same sentiments. See for example Personal interview, A (pseudonym), serving senior intelligence officer, Harare, 17 July 2019; Personal interview, B (pseudonym), serving senior intelligence officer, Harare, 22 August 2019; Skype interview, DMat (pseudonym), serving civil society senior official based in Harare, 20 August 2019.

70 J Makumbe, The Impact of Democracy in Zimbabwe: Assessing Political, Social and Economic Developments since the Dawn of Democracy (Research Report 119, Johannesburg: Centre for Policy Studies, 2009), 9.

71 See for example, M Bratton and E Masunungure, ‘Zimbabwe’s Long Agony,’ Journal of Democracy 19, no. 4 (2008): 41–55; C Mangongera, ‘The Military vs. Democracy,’ 67–76; S Ndlovu-Gatsheni, ‘Nationalist-Military Alliance,’ 49–80.

72 Apart from Zvinavashe, General Constantine (Constantino) Chiwenga (2008); Prisons boss, retired Major-General Paradzai Zimondi (2008); former police boss, Augustine Chihuri (2008); Brigadier General Sigauke (2008) and then Major-General Douglas Nyikayaramba (2011) made more or less similar declarations. For details see, Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, ‘Zimbabwe National Army has Always been Prepared to Shoot for Zanu PF,’ Crisis Report, October 24, 2018, http://kubatana.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/Crisis-Report-October-24-10-18.pdf.

73 Skype interview, DMat (pseudonym), serving civil society senior official based in Harare, 20 August 2019.

74 B-M Tendi, ‘Ideology, Civilian Authority and the Zimbabwean Military,’ 830.

75 M Rupiya, ‘Calling in the Generals,’ in The Day After Mugabe: The Prospects for Change in Zimbabwe, ed. G Moyo and M Ashurst (London: Africa Research Institute, 2007), 63; see also BC Smith, Understanding Third World Politics: Theories of Political Change and Development. 2nd ed. (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003), 178–9.

76 While this point was emphasised by Dr F Nganje when he commented on my first draft, it was also central in interviews. See Personal interview, H (pseudonym), senior University of Zimbabwe academic, Harare, 4 September 2019; Personal interview, I (pseudonym), senior University of Zimbabwe academic, Harare, 17 September 2019.

77 Personal interview, B (pseudonym), serving senior intelligence officer, Harare, 22 August 2019; Personal interview, E (pseudonym), serving senior police officer, Harare, 27 August 2019; Personal interview, C (pseudonym), serving middle ranking soldier, Harare, 2 August 2019; Personal interview, GV (pseudonym), MDC senior official, Harare, 11 September 2019; Personal interview, K (pseudonym), MDC senior official, 12 October 2019.

78 Pre-bendalism denotes a form of ‘elite clientelism practised by a head of government who awards persons with positions in the state, which the appointees treat as an entitlement and use to gain personal access to resources. See B-M Tendi, ‘Ideology, Civilian Authority and the Zimbabwean Military,’ 841.

79 Tendi, ‘Ideology, Civilian Authority and the Zimbabwean Military,’ 841.

80 A Noyes, ‘Securing Reform? Power Sharing and Civil-Security Relations in Kenya and Zimbabwe,’ African Studies Quarterly 13, no. 4 (2013): 33; G Moyo, ‘The Curse of Military Commercialism in State Enterprises and Parastatals in Zimbabwe,’ Journal of Southern African Studies 42, no. 2 (2016): 356.

81 Skype interview, DMat (pseudonym), serving civil society senior official based in Harare, 20 August 2019; Personal interview, GV (pseudonym), MDC senior official, Harare, 11 September 2019; WhatsApp call interview, M (pseudonym), a former MDC senior official and minister during the Government of National Unity, 17 October 2019.

82 M Hove, ‘The Necessity of Security Sector Reform in Zimbabwe,’ Politikon 44, no. 3 (2017): 425–45; C Mangongera, ‘A New Twilight in Zimbabwe?: The Military vs. Democracy,’ Journal of Democracy 25, no. 2 (2014): 67–76.

83 The accusations against Mujuru’s bid to succeed Mugabe ranged from attempts to bewitch Mugabe to her involvement in promiscuous relationships with other ZANU-PF elites. For details, see B-M Tendi, ‘State Intelligence and the Politics of Zimbabwe’s Presidential Succession,’ African Affairs 115, no. 459 (2016): 203–24.

84 I am mindful that the post-Mugabe era has not witnessed a faction free ZANU-PF because Mnangagwa and Chiwenga are alleged to have started leading two factions in which it is still too early to tell where these will be heading but suffice to say that Chiwenga’s side has strong army backing. See, W Zhangazha and H Ndebele, ‘Mnangagwa, Chiwenga Power Clashes Intensify,’ Zimbabwe Independent, May 4, 2018; P Muzulu, ‘ED’s Military Shake up: Smoke and Mirrors,’ Newsday, March 7, 2019.

85 B-M Tendi, ‘The Motivations and Dynamics of Zimbabwe’s 2017 Military Coup,’ 39–67.

86 H Ndebele, ‘China’s ‘Gang of Four’ tale replays in Zim,’ Zimbabwe Independent, November 17, 2017; A Tapfumaneyi , ‘When the Gun Gets Angry … ,’ The Sunday Mail, November 26, 2017.

87 Zimbabwe Independent, ‘How Army Takeover was Executed?,’ November 17, 2017.

88 See for instance, B Mpofu, ‘Chiwenga Faces Uncertain Future,’ Zimbabwe Independent, April 8, 2016; B Mpofu, ‘Mugabe to Reshuffle Key Security Bosses,’ Zimbabwe Independent, October 20, 2017.

89 There were successful demonstrations organised by the Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans’ Association in solidarity with the military involvement in ZANU-PF factional wars on 18 November 2017 which made it appear to have popular support. Again, the ruling party’s Central Committee met on 19 November 2017 and resolved that it had removed Mugabe as the first secretary of the party. The day Mugabe resigned on 21 November 2017, an impeachment process initiated by the ZANU-PF party which had largely become composed of the Mnangagwa faction and had courted MDC support had just begun. This paved way for Mnangagwa who was sworn in as president of Zimbabwe on 24 November 2017 following the forwarding of his name to the Speaker of Parliament a day after Mugabe’s resignation by ZANU-PF. For details see B Mananavire, ‘Aide recounts Mugabe’s Last Days,’ Daily News, January 14, 2018.

90 B-M Tendi, ‘Ideology, Civilian Authority and the Zimbabwean Military,’ 841.

91 Personal interview, B (pseudonym), serving senior intelligence officer, Harare, 22 August 2019; Personal interview, H (pseudonym), senior University of Zimbabwe academic, Harare, 4 September 2019.

92 R Chidza, ‘Police, Army Clashes Mystery Deepens,’ Newsday, August 5, 2017.

93 T Mugabe, ‘Security Forces on High Alert: Chiwenga,’ The Chronicle, April 19, 2016; R Chidza, ‘Jonathan Moyo Pokes Chiwenga,’ Newsday, April 21, 2016; T Maodza, ‘Of “chinhu chedu” and Political Economy … Unpacking Operation Restore Legacy,’ The Herald, November 27, 2017.

94 WhatsApp call interview, M (pseudonym), a former MDC senior official and minister during the Government of National Unity, 17 October 2019.

95 Personal interview, A (pseudonym), serving senior intelligence officer, Harare, 17 July 2019.

96 Personal interview, I (pseudonym), senior University of Zimbabwe academic, Harare, 17 September 2019.

97 A Kunambura, ‘New Power Struggle Rocks Zanu PF,’ Zimbabwe Independent, November 23, 2018; F Kwaramba , ‘Mnangagwa Keeps Chiwenga in Check,’ The Zimbabwe Mail, September 12, 2018, https://www.thezimbabwemail.com/zimbabwe/mnangagwa-keeps-chiwenga-in-check/.

98 Kunambura, ‘New Power Struggle Rocks Zanu PF’; Kwaramba, ‘Mnangagwa Keeps Chiwenga in Check.’

99 T Kamhungira, ‘Mnangagwa Tightens Grip on Power,’ Daily News, December 30, 2017.

100 B Mhlanga, ‘ED Elbows out Rugeje,’ Newsday, June 11, 2019.

101 These include but are not limited to: retired Major Anywhere Mutambudzi, retired Major-General Paradzai Zimondi, Major Utoile Silaigwana, retired Major-General Thando Madzvamuse and retired Lieutenant-General Douglas Nyikayaramba.

102 A Magaisa, ‘Zimbabwe: An Opportunity Lost,’ Journal of Democracy 30, no. 1 (2019): 143–57.

103 Zimbabwe Election Support Network, Report on the 30 July 2018 Harmonised Elections, 2018, 72, http://www.zesn.org.zw/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/Final-ZESN-2018-Harmonised-Election-Report.pdf.

104 A Kunambura, ‘Poll Ghost Haunts President,’ Zimbabwe Independent, August 23, 2019.

105 About 383 security sector personnel were employed in the electoral management body’s secretariat. See B Mhlanga and R Chidza, ‘Zec in Soldiers Storm,’ Newsday, March 2, 2018.

106 Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the 1st of August 2018 Post-Election Violence, 2018, v–vii, http://www.postelectionviolencecommission.gov.zw/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/Final%20Report%20of%20the%20Commission%20of%20Inquiry%2018%20%20DEC%2018.pdf.

107 For instance, see, International Republican Institute and National Democratic Institute Election Observation Mission, IRI/NDI Zimbabwe International Election Observation Mission Final Report (Washington, DC: IRI/NDI, 2018), https://www.iri.org/sites/default/files/2018-10-29_final_zieom_report.pdf; The Commonwealth Observer Group, Zimbabwe Harmonised Elections 30 July 2018, 2018, http://thecommonwealth.org/sites/default/files/inline/Zimbabwe%202018%20COG%20Report%20-%20Final.pdf; European Union Election Observation Mission Republic of Zimbabwe Harmonised Elections 2018 Final Report, http://www.veritaszim.net/sites/veritas_d/files/EU%20Election%20Observers%20Final%20Report%20Zimbabwe%202018-.pdf.

108 Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, ‘Darkness at Noon: Inside Mnangagwa’s ‘New’ dispensation,’ February 2019, http://kubatana.net/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/Darkness-at-Noon-Inside-Mnangagwas-New-Dispensation.pdf; European Union Election Observation Mission Republic of Zimbabwe Harmonised Elections 2018 Final Report, 39–40, http://www.veritaszim.net/sites/veritas_d/files/EU%20Election%20Observers%20Final%20Report%20Zimbabwe%202018-.pdf.

109 See, Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the 1st of August 2018 Post-Election Violence, 2018, v–vii, http://www.postelectionviolencecommission.gov.zw/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/Final%20Report%20of%20the%20Commission%20of%20Inquiry%2018%20%20DEC%2018.pdf; Transcript Consolidated Commission of Inquiry into Post-violence 1 August 2018, https://www.scribd.com/document/399177702/Transcript-Consolidated-Commission-of-Inquiry-in-to-Post-violence-1-August-2018-Final-pdf.

110 R Razemba, ‘Only 11 Top Cops Retired: Police,’ The Herald, January 20, 2018; E Mushava, ‘Mnangagwa Fires 17 top CIOs,’ Newsday, March 6, 2018.

111 Zimbabwe Independent, ‘Mnangagwa Reels over Security Sector Reform,’ May 17, 2019.

112 JN Moyo, ‘Zimbabwe a Year after the Coup,’ The Standard, December 2, 2018, https://www.thestandard.co.zw/2018/12/02/zimbabwe-year-coup/. For Zezuru dominance, see, C Maroleng, ‘Zimbabwe's Zezuru Sum Game,’ African Security Review 14, no. 3 (2005): 76-93.

113 Namely Martin Chedondo, Anselem Nhamo Sanyatwe, Douglas Nyikayaramba and Sheba Shumbayawonda, together with retired Major-General Thando Madzvamuse in early 2019. F Share, ‘President Appoints 15 New Ambassadors,’ Chronicle, April 5, 2019.

114 N Mangwana, ‘ED’s Reform Programme Steams Ahead,’ The Sunday Mail, April 28, 2019.

115 Zimbabwe Independent, ‘Mnangagwa Reels over Security Sector Reform,’ May 17, 2019.

116 O Manayiti and X Ncube, ‘ED Purges Chiwenga Top Allies,’ Newsday, February 19, 2019; P Muzulu, ‘ED’s Military Shake up: Smoke and Mirrors,’ Newsday, March 7, 2019.

117 Personal interview, A (pseudonym), serving senior intelligence officer, Harare, 17 July 2019.

118 Zimbabwe Independent, ‘Mnangagwa Reels over Security Sector Reform,’ May 17, 2019.

119 Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission, Monitoring Report in the Aftermath of 14 January to 16 January 2019 ‘Stay Away’ and Subsequent disturbances [Press Release], 28 January 2019, http://www.zhrc.org.zw/monitoring-report-in-the-aftermath-of-the-14-january-to-16-january-2019-stay-away-and-subsequent-disturbances/.

120 F Share, ‘Cabinet Sets up Team to Assess Demo Damage,’ The Herald, January 30, 2019.

121 Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, On the Days of Darkness in Zimbabwe: An Updated Report on the Human Rights Violations Committed between January 14, 2019 to February 5, 2019 (Harare: Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, 2019), 3.

122 K Kuwaza, ‘Internet Shutdown Negatively Impacts on Zim Businesses,’ Zimbabwe Independent, January 25, 2019; N Nkomo, ‘ED Justifies Internet Shutdown,’ Daily News, January 27, 2019.

123 Amnesty International, ‘Open for Business’, Closed for Dissent: Crackdown in Zimbabwe during the National Stay Away 14–16 January 2019 (London: Amnesty International, 2019), 19; K Kuwaza, ‘Internet Shutdown Negatively Impacts on Zim Businesses,’ Zimbabwe Independent, January 25, 2019.

124 Personal interview, C (pseudonym), serving middle ranking soldier, Harare, 2 August 2019.

125 Personal interview, H (pseudonym), senior University of Zimbabwe academic, Harare, 4 September 2019.

126 L Ndebele, ‘Zimbabwe Rallies Banned as Police Fear Massive Turnout on Streets,’ Times Live, August 21, 2019, https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/africa/2019-08-21-zimbabwe-rallies-banned-as-police-fear-massive-turnout-on-streets/.

127 Personal interview, E (pseudonym), serving senior police officer, Harare, 27 August 2019.

128 Zimbabwe Parliamentary Debates, volume 27, number 21, 18 October 2000, starting at column 2130.

129 T Mugabe, ‘Shutdown a Regime Change Attempt: ED,’ The Herald, February 12, 2019; D Musarurwa, ‘US Role in MDC Demonstrations Unmasked,’ The Sunday News, August 18, 2019, https://www.sundaynews.co.zw/us-role-in-mdc-demonstrations-unmasked/.

130 See for example, B Mananavire, ‘Mnangagwa Now Face Tough Political Choices,’ Zimbabwe Independent, June 22, 2019; B Mhlanga, ‘We’ll Overthrow ED Govt: MDC,’ Newsday, July 8, 2019; B Mhlanga and X Ncube, ‘Prices will Destroy Zanu PF: Chamisa,’ Newsday, May 29, 2019; T Karombo, ‘MDC’s Job Sikhala says Mnangagwa will be Overthrown before 2023,’ Zimlive.com, July 8, 2019, https://www.zimlive.com/2019/07/08/mdcs-job-sikhala-says-mnangagwa-will-be-overthrown-before-2023/.

131 Voice of America, ‘Zimbabwe Police Arrest MDC Youth Leader as Party VC Job Sikhala Faces Subversion Charges,’ July 10, 2019, https://www.voazimbabwe.com/a/zimbabwe-ostallos-siziba-arrested-job-sikhala/4994561.html.

132 Amnesty International, ‘Zimbabwe: Mnangagwa’s First Year in Office Marked by a “Systematic and Brutal Crackdown on Human Rights”,’ August 26, 2019, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2019/08/zimbabwe-mnangagwas-first-year-in-office-marked-by-a-systematic-and-brutal-crackdown-on-human-rights/; K Mugari, ‘Govt Shoots Down Amnesty International,’ The Herald, August 28, 2019.

133 Past support from SADC for Zimbabwe’s government in the face of civil protests as well as growing demands to uphold rule of law under Mugabe are well documented. See L Nathan, ‘The Disbanding of the SADC Tribunal: A Cautionary Tale,’ Human Rights Quarterly 13 (2013): 870–92; W Scholtz and G Ferreira, ‘Much Ado about Nothing? The SADC Tribunal’s Quest for the Rule of Law Pursuant to Regional Integration,’ ZaöRV 71 (2011): 331–58; M Hove and E Ndawana, ‘Regional Mediation Strategy: The Case of Zimbabwe,’ African Security Review 25, no. 1 (2016): 63–84.

134 Zimbabwe has been under unilateral sanctions imposed by the West, especially the European Union and the US since the early 2000s as a result of a combination of factors ranging from misgovernance and poor human rights record, especially during the implementation of the fast track land reform programme to the conduct of elections characterised by irregularities. See M Hove and E Ndawana, ‘How Cuba Survived Sanctions and the Lessons for Zimbabwe,’ Jadavpur Journal of International Relations, Advance online, 2020, 6–7, doi:10.1177/0973598420911856.

135 The Herald, ‘SADC backs Zimbabwe against Onslaught,’ February 12, 2019.

136 D Musarurwa, ‘SADC Declares Anti-Sanctions Day,’ The Herald, August 19, 2019.

137 See, B Raftopoulos, ‘Responses to Zimbabwe Highlight Gulf between the Region and the West,’ The Conversation, March 10, 2019, https://theconversation.com/responses-to-zimbabwe-highlight-gulf-between-the-region-and-the-west-112973.

138 K Bwititi, ‘President Focuses on Economy, Livelihoods,’ The Sunday Mail, November 26, 2017.

139 D Dore, ‘An Art of Creating Money: An Appraisal of Zimbabwe’s Economy,’ Southern Africa Report 18, November 2018 https://issafrica.org/research/southern-africa-report/the-art-of-creating-money-an-appraisal-of-zimbabwes-economy; International Monetary Fund, Zimbabwe: 2019 Article IV Consultation - Press Release; Staff Report; and Statement by the Executive Director for Zimbabwe, 2020, IMF Country Report No. 20/82, https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/Issues/2020/03/19/Zimbabwe-2019-Article-IV-Consultation-Press-Release-Staff-Report-and-Statement-by-the-49283.

140 For details see, J Burke and N Chingono, ‘Millions Face Hardship as Zimbabwe Comes Close to Meltdown,’ The Guardian, July 21, 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jul/21/millions-face-hardship-as-zimbabwe-comes-close-to-meltdown; T Kairiza, ‘Re-Engagement Drive: Govt Should Prioritise Its Citizens,’ Zimbabwe Independent, July 19, 2019.

141 M Tafirenyika, ‘Mnangagwa Has Failed,’ Daily News, March 1, 2018.

142 See for example, N Chingono, ‘Anti-Corruption Campaign Insincere,’ Zimbabwe Independent, April 12, 2019; N Chingono, ‘Missing US$3bn an Indictment on Mnangagwa’s Government,’ Zimbabwe Independent, July 26, 2019; E Mushava, O Manayiti, and X Ncube, ‘Gloves off in Zanu PF,’ Newsday, July 30, 2019; G Kwinjeh, ‘Can Zanu PF Deal with the Corruption Scourge,’ Business Times, August 2, 2019.

143 Skype interview, DMat (pseudonym), serving civil society senior official based in Harare, 20 August 2019.

144 Personal interview, A (pseudonym), serving senior intelligence officer, Harare, 17 July 2019; Personal interview, F (pseudonym), senior University of Zimbabwe academic, Harare, 28 August 2019.

145 Personal interview, E (pseudonym), serving senior police officer, Harare, 27 August 2019.