Political Accountability and Military Spending

Figures & data

Table 1. Descriptive statistics.

Variable	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
Military burden	7477	0.028	0.029	2.97 10^−^7	1.173
Conflict	12,283	0.135	0.341	0	1
Military spending as a share of government expenditure	4029	0.076	0.065	0.000	0.574
Political accountability	10,824	0.55	0.31	0.025	0.982
Vertical accountability	10,824	0.592	0.282	0.059	0.965
Diagonal accountability	10,824	0.55	0.317	0.016	0.982
Horizontal accountability	10,824	0.52	0.308	0.014	0.99
Clientelism	10,824	0.497	0.264	0.018	0.984
Reg. support group size	10,824	2.9	1.03	0.000	3.968
GDP per capita	7997	10,420.81	15,912.36	132.077	116,232.8
Oil rents (% of GDP)	6865	4.324	10.533	0.000	87.369
Population	10,009	3.13 10^7	1.15 10^8	41,700	1.40 10^9
Tax effort (% of GDP)	3694	17.28	8.025	0.000	149.283
Trade (% of GDP)	7475	73.354	48.285	0.020	437.326
Total debt service (% of GDP)	4474	4.864	5.554	0.000	102.220
Political accountability stock (δ 0.99)	11,534	0.141	0.195	0.001	0.819
Political accountability stock (δ0.95)	11,534	0.069	0.083	0.001	0.797
Political accountability stock (δ 0.90)	11,534	0.043	0.049	0.001	0.763

Figure 1. Correlation of accountability measures and military burden in 2015.

Table 2. Results of main specifications.

	Dependent variable: log of military spending as a share of GDP
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Political accountability	−0.242***
	(0.078)
Horizontal accountability		−0.184**
		(0.070)
Vertical accountability			−0.164**
			(0.077)
Diagonal accountability				−0.267***
				(0.078)
Conflict	0.064**	0.066**	0.065**	0.059*
	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.032)
GDP per capita	0.037	0.032	0.037	0.041
	(0.096)	(0.096)	(0.095)	(0.097)
Trade (% of GDP)	−0.0006	−0.0006	−0.0006	−0.0006
	(0.0007)	(0.0007)	(0.0007)	(0.0007)
Tax (% of GDP)	0.008**	0.008**	0.008**	0.008**
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Oil rents (% of GDP)	−0.007	−0.001	−0.0008	−0.0005
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Population	−0.779**	−0.840**	−0.826**	−0.763**
	(0.345)	(0.338)	(0.343)	(0.346)
Country fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country-specific time trends	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3289	3289	3289	3289
Time period	1973-2019	1973-2019	1973-2019	1973-2019
R^2 within	0.727	0.726	0.725	0.727

*p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01

Table 3. Results – robustness tests – alternative measure of military spending.

	Dependent variable: log of military spending as a share of government expenditure
	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Political accountability	−0.594***
	(0.202)
Horizontal accountability		−0.355*
		(0.180)
Vertical accountability			−0.390***
			(0.128)
Diagonal accountability				−0.588***
				(0.199)
Conflict	0.077**	0.082**	0.076*	0.071**
	(0.035)	(0.037)	(0.038)	(0.034)
GDP per capita	0.137	0.141	0.185	0.133
	(0.154)	(0.158)	(0.157)	(0.155)
Trade (% of GDP)	0.0004	0.0002	0.0004	0.0004
	(0.0008)	(0.0008)	(0.0008)	(0.0008)
Tax (% of GDP)	0.0005	0.0003	0.0006	0.0003
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Oil rents (% of GDP)	−0.002	−0.002	−0.001	−0.001
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Population	−0.641**	−0.771	−0.613*	−0.676
	(0.757)	(0.748)	(0.777)	(0.743)
Country fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country-specific time trends	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2424	2424	2424	2424
Time period	1989-2019	1989-2019	1989-2019	1989-2019
R^2 within	0.576	0.571	0.578	0.577

*p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01

Table 4. Results – robustness tests – confounders and outliers.

	Dependent variable: log of military burden
	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)
Political accountability	−0.275***	−0.175*	−0.253***	−0.154*	−0.069	−0.241***	−0.239***	−0.191***
	(0.099)	(0.093)	(0.090)	(0.088)	(0.081)	(0.078)	(0.078)	(0.071)
Regime support group size	0.021
	(0.033)
Military dimension index		0.148*
		(0.085)
Clientelism			−0.047
			(0.266)
Debt service (% of GDP)				−0.001
				(0.003)
Lag of military burden					0.958***
					(0.067)
Conflict	0.064**	0.062**	0.064*	0.059	0.038**	0.064**	0.073**	0.069**
	(0.032)	(0.031)	(0.032)	(0.039)	(0.017)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.029)
GDP per capita	0.041	0.042	0.037	0.064	0.007	0.036	0.066	0.054
	(0.095)	(0.097)	(0.096)	(0.132)	(0.010)	(0.096)	(0.089)	0.081
Trade (% of GDP)	−0.0006	−0.0006	−0.0006	−0.001	−0.000	−0.0006	−0.0006	−0.0004
	(0.0007)	(0.0007)	(0.0007)	(0.001)	(0.0001)	(0.0006)	(0.0006)	0.0006
Tax (% of GDP)	0.008*	0.008*	0.008*	0.019**	0.000	0.008*	0.006*	0.005
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.008)	(0.0009)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Oil rents (% of GDP)	−0.0005	−0.0005	−0.0005	−0.004	−0.0002	−0.0007	−0.0005	−0.001
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.001)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Population	−0.790**	−0.748**	−0.775**	−1.338	0.0000	−0.789**	−0.495	−0.274
	(0.345)	(0.333)	(0.345)	(0.863)	(0.004)	(0.345)	(0.313)	(0.310)
country fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	-	Yes	Yes	Yes
time fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	-	Yes	Yes	Yes
country-specific time trends	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	-	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3289	3289	3289	1655	3263	3289	3289	3289
Time period	1973-2019	1973-2019	1973-2019	1973-2019	-	1973-2019	1973-2019	1973-2019
R^2 within	0.727	0.727	0.727	0.657		0.727	0.730	0.731
AR(1)					0.000
AR(2)					0.055

*p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01

Table 5. Results – Robustness tests – heterogeneity.

	Dependent variable: log of military spending as a share of GDP
	High income (17)	Low income (18)	Closed autocracy (19)	Minimally constrained regimes (20)
Political accountability	−0.322***	−0.415**	−0.345	−0.211*
	(0.111)	(0.167)	(0.325)	(0.118)
Conflict	0.065	0.068	−0.026	0.044
	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.073)	(0.030)
GDP per capita	−0.147	0.355	−0.170	0.066
	(0.098)	(0.236)	(0.424)	(0.108)
Trade (% of GDP)	−0.0001	0.0002	0.005	−0.0005
	(0.0006)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.0007)
Tax (% of GDP)	0.004	0.019*	−0.023	0.008
	(0.003)	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.004)
Oil rents (% of GDP)	0.003	−0.006	0.011	−0.006
	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.005)
Population	−0.125	−0.870	−2.121	−1.013
	(0.397)	(1.052)	(0.481)	(0.384)
country fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
time fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
country-specific time trends	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2167	1122	264	3025
Time period	1973-2019	1988-2019	1973-2019	1973-2019
R^2 within	0.803	0.581	0.766	0.726

*p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01

Table 6. Results of two-stage least-squares regressions.

	Dependent variable: political accountability
	(21)	(22)	(23)
Political accountability stock (δ 1%)	1.347***
	(0.097)
Political accountability stock (δ 5%)		2.346***
		(0.131)
Political accountability stock (δ 10%)			4.447***
			(0.225)
Conflict	−0.045***	−0.036***	−0.031***
	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.009)
GDP per capita	−0.012	0. 013	0.023***
	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.008)
Trade (% of GDP)	−6.15 10^−7	−0.0001**	0.0002***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	0.000
Tax (% of GDP)	0.0005	0.0004	0.0003
	(0.0005)	(0.0005)	(0.0005)
Oil rents (% of GDP)	−0.0006	−0.0007	−0.0008
	(0.0006)	(0.0006)	(0.0006)
Population	0.328***	0.320***	0.300***
	(0.019)	(0.017)	(0.016)
	Second stage: log of military spending as a share of GDP
	(21)	(22)	(23)
Political accountabilityt	−0.690***	−0.108	−0.104
	(0.137)	(0.137)	(0.087)
Conflict	0.138***	0.167***	0.167***
	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.025)
GDP per capita	−0.210***	−0.234***	−0.235***
	(0.029)	(0.028)	(0.028)
Trade (% of GDP)	−0.002***	−0.002***	−0.002***
	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)
Tax (% of GDP)	0.011***	0.010***	0.010***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Oil rents (% of GDP)	0.004	0.005*	0.005*
	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Population	−0.608***	−0.763***	−0.765***
	(0.067)	(0.062)	(0.060)
Observations	3244	3244	3244
Centered R^2	0.377	0.389	0.389
Uncentered R^2	0.377	0.389	0.389

*p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01