Ruin(ed) policies: why we should aim for protecting ruins regionally

ABSTRACT

Ruins are of high cultural significance and their protection is an important policy issue. This article argues that a focus on regional policies might in some instances help to counter ruined policies. In a first step, the article contours an understanding of ruins and distinguishes functions of ruins by the motivation of the constructors and the preservers. Subsequently, the article finds that some current attempts to ‘keeping ruins alive’, efforts to putting the presence in perspective with the past, relate to ruin(ed) temporalities because either the motivation of the constructors of ruins is ignored or the function of ruins for preservers is not reflected on sufficiently. The article concludes that a regional policy focus – in contrast to an international or domestic approach – might do more justice to these spatial differences and therefore might counter ruined temporalities and ruined policies.

KEYWORDS:

• Ruins
• temporality
• regional cultural heritage protection

Acknowledgments

I am grateful to Sina Farzin, Jens Hacke, Lucas Lixinski, Benjamin Schmid, Alain Schnapp and Jan Suntrup as well as two anonymous reviewers for discussions, useful suggestions and critical remarks on various early versions of this article.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1. On temporality, meaning and scope of heritage, see Harvey (2001, 2008).

2. Exceptions are artificial ruins, i.e. structures which were explictily created as ruins such as Ruinenberg in Germany. Cf Zimmermann (1989).

3. Cf Schnapp (2014, 119) who mentions, e.g. the collapsed pyramids, walls temples of Egypt, Mesopotamia, Athens and Rome as well as the corroded papyri as ruins showing the age old fight between forces of remembrance and the power of forgetting.

4. Quoted after Schnapp (2014, 9, Fn. 3), who further differentiates between those ruins with inscriptions (passing information on their identity and meaning) as well as those ruins with oral transmission (for instance by poems).

5. Cf critically concerning such an understanding of ruins Schnapp (2014, 118, Fn. 132).

6. Discussing the contradiction between the position of the French architect Viollet-le-duc (1854-1868), expressed in the 1830s, to aim for the protection of the original meaning of historical monuments versus the position stated by Ruskin ([1849] 1988) holding that restauration is the falsification of a historically developed condition (see Schmaedecke, 2006).

7. Cf ibid. ‘and that glory is alwayes greatest, that is most permanent: it was a high point of Wisedome and Policie in our Forefathers to erect publick memorials of great and worthy men, such as being lookt upon by their Successors, might inspire them with a generous Emulation to atchieve the like meritorious actions, that so they may attain to the like honour and esteem, with those that shall come after them. Virtue, though a sufficient reward to it self, would yet have but few followers, unless attended on by Fame.’

8. Think of industrial ruins, for instance in the Ruhr area in Germany, which were originally simply industrial buildings, but now are considered to be ‘ruins’. Cf on this Edensor (2005), who also points to a ‘fragmentary nature’ of such ruins, however, as the intention of the constructors had no time-spanning preservation in mind, industrial ruins are valuable in a process of meaning making because of their ‘lack of fixed meaning’. The author is grateful to Sina Farzin for pointing out the ‘Ruhrpott’ example. For a historical account of artificial ruins, see Zimmermann (1989).

9. Compare Kersel and Bouchenaki (2020, 958), concluding that UNESCO might act as a coordinator in preventing illicit trafficking and destruction of cultural heritage and strengthen a network between international and national actors. According to them, UNESCO, in this vein, might even ‘harness the power of heritage as a positive and unifying force’ which, in turn, ‘can help prevent conflicts and facilitate peace-building, recovery, and reconciliation’.

10. ICC, The Prosecutor v. Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi, 27 September 2017 No ICC-01/12-01/15. For an analysis, see, e.g. Bishop-Burney (2017); cf also Vrdoljak (2018).

11. See, e.g. generally in favor of a universal approach Cuno (2008, 146), stating that ‘[a]ntiquities are the cultural property of all humankind, humankind – of people, not peoples – evidence of the world’s ancient past and not that of a particular modern nation. They comprise antiquity, and antiquity knows no borders.’

12. See for instance Schnapp (2020, 643–644) referring to the work of Denis Diderot and Constantin François Chasseboeuf Boisgirais, Comte de Volney, both pointing out the injustice of colonialism like in Constantin François Chasseboeuf Boisgirais, Comte de Volney ([1791] 1869), 75 ‘Et ces peoples qui se dissent polices ne sont-ils pas ceux qui depuis trois siècles remplissent la terre de leur injustice? Ne sont-ce pas eux qui, sous des prétextes de commerce, ont dévasté l’Inde, dépeuplé le nouveau continent, et soumettent encore aujourd’hui l’Afrique au plus barbare des esclavages.’ Schnapp (2020, 643) indicates that ruins even might serve as something like a revolutionary tool in this regard: ‘Les ruines sont pour Volney un révélateur de la situation sociale, le soubassement ultime des États et des économies.’

13. See already Francioni (2011, 9) being certain that such a dichotomy ‘cannot adequately explain the present state of the law and, in particular, of international law. Today, there are more than just two ways of thinking about cultural property.’

14. Quoted after Lenzerini (2012) who underlines this decision (ibid 174) by finding ‘confirmation in the relevant international law applicable to the subject of the present enquiry’.

15. See on this De Cesari (2010, 299). Cf also Irene Maffi, The emergence of cultural heritage in Jordan: The itinerary of a colonial invention, Journal of Social Archaeology 9 (1) (2009), p. 5, speaking of a ‘colonizer’s affaire’. Note, however, too, that UNESCO’s General Conference has voted to include Palestine as a full member in 2011 and Palestine, thus, has ratified the World Heritage Convention in 2011 and has sites, such as the ‘Birthplace of Jesus: Church of the Nativity and the Pilgrimage Route, Bethlehem’, included in the world heritage list.

16. Lixinski (2019), espec. 240 et seq highlighting ‘dark sides’ of international heritage law.

17. Ndoro and Wijesuriya (2015, 131). Cf ibid 134 et seq where they also do away with ‘[o]ne of the most commonly held misconceptions [which] is that there was no system of heritage management and conservation in precolonial Africa and parts of Asia’ and point to further references in this regard (Joffroy 2005; and Wijesuriya 2003, 274).

18. Ndoro and Wijesuriya (2015, 131) with further reference to Waterton (2010); as well as Chirikure and Pwiti (2008).

19. See also Kirchmair (2020, 267–85); cf in this regard Smith (2020, 19) on the so-called ‘Authorised Heritage Discourse’, which stresses ‘nationalising values of material disciplinary debates’.

20. See, however, Mezey (2007) arguing that cultural property is a paradox as within a logic of property ‘each group possesses and controls or ought to control – its own culture’ which is at odds with a dynamic understanding of what is culture. For a look at cultural diplomacy beyond the national interest, see Ang, Isara, and Mar (2015).

21. Cf also Delanty (2009, 36) stating that speaking of ‘European heritage’ entails both, the historical tradition and the ‘consciousness of a tradition that is relevant to the self-understanding of the present.’

22. Cf e.g. the Convention on the Protection of the Archeological, Historical, and Artistic Heritage of the American Nations approved on June 16 1976 by Resolution AG/RES. 210 (VI-O/76) adopted at the 6th Regular Session of the General Assembly in Santiago de Chile. For an overview, see Office of Education and Culture/DDHEC 2013.

23. Compare Schnapp (2014, 90) on two ways of dealing with ruins. The most common approach is constantly renewing monuments in order to secure their continuity. The other approach intends to restore monuments in their original shape. Ibid (91) refers to a Greek example – in times of war – at the beginning of the 5th century B.C. that Greeks at Plataiai decided not to restore temples in order to keep them as a remembrance of the barbaric behavior of Persians quoting Lykurg.

24. See Schnapp (2014, 92) who refers to the ‘Oath of Plataea’ who anchored the idea of the presence of absence in relation to monuments. The idea of emptiness, the halt of history, in this vein precisely comes by the destruction and not by restoration. Compare also Simmel (1911), who, however, denies the charm of Roman ruins when they had become ruins through human destruction. Critically of Simmel in this regard, denoting him an ‘Anti-Benjamin’, Raulet (1996, 181–2).

25. For a specific case of destruction of cultural heritage, see, e.g. Turku (2018).

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Lando Kirchmair

Prof. Dr. Lando Kirchmair studied law, business law, Spanish and Portuguese as well as psychology at the universities of Innsbruck, Salamanca and Salzburg, holding Magister iuris (2009) and Magister iuris rerum oeconomicarum (2010) degrees from the University of Innsbruck and a Doctor iuris (with distinction from the University of Salzburg (2012). In June 2020, he completed his habilitation thesis and received the venia legendi (Doctor habilitatus) for Public Law, European Union Law, Public International Law and Legal Philosophy from the Department of Social Sciences and Public Affairs at Universität der Bundeswehr München. Since April 2020 he is Deputy Professor for National and International Public Law with a Focus on the Protection of Cultural Heritage at the Department of Social Sciences and Public Affairs, Universität der Bundeswehr München. In July 2020 he became a member of the Arab German Young Academy of Sciences and Humanities based at the Berlin-Brandenburg Academy of Sciences and Humanities (BBAW).