(Re)assessing Parliamentary Policy Impact: The Case of the Australian Senate

Abstract

A recent article in this Journal suggested that assumptions about the legislative influence of the Australian Senate may overstate its de facto power. Stanley Bach indicated that compromise with the Senate was relatively rare, and pointed out that most successful Senate amendments were government amendments. This paper provides an alternative view. We suggest that legislative influence is more subtle than Bach acknowledged, and that it is necessary to dig deeper in the data to fully understand the Senate's role. We therefore supplement his analysis in two ways: (1) through tracking the ultimate outcome of government defeats in the Senate; and (2) through analysis of two case study bills. We find that in confrontations with government the Senate ‘wins’ the great majority of the time. This shapes government behaviour in the chamber, such that many government amendments actually respond to non-government concerns. The most important element of Senate influence is therefore ‘soft power’– exercised through negotiation – backed up only in extremis by the ‘hard power’ of government defeat. This holds important lessons for the study of legislative influence more broadly, as well as demonstrating the true power of the Australian Senate.

Notes

¹Exceptions include, for Britain, Shephard and Cairney (2005) and Russell and Sciara (2008). There have also been numerous interesting studies of the European Parliament in recent years, including Kreppel (1999), Tsebelis et al (2001) and Kasack (2004).

²These figures are based on Bach's (1998) Table 1.

³In both cases, ESRC-funded surveys carried out by the Constitution Unit at University College London. Response rates were approximately 50%, and responses were broadly representative of the House. N = 377 for the 2005 question; N = 363–70 for the 2007 questions.

⁴Although no other recent work of this kind has been published on legislative influence at Westminster, a classic study from the 1970s used similar methods and found some similar effects (Griffith 1974). More recent work on the Scottish Parliament has also found that many executive amendments respond to early points made by opposition and backbench members (Shephard and Cairney 2005). Publication of a more complete analysis of amendment outcomes at Westminster is planned.

⁵This clearly differs slightly from Bach's (2008) figure of 53. In two of the 55 cases (on the Airports Bill 1996 and the Native Title Amendment Bill 1997) the division in the Senate on the amendment was subsequently re-taken and the amendment defeated. In the third case (on the Social Security Legislation Amendment (Newly Arrived Residents Waiting Period and Other Measures) Bill 1996) there was no record of the amendment in Hansard, and no details of the mover provided by the Senate authorities. The difference, therefore, probably relates to differences of interpretation in respect to these three amendments.

⁶By comparison, the House of Lords inflicted 246 defeats on government during 1999–2004.

⁷ Senate Hansard, 1 July 1998, column 4521.

⁸ Senate Hansard, 1 July 1998, column 4521.

⁹ Senate Hansard, 1 July 1998, column 4557.

¹⁰ Senate Hansard, 30 November 1998, column 913.

¹¹ Senate Hansard, 30 November 1998, column 914.

¹² Senate Hansard, 25 June 1998, column 4066.

¹³'Fielding Deal “Kills WorkChoices Forever”.’ABC News 20 March 2009. URL: <http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2009/03/20/2522077.htm>. Consulted 20 April 2010.

¹⁴Except, perhaps, in unusual cases in which the electoral benefits for government from a bicameral showdown would exceed the problems generated.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Meg Russell

Meg Russell is Reader in British and Comparative Politics and Deputy Director of the Constitution Unit in the Department of Political Science, University College London. Meghan Benton is a Research Assistant at the Constitution Unit and a PhD candidate at the School of Public Policy, University College London. This work was funded by the Economics and Research Council (ESRC) ref RES-063-27-0163. We thank Leah Jennings and Laragh Widdess for their research assistance in the preparation of this article. We are also very grateful to Harry Evans and his staff in the Senate for providing data and feedback on our analysis.