Does Institutional Location Protect from Political Influence? The Case of a Minimum Labour Standards Enforcement Agency in Australia

Abstract

Among the many factors that influence enforcement agencies, this article examines the role of the institutional location (and independence) of agencies, and an incumbent government's ideology. It is argued that institutional location affects the level of political influence on the agency's operations, while government ideology affects its willingness to resource enforcement agencies and approve regulatory activities. Evidence from the agency regulating minimum labour standards in the Australian federal industrial relations jurisdiction (currently the Fair Work Ombudsman) highlights two divergences from the regulatory enforcement literature generally. First, notions of independence from political interference offered by institutional location are more illusory than real and, second, political need motivates political action to a greater extent than political ideology.

Notes

¹The National Employment Standards are ten minimum working conditions introduced into the Australian employment relations environment by the Fair Work Act 2009. The Standards cover maximum working hours, various types of leave, requests for flexible working arrangements and rights in relation to termination and redundancy as well as employment information for new employees.

²Poor reporting standards may have resulted in a few prosecutions being unreported.

³Poor reporting standards may have resulted in inaccuracies between 1999–2000 and 2001–02 (DEWR Annual Reports).

⁴The OEA, established in 1996, focused on matters associated with Australian Workplace Agreements, while the ABCC, created in 2005, enforced a broader range of federal rights and responsibilities in the building industry.

⁵While it is possible to identify staffing levels within the agency at a given time, it has been impossible to compare funding and staffing levels between periods because of different legislative roles assigned to the agency, as well as its enforcement activities in more recent periods being split between agencies. The more overt discussion by government of funding provided during recent periods has been included to highlight the argument about political motives.

⁶Simultaneously, the Work Choices amendments were constraining union enforcement capabilities by restricting right of entry, with Ministers even participating in litigation to prevent unions investigating breaches (Lee 2006, 48).

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Glenda Maconachie

Dr Glenda Maconachie is a Senior Lecturer in Industrial Relations at the Business School at Queensland University of Technology. Dr Miles Goodwin is the Director of Economics Research Branch at the Australian Parliamentary Library, Canberra.