Abstract
The authors refute the portrayal of Australia as America's pliant ally in the Vietnam and Iraq Wars, instead arguing that Australian leaders saw such involvement as strategic opportunities to strengthen the Australian–American alliance. In the case of the Vietnam War particularly, the Australian government also saw these conflicts as a way to draw America into greater military engagement in their region. The authors' interpretation follows earlier revisionist scholarship on the Vietnam War, but is strengthened by new archival evidence. In the case of the 2003 Iraq War, their position is inevitably more provisional due to the lack of archival material. However, after interviewing senior government officials to better understand the Howard government's motivations for military involvement in Iraq, they discern a similar pattern of strategic motivation. The article concludes with a discussion of the costs and benefits of using wars to strengthen the Australian–American alliance.
Notes
1Morgan Gallup polling found that 61 per cent of Australians approved of the government's deployment of the ATTVN to Vietnam in mid-1962 (Goot and Tiffen 1983, 134). Similarly, in the context of the 1963 federal election, 64 per cent said that Australia should maintain its military commitment in Vietnam, while only 16 per cent demurred. This support remained relatively stable through 1964 and 1965, and was at least partly reflected in a slightly increased vote for the Coalition in the November 1964 half-Senate election and, as we have already noted, in Labor's heavy defeat in the 1966 general election.
2Does this history of supporting the US lock Australia into not breaking its ‘perfect record’? On this issue Howard's memoirs are interesting to consider: ‘During a cabinet meeting in late 2002, Warren Truss had said that some staunch National Party supporters were uneasy, and one of them had said to him, “Can't we just this once not go along with the Americans?”’ (Howard Citation2010, 446).