The Australian mining tax and the political power of business

Abstract

This article provides a detailed analysis of the Australian Labor government's mining tax, building on recent debates that critique Lindblom's Politics and markets. We argued that the case illustrates the power of big business, in particular the importance of the relative flexibility of large companies, especially in the form of ‘investment strikes’, although such a strategy is more constrained in the resource sector. We also explore two other key factors. First, we analyse Lindblom's argument that government has resources which big business needs, and suggest that this argument depends on governments being competent in negotiations with large companies. We find that the claim did not apply to the case of the mining tax. Second, we analyse his view that business power owes a great deal to the manipulation of citizens' ‘volitions’. We find some evidence to support this claim, but again suggest that the failure of the government to effectively make the case for a mining tax helped business.

本文就最近有关林德·布罗姆《政治与市场》一书的辩论，对澳大利亚工党政府的矿业税做了详尽的分析。笔者指出，矿业税说明了大企业的力量，尤其是大公司的相对灵活性，特别是他们的“投资罢工”，尽管在资源部门这种策略受到了扼制。笔者还探讨了另外两个关键因素。第一个是林德·布罗姆观点，即政府有大企业所需的资源。此论的根据是政府有能力与大公司讨价还价。笔者认为，这种说法并不适用于矿业税。第二个是，林德·布罗姆认为企业力量很大程度要受公民“意志”的左右。此说有一定根据，但政府未能搞定矿业税则帮了企业。

Keywords:

• Australia
• big business
• mining tax
• political power

Notes

1 For a critique of this position, see Marsh (2010) and Akram and Marsh (2013).

2 Beetham (2011) analyses how changes in contemporary capitalism, including the global financial crisis (GFC), have affected relations between government and business in the UK.

3 It is significant here that over half of the articles Boulus and Dowding report were taken from The Australian and the Australian Financial Review.