Liberty or protection? Making law for employment and social security

ABSTRACT

Recent disruptions to the usual working conditions, such as the pandemic, highlight the insecurity of the minimum waged, casually employed working poor; they also point up the precarity of the heavily indebted, over-worked middle-class. Contrasting the cause of social protection with that of market liberty, this study examines the terms of the security debate to see how the cause of protection seeks to counter the cause of liberty. It reviews three recent regulatory events to see what success the cause of protection has had: the industrial relations reform process, the government response to the COVID-19 pandemic, and the agenda setting for women’s economic security. It notes the reforms that Australia's new Labor government proposes. The study recommends that, if reforms are to be effective, the cause of protection must move beyond the particulars of the labour contract to address the structures of power in the political economy of law making.

KEYWORDS:

• Employment security
• social security
• liberty
• protection
• industrial relations reform
• COVID-19 pandemic response
• women’s economic security
• political economy
• law making

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1 Borrowing from an ACTU report (ACTU 2012), the Senate Select Committee (2021, 1) defined insecure work as ‘that which provides workers with little economic and social security and little control over their working lives’ and went on to nominate such factors as unpredictable and irregular pay and hours, lack of security over the length of the job, and lack of voice. That definition is adopted here.

2 The characterisation of the two as causes adopts socio-legal studies terminology, see Cummings (2018). The actors are identified as proponents of liberty or protection and the proponents are identified with their particular proposals throughout the text.

3 See also its characterisation in the industrial relations literature: Casperz and Gillan (2011), Cooper and Ellem (2008), and Buchanan and Callus (1993).

4 Dukes (2020), p. 227.

5 Dukes (2019), p. 402. This political economy is often of a classical kind, recalling the work of social theorists like Karl Polanyi, updated for the complexity of the post-modern world, especially by regulatory studies, see for example Lange et al. (2015).

6 See further Arup (2020).

7 See Ross Gittins, It’s not jobs, it’s real wages we need, Age, 20 April 2022.

8 Adams (2021), p. 435. Locally, see the comments of the retiring chair of the ACCC in John Kehoe, ‘Weak wages linked to ‘concentrated economy’: Sims’, Australian Financial Review, 18 May 2022.

9 Adams (2021), p. 466.

10 Adams (2021), p. 448. See also Tomlins (2021). One of Adams’ examples is reform to the terms of casual employment.

11 Here, see Adams (2021), p. 464; Dukes (2020), p. 226, (2019a), p. 354.

12 Miola and Picciottto (2022), p. 154; generally Pistor (2019).

13 Dukes (2019a), p. 359. Again, Dukes cites the platform economy. See also Dukes et al. (2021).

14 Miola and Picciotto (2022), p. 145. As evidence, they cite the platform economy’s ability to circumvent employment law. See also Dukes (2020).

15 Adams (2021), p. 435.

16 Thus, the study includes social security within labour law, see also, in this vein, O’Donnell (2017); Ramia (2020); Mendes (2019). Some others, such as Adams, see social security rather as part of the structure around the operation of labour law.

17 Two ALP senators, two Coalition and one Green comprised the initial Committee; one more ALP and one independent senator were added. The Committee received some 230 submissions and held extensive public hearings. The Committee has made five reports (Senate Select Committee 2021, 2021a, 2021b, 2022 and 2022a).

18 Adams (2021), p. 436.

19 Of course, the rivalry plays out at this lower level too, see Arup (2020).

20 Reich (2016, 2020). See others such as Pistor (2019). These critiques continue in the long tradition of social theory’s contribution to the study of law and capitalism, though they must now allow sufficiently for the complexity and fluidity of post-modern regulation, see Miola and Picciotto (2022).

21 Following Dukes (2019), p. 419. Labour law studies already do so, see for example Arup and ors (2006).

22 Uber submission to the Senate Committee, submission number 19. The submissions are posted at: https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Job_Security/JobSecurity/Submissions.

23 National Farmers Federation submission number 83; Australian Retailers Association submission number 25.

24 Senate Select Committee (2021a), Dissenting Reports by Liberal and National Senators.

25 Deliveroo submission number 20; Amazon submission number 114.

26 Senate Select Committee (2021) and (2021a), see Dissenting Reports.

27 For critique of these claims (and the use of rhetoric), see Slee (2017) and Prassl (2018).

28 Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry submission number 71; Australian Industry Group submission 77. Cf. Lass and Wooden (2020).

29 Senate Select Committee (2021a), Dissenting Reports.

30 Numbers became a contested issue on the very first day of the 2022 federal election campaign, see John Kehoe, ‘Labour casual job claims wrong’, Australian Financial Review, 12 April 2022. Cf. Tony Sheldon, ‘The precarious grind of casual work is no ‘made-up’ issue’, Australian Financial Review, 19 April 2022.

31 Chan et al. (2014). Permanent is the terminology colloquially used for ongoing employment, though it may be ended by the employer on valid grounds such as serious misconduct or economic redundancy (see below).

32 Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry submission. The Senate Select Committee Dissenting Reports stressed this point.

33 This view draws on Chicago School law and economics; thus, the argument for freedom of contract is elegantly put by Epstein (2019). Collins (2018), Rittich (2014) and Barmes (2018) are among the labour lawyers who critique this argument. The High Court has recently taken this liberal view in favour of freedom of contract, see Workpac v Rossato & ors [2021] HCA 23 (4 August 2020); ZG Operations Australia Pty Ltd v Jamsek [2022] HCA 2 (9 February 2022); further Pruessner v Caelli Constructions [2022] FedCFamC2G 206 (25 March 2002).

34 For critical accounts of this opposition to minimums, see Campbell et al. (2019); Markey and McIvor (2018); Rawling et al. (2017). And, at certain moments, they have sought to dismantle the scheme, for instance with WorkChoices, see Buchanan and Callus (1993).

35 Australian Nursing and Midwifery Federation submission number 27. Paradoxically, a policy requiring a strong state, see Kimberley and McCrystal (2020) and Ewing and Hendy (2020) for recent instances.

36 For the history of this policy, see Mendes (2021); Ramia (2020); O’Donnell (2019).

37 Central to recent strategy, see Wright and Clibborn (2020); Ramia (2020).

38 Boltanski and Chiapello (2018); O’Donnell (2019). Mitchell and Fazi (2017).

39 Howe (2008).

40 Grimshaw (2020).

41 David Marin-Guzman, ‘CEOs want action on bargaining to lift wage growth, Australian Financial Review, 8 April 2022; post-election see Angus Thompson, Business puts wage test on PM’s agenda, Age, 24 May 2021; David Marin-Guzman, ‘Albanese must revive Hawke-Keating bargaining: employers’, Australian Financial Review, 24 May 2022.

42 David Marin-Guzman, ‘Coalition still committed to IR reforms’, Australian Financial Review, 12 April 2022. Except for changes to the BOOT.

43 Clibborn (2021).

44 Schofield-Georgeson (2021).

45 See for example Australian Industry (Ai) Group (2020).

46 ACTU (2020).

47 See further Stewart et al. (2021).

48 Jennifer Hewett, ‘Business splits over union deal’, Australian Financial Review, 17 September2020.

49 Australian Government, Minister for Industrial Relations (2020), introducing the Bill 2020.

50 Information about the Bill’s supporters and critics is to be found in the Bills Digest, see Ramesh and Murphy (2021), gathered under ‘stakeholder views’.

51 WorkPac Pty Ltd v Rossato (2020) 378 ALR 585.

52 Stewart (2021).

53 Workpac v Rossato & ors [2021] HCA 23 (4 August 2020). As noted, the High Court subsequently took the same approach to independent contracting.

54 For analysis, see Pittard (2021); Shannon and Crockett (2022).

55 See Parliament of Australia (2019–2020) for the rationale; further see Thornwaite and Sheldon (2021); Campbell et al. (2019).

56 Murray et al. (2021). The ACTU has been working with the Small Business Council of Australia on award simplification for small business.

57 Schofield-Georgeson (2021).

58 Hart v Coles Supermarkets Australia Pty Ltd [2016] FWCFB 2887 (31 May 2016). See Arup (2020); Hamberger (2020).

59 Awards largely prescribed minimum rates and conditions. At this time, employers were terminating enterprise agreements and refusing to make new ones, unsure they could circumvent the award, see Arup (2020).

60 Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth), section 15A. See Ramesh and Murphy (2021).

61 Murray et al. (2021). The Fair Work Commission is responding to this push, see its decision in Australian Hotels Association [2021] FWCFB 5371 (3 September 2021). But see also its decision to give annualised salary workers a little more award protection from unpaid overtime, 4 yearly review of modern awards – Annualised Wage Agreements [2022] FWCFB 51 (7 April 2022).

62 Australian Association of Social Workers submission number 8; Transport Workers Union submission number 39.

63 Australian Services Union submission number 33; United Workers Union submission number 54.

64 Australian Association of Social Workers submission. For empirical evidence, see Peetz et al. (2019).

65 For inside accounts, see Kessler (2018); Bloodworth (2018); Gessler (2018).

66 Transport Workers Union submission; United Workers Union submission; Rideshare Workers Association submission number 74.

67 Emeritus Professor David Peetz submission 88.

68 ACTU (2018a) submission number 98; further Dawson et al. (2020); ACTU (2022).

69 Labour law scholarship sustains much critique like this, for example Collins (2018).

70 This extends beyond casual hiring to a preference for flexible part-time employment (with minimal guaranteed hours) over full-time, see Senate Select Committee (2021b); further Campbell et al. (2016). Consequently, workers are under-employed or taking multiple jobs. Full-time permanent employment is in decline.

71 In its fourth report, the Senate Select Committee (2022) went to some lengths to show it was increasing.

72 Senate Select Committee (2021b), p. 95, ‘the Amazon effect’; see further Jones (2021).

73 Anglicare submission number 94; St Vincent de Paul National Council submission number 40. For real life accounts, see Kurmelovs (2020); Armstrong (2017); Curtis et al. (2012); Standing (2011); McMasterman-Smith and Pocock (2008); Wynhausen (2005); Ehrenreich (2021).

74 Recent reporting from the front captures the human and social side, see MacGillis (2021); Bruder (2017).

75 Dr Paula McDonald & ors submission number 112. Sperling (2020) makes a very good case.

76 United Workers Union submission; Australian Nursing and Midwifery Federation submission; Health Services Union submission number 84.

77 This is Quart’s word, see Quart (2018).

78 Professionals Australia (2021); National Tertiary Education Union submission number 47.

79 Australian Services Union submission. For the impact, see Schofield-Georgeson (2020); Rubin (2020); Pusey (2003).

80 For the impact, see OECD (2019); Ehrenreich (2021a); Pocock et al. (2012); Berardi (2009).

81 Senate Select Committee (2021a), chapter 8.

82 Weiss (2019) and Therborn (2020) capture this dilemma.

83 Emma Dawson, ‘Not the time for a workplace brawl’, Australian Financial Review, 15 December 2020.

84 ACTU submission; see also Emeritus Professor David Peetz submission, McKell Institute Victoria submission number 86.

85 See National Foundation for Australian Women submission number 11.

86 Senate Select Committee (2021) Recommendation 14 and (2022), Recommendation 7.

87 Senate Select Committee (2021b), Recommendation 1.

88 Transport Workers Union submission; National Foundation for Australian Women submission. For the dynamic, see Arup (2019) and Arup (2020).

89 Senate Select Committee (2021), recommendation 7.

90 For pros and cons, see Department of Premier and Cabinet (2020); Stewart and McCrystal (2019); Katz (2015).

91 Senate Select Committee (2022), Recommendation 10.

92 Rawling and Riley submission number 3. See Angus Thompson, Uber advocates earnings safety net across sector, Sydney Morning Herald, 18 June 2022.

93 For example, a right to switch off, see Opie (2016); Jessica Yun, ‘Call for ‘always on’ workers to be given the right to switch off’, Sydney Morning Herald, 5 February 2022. There is a surge in reports of dissatisfaction since the pandemic, see for instance Ayesha de Kretser, ‘NAB faces union claims staff are overworked’, Australian Financial Review, 7 December 2021. With annualised salaries, these extended hours are often unpaid overtime, see, for example, Julie Hare, ‘Junior doctors joining lawsuit over wage theft’, Australian Financial Review, 15 November 2021; further Arup (2020); Australian Institute, Centre for Future Work (2021). Proposals to reduce hours and to institute four day working weeks are also being canvassed.

94 Community and Public Sector Union submission number 101. Further see Schofield-Georgeson (2020); Sperling (2020); Quart (2018); Nau and Soener (2019).

95 Forsyth and Stewart (2021); Australian Services Union submission.

96 Australian Services Union submission. The Senate Select Committee did express concern about the extent of outsourcing by the Commonwealth Government and the loss of public service jobs (see below). But it did not address the redundancy laws.

97 Schofield-Georgeson (2020); Ewing and Hendy (2020); Nau and Soener (2019).

98 Senate Community Affairs References Committee (2020); Australian Association of Social Workers submission; Senate Select Committee (2022), Recommendation 5.

99 For recent GMI proposals, see Spies-Butcher et al. (2021) and Garnaut (2021). There is limited interplay at present between work and welfare as co-existing sources of income, see O’Donnell and Arup (2021); Ramia (2020); Behrendt and Nguyen (2019).

100 Carney (2020).

101 Anglicare (2021).

102 Per Capita submission number 30; Dr Paul McDonald & ors submission.

103 Lansbury (2021); Crouch (2019); Behrendt and Nguyen (2019).

104 Wood et al. (2020); Quart (2018).

105 Ewing and Hendy (2020); Peetz et al. (2020). For overview, see Mazzucato (2013).

106 Picciotto (2017); Wigger and Buch-Hansen (2014).

107 Deakin and Meng (2020); Mitchell and Fazi (2017).

108 Peetz et al. (2020); Tham (2020).

109 United Workers Union submission.

110 National Tertiary Education Union submission; St Vincent de Paul submission. For analysis, see Forsyth and Stewart (2021).

111 Megalogenis (2021).

112 For analysis, see Neil et al. (2021).

113 The Commission was also given powers to relax the requirements of awards restricting the hours, locations and tasks of work, affording employers more flexibility to deploy workers, see Murray et al. (2021).

114 For analysis, see O’Donnell and Arup (2021).

115 See Neil et al. (2021).

116 Forsyth and Stewart (2021).

117 For analysis, see O’Donnell and Arup (2021).

118 United Workers Union submission.

119 Ibid.

120 ACOSS (2020).

121 For the concessions, see O’Donnell and Arup (2021).

122 Biddle et al. (2020); National Shelter (2021).

123 Finbar O’Mallon, ‘Restaurant hands demand $50 an hour’, Australian Financial Review, 13–14 November 2021.

124 Dominic Powell, ‘Major retailers facing staff shortage in numbers crunch’, The Age, 20 November 2012.

125 Emma Breheny, ‘Staff squeeze sparks crisis in the regions’, Sunday Age, 21 November 2021.

126 Caitlin Fitzsimmons, ‘After two long years in lockdown, workers want a slice of the action’, Sunday Age, 14 November 2021; David Marin-Guzman, ‘Farmers fret over $25 minimum wage for fruit pickers’, Australian Financial Review, 4 November 2021.

127 Social Security Act 1991 (Cth), section 8. There were also small cash grants to help with relocation. But at the same time property prices and rents have escalated in regional towns.

128 Victorian Council of Social Services submission number 13.

129 Sean Kelly, ‘Spin belies the pandemic divide’, Age, 17 January 2022.

130 Health Sector Awards – Pandemic Leave [2020] FWCFB 3940 (27 July 2020), see further Murray et al. (2021).

131 Victorian Labor Government is now trialling a casual worker sick leave scheme.

132 Tom McIlroy, ‘More vaccine needed to boost aged care staff jabs’, Australian Financial Review, 30 June 2021. Further, Megalogenis (2021).

133 United Workers Union submission.

134 Board of Inquiry (2020), ch. 6.10, para. 281.

135 David Marin-Guzman, ‘Hundreds of hotel quarantine guards underpaid $1.2m’, Australian Financial Review, 2 October 2021.

136 Thornton (1990).

137 Australian Association of Social Workers submission.

138 See now Australian Human Rights Commission (2021).

139 Australian Government, Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet (2020).

140 Barmes (2015); Smith (2019).

141 Australian Government, Minister for Industrial Relations (2021).

142 See Shi and Zhong (2020); Foley and Williamson (2021). See further Australian Human Rights Commission (2020).

143 There are many organisations involved in the campaigns, see eg. ACTU (2018b); Work + Family Policy Roundtable (2022). In the Senate see eg. ACTU submission; National Foundation of Australian Women submission; Per Capita submission.

144 Deloitte (2022). See further McCarthy (2020).

145 Sally Patten, ‘Older women miss out as government finally acts’, Australian Financial Review, 12 May 2021.

146 As found, for instance, in Heron and Charlesworth (2012); Chapman (2013); Allen and Orifici (2021). See Wendy Tuohy, ‘Every Which Way’, Sunday Age, 22 August 2021.

147 Even though they benefit from the participation of women and indeed from the ‘reproduction’ of the workforce, through the nurture and socialisation of children, and other unpaid labour, see Fraser (2016); Heron and Charlesworth (2016).

148 Thornton (2020). Cf. Scott et al. (2021).

149 Wood et al. (2020).

150 Emma Dawson, ‘Australian women are done waiting. It’s time for a budget that invests in childcare’, Guardian Australia, 10 May 2021.

151 National Council of Single Mothers & their Children Inc submission number 197; Luke Henriques-Gomez, ‘Single parents are poorer but older Australians have seen wealth grow’, Guardian Australia, 20 November 2020.

152 Cook and Noblet (2016).

153 Howe and Pidwell (2016). See now Katherine Churchin, ‘’Demeaning ‘crackdown on single mothers scrapped, budget papers reveal’, Guardian Australia 13 May 2021.

154 Laura Tingle, ‘We’ve turned our back on lessons of the pandemic’, Australian Financial Review, 27 November 2021.

155 United Workers Union submission.

156 Smith and Whitehouse (2020); National Foundation for Australian Women submission; see historically Bennett (1984). See now David Marin-Guzman, ‘Preschool, daycare pay to rise up to 13pc’, Australian Financial Review, 13 October 2021, Independent Education Union of Australia, Application to vary Education Services (Teachers) Award 2010 on work value grounds [2021] FWCFB 6021 (11 October 2021).

157 Foley and Cooper (2021).

158 Australian Nursing and Midwifery Federation submission; Health Services Union submission; Macdonald and Charlesworth (2021); Dixon and Hodgson (2021).

159 Royal Commission (2021), vol. 3B, ch. 12; see further, Aged Care Workforce Strategy Taskforce (2018).

160 Senate Select Committee (2021a), Recommendation 3.

161 Rick Morton, ‘Old Habits’, The Saturday Paper, November 27–December 3, 2021.

162 See further Prassl (2018) and Jones (2021).

163 Wilson (2018); Spies-Butcher (2020).

164 Adams (2021).

165 Thornwaite and Sheldon (2021).

166 Grimshaw (2020).

167 Wark (2019); Waters (2020/2021).

168 Arup (2019); Beaton-Wells and Paul-Taylor (2017); Tucker (2018).

169 See Collins (2011). Also true of casual employment, see Huws (2011).

170 Peetz (2018); Prassl (2015); Weil (2014).

171 Tomlins (2021). Elaborated by Boltanski and Chiapello (2018).

172 Nau and Soener (2019).

173 Pusey (2003).

174 Australian Services Union submission; Australian Nursing and Midwifery submission; Community and Public Sector Union submission.

175 Latour (2018); O’Donnell (2017).

176 Grimshaw (2020).

177 Roberts and Kwon (2017). Contrary perhaps to Polanyi who expected the double movement to fight back, see Latour (2018); Ramia (2020).

178 Latour (2018); Denniss (2018); Giriharadas (2020). Locally, see Ross Garnaut, ‘Will to reform is best fix for a dreadful set of numbers’, Australian Financial Review, 11–12 June 2022; Wilson (2018).

179 Wilson (2018).

180 O’Donnell and Arup (2021).

181 Markey and O’Brien (2021).

182 Goods et al. (2019); Kaine and Josserance (2019).

183 Senate Select Committee (2021, 2021a, 2021b and 2022), Dissenting Reports.

184 Forsyth (2022).

185 Beaton-Wells and Paul-Taylor (2017). Note the Senate Economic References Committee (2022) recommendation that wage theft be rendered an anti-competitive practice.

186 Reich (2016); Streeck (2016). Locally, see Ross Gittins, ‘Why Albanese needs to protect capitalism from capitalists’, Sydney Morning Herald, 18 June 2022.

187 Which private law, the code of capitalism, enhances, see Pistor (2019).

188 Reich (2016); Sims (2021).

189 Arup (2019).

190 Hardy (2016).

191 Nossar et al. (2015); Rawling and Kaine (2012).

192 Anderson (2019). And corporations law more generally, see Carse and Njoya (2015).

193 Forsyth (2019); Senate Select Committee (2021b), Recommendation 2.

194 Transport Workers’ Union submission; Australian Services Union submission.

195 Community and Public Sector Union submission; Transport Workers Union submission. See further, Forsyth (2021) on the TWU v Qantas litigation over the outsourcing of ground staff; also Rick Morton, ‘Inside the Qantas saga’, Saturday Paper, June 18-24, 2022.

196 Australian Services Union submission; Australian Nursing and Midwifery Federation submission; Mable submission number 24. See further, Macdonald (2021); Natasha Boddy, ‘Union launches legal action over aged care wages’, Australian Financial Review, 30 May 2022.

197 Senate Select Committee (2021a), Recommendation 30.

198 Ibid, Recommendations 3 and 18.

199 Julie Hare, ‘ACCC should oversee childcare plan: Weatherill’, Australian Financial Review, 25 May 2022; Denniss (2022).

200 ACTU (2020).

201 Arup (2020).

202 Salvation Army submission number 45; Kingsford Legal Centre and Redfern Legal Centre submission number 92; Maurice Blackburn Lawyers submission number 17; Australian Services Union submission; Young Workers Centre submission number 85. For analysis of the causes, see for instance Reilly et al. (2018); Tham and Fudge (2019).

203 Clibborn and Wright (2018); Clibborn (2020).

204 Stewart et al. (2022).

205 Application by Transport Workers Union of Australia [2021] FWC 5086 (20 August 2021. For resolution, see David Marin-Guzman, ‘FedEx strikes to delay thousands of deliveries’, Australian Financial Review, 18 November 2021. For background, see Pat McGrath, Marty Smiley and Max Chalmers, ‘No way to live’, ABC News, 29 August 2021.

206 Australian Institute of Employment Rights submission number 6.

207 Forsyth (2020); Pennington (2019); McCrystal et al. (2018).

208 Hardy and McCrystal (2020), Rawling and Riley (2021). See also Rawling and Riley submission number 3.

209 Senate Select Committee (2021b), Recommendation 18.

210 See Applications to vary the Transport Industry – General Carriers Contract Determination 2017 and Transport Truck Contract Determination [2022] NSWIRComm 1003 (18 February 2022). See NSW Upper House report; Victorian Government draft provisions.

211 Homecare also faces the issue of independent contracting, see Stephen Duckett, ‘Why home care sector needs overhaul’, Age, 13 December 2021; further Macdonald (2021).

212 Wright and Clibborn (2020).

213 Reilly & ors (2018); Howe et al. (2018).

214 Migrant Workers Taskforce (2019); Senate Select Committee (2021b); Senate Select Committee on Temporary Migration (2021).

215 Clibborn and Wright (2018). After the pandemic, the Coalition Government planned to reopen temporary migrant labour supply channels, with some safeguards drawn from the Migrant Workers Taskforce (2019) recommendations, see Migrant Amendment (Protecting Migrant Workers) Bill 2021. At the same time, it created a new agricultural workers visa and extended international student working hours from 20 to 40 h per week. Employers continue to press for migrant workers but the unions propose limits be applied, see David Marin-Guzman, ‘Unions propose limits to skilled migrant influx’, Australian Financial Review, 25 May 2022.

216 Forsyth (2020, 2022).

217 Cummings (2018); Dias-Abey (2019); Jones (2021).

218 Fraser (2013); Zahn (2019).

219 Scott et al. (2021).

220 Howe and Pidwell (2016); Dawson et al. (2020).

221 Mitchell and Fazi (2017); Deakin and Meng (2020).

222 Macdonald and Charlesworth (2021). For the regulatory theory, see Howe (2010). This was a major thrust of Senate Select Committee (2021a) recommendations.

223 Waters (2020/2021).

224 Gordon (2019).

225 Scott et al. (2021).

226 Megalogenis (2021). Concerning expectations in the election, see Nick Dyrenfurth, ‘Election about who you trust not to change things’, Australian Financial Review, 1 December 2021.

227 Latour (2018); Reich (2020).

228 See ALP Plan (2021) and Fair Work Amendment (Same Job, Same Pay) Bill 2021.

229 See ALP Plan (2021); further Workplace Express, New FWC power to confer gig-matching flexibility: Labor, 12 November 2021. The Shadow Industrial Relations Minister said Labor would implement the recommendations of the Victorian taskforce, see Department of Premier and Cabinet (2020).

230 See Shane Wright and Jennifer Duke, ‘Labor vows to help “middle Australia”’, The Age, 25 November 2021.

231 See David Crowe, ‘Labor drops JobSeeker rate review’, Age, 13 April 2002.

232 ALP Plan (2021). But see Ronald Mizen and David Marin-Guzman, ‘Labor cold on industry bargaining’, Australian Financial Review, 27 November 2021.

233 Matthew Knott, ‘Labor vows to stop nation of guest workers’, Age 8 April 2020.

234 Tham (2020). Laura Tingle, ‘We’ve turned our back on lessons of the pandemic’, Australian Financial Review, 27 November 2021.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Christopher Arup

Chris Arup is a Professor Adjunct to the Department of Business Law and Taxation at Monash University, Caulfield. Chris has many years’ experience researching and writing about labour law, regulatory studies and socio-legal studies. He was a founding editor of the Cambridge University Press monograph series Studies in Law and Society. Chris has a PhD from the Griffith University Socio-Legal Research Centre.