Abstract
The Review Conference of the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) has been one of the primary international arenas for discussing pathways to establishing a Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction-Free Zone (ME WMDFZ). This contentious issue was considered the make-or-break factor that determined whether some past Review Conferences could adopt a final document. With the commencement of the Conference on the Establishment of a Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction in 2019, mandated by the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), questions have been raised about whether this new track replaces the NPT in addressing the Zone issue and, if not, in what format both tracks should interact. This essay sets the context for these questions by discussing evolving nuclear risks in the Middle East, the linkages between the NPT and the Zone, and the potential risks of decoupling the Zone issue from the NPT review process. The essay then argues for a balanced approach in which the NPT and the UNGA-mandated tracks function in conjunction with, and complement, each other. This approach would preserve the integrity and efficacy of each process and maintain the region’s commitments to the Zone, to abolishing nuclear weapons and to preventing further proliferation.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Thanks to Dr. Chen Zak Kane and Dr. Leonardo Bandarra, among other contributors, for their feedback and valuable insights. I also would like to thank the two anonymous peer reviewers for their careful review and their insightful feedback.
DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes
1 The US view at the 2020 NPT Review Conference was that the “NPT review cycle cannot be the primary mechanism for progress” on the Zone (NPT PrepCom 2018). One interpretation of this statement at the time was that the Zone issue should not be raised during the review cycle. However, the US position is currently perceived as being that the review process should be limited to “discussions” on but not “negotiations” of the Zone.
2 This concern was alleviated in the UNGA Zone process by the agreement that all decisions of the November Conference would be adopted by consensus.
Additional information
Notes on contributors
Almuntaser Albalawi
Almuntaser Albalawi is a Researcher for the Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone (ME WMDFZ) Project at the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) and a Ph.D. candidate in political science at the Goethe University Frankfurt. Prior to joining UNIDIR, Almuntaser was a doctoral researcher in the International Security Department of the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF). Before PRIF, Almuntaser worked at the Royal Scientific Society of Jordan, where he led the Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Threat Office, and served as a senior staff scientist at the Biosafety and Biosecurity Center in Jordan. He holds a Bachelor of Science in nuclear engineering and a master’s in international relations and conflict resolution. E-mail: [email protected]