Realism of Confidence, Modes of Apprehension, and Variable-Use in Visual Discrimination of Relative Mass

Abstract

In dynamic event perception, one issue is whether direct perception or cue-based inferences explains learning and performance. For visual discrimination of relative mass of colliding objects, Runeson, Juslin, and Olsson (2000) found that observers change from an inferential to a direct-perceptual mode of apprehension during practice, as indicated by lower confidence in their judgments. Unlike Runeson et al. (2000), we scored confidence against the variables used in individual blocks and analyzed collision-subsets, thereby counteracting inflated confidence scores. A majority of 40 novice participants used a nonspecifying variable and functioned inferentially, as indicated by realistic confidence. Five novices used the mass-ratio invariant and were overconfident therein. Ten participants received feedback based on the most-used nonspecifying variable. Despite feedback suggesting specificity of the variable, they continued to use the variable inferentially. After practice based on the invariant, 7 out of 10 used the invariant. An unexpected dearth of underconfidence for invariant usage is explained by fluctuations in variable usage. Methodological problems in the use of confidence as a mode indicator are discussed.

Notes

¹See Runeson and Andersson (2007) for a critical discussion of the argument from simplicity. Furthermore, it is shown that the two cue-variables are far from simple physical dimensions. Note also that the invariant cannot be composed or derived from them.

²According to the sensory sampling model of confidence, in sensory discrimination tasks with paired comparisons, confidence ratings are based on the variability of a sample of sensations, whereas the judgment is based on the mean of the sensations (Juslin & Olsson, 1997).

³A hypothetical example of a transition from an inferential mode to a direct-perceptual mode when using one and the same variable would be as follows: Consider a child who hasn't yet learned that a red traffic light means you should stop walking and not cross the street. The child has to learn this conventional constraint, perhaps by instructions or by observing other pedestrians. It is conceivable that the child has to think, and be reminded, about the meaning of the red light. However, with sufficient experience, the red light may directly constrain action, and it is probably not necessary to think about what the red light means.

⁴ Runeson & Andersson (2007) did not report any confidence data.