Why democratic police reform mostly fails and sometimes succeeds: police reform and low state capacity, authoritarianism and neo-patrimonial politics (in the former Soviet Union)

Figures & data

Table 1. Regime types.

Regime type	Democratic	Hybrid			Authoritarian
Government	Legal	Legal	Legal (personal)	Personal	Personal
Bureaucracy	Legal-rational	Neo-patrimonial	Neo-patrimonial	Neo-patrimonial	Legal-rational

Adapted from: (Erdmann and Engel 2007).

Figure 1. State capacity in Georgia, Kyrgyzstan and Russia (1996–2019).

Figure 2. Degree of democracy / authoritarianism in Georgia, Kyrgyzstan and Russia (1996–2019).

Table 2. Contrasting patterns of political and police transformation in Georgia, Kyrgyzstan and Russia (1990-2012).

	Causal Variables			Outcome
Country	State Capacity	Bureaucracy	Government	Type of Policing
Georgia	Increase to moderate state capacity	Consolidated Mixed neo-liberal managerial and authoritarian / neo-patrimonial governance Effective anti-corruption reforms	Full domination by president Some elite corruption Mixed neo-liberal and authoritarian / neo-patrimonial leadership	Low level of corruption Low violence Politicised
Kyrgyzstan	Low	Fractured Authoritarian / neo-patrimonial governance No effective anti-corruption reforms	Fractured amongst elites High levels of elite corruption Authoritarian / neo-patrimonial leadership	High levels of corruption Violent Politicised
Russia	Increase to moderate state capacity	Consolidated Authoritarian / neo-patrimonial governance No effective anti-corruption reforms	Partial domination by president High levels of elite corruption Authoritarian / neo-patrimonial leadership	High levels of corruption Violent Politicised

Erdmann, G., and Engel, U., 2007. Neopatrimonialism reconsidered: critical review and elaboration of an elusive concept. Commonwealth & comparative politics, 45 (1), 95–119.

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