Measuring Intuitive Use: Theoretical Foundations

Figures & data

Figure 1. QUT video coding scheme after Blackler (2006), adapted from Reinhardt et al. (2018).

Figure 2. Decision tree to differentiate between intuitive and non-intuitive interactions using the CHAI method (Reinhardt et al., 2018).

Table 1. Characteristics and measures of intuitive use as proposed by previous research (see text for abbreviations)

Characteristic of intuitive use	Proposed by	Questionnaire	Behaviour coding	Verbal protocol analysis	Logfile analysis	Other
Subconscious application of prior knowledge	QUT, IUUI, GT, Others	TFQ, QUESI, TAM, PENS	QUT: Certainty, Anticipation, Embodiment	QUT: clear expectations, reference to past experience; GT: analytic and intuitive processing; Macaranas (2013)		Q-score Asikhia (2015); Schema-matching (Fischer et al., 2015a,b)
High temporal efficiency	QUT, Others		QUT: low latency, procedure; CHAI: low latency		GT: temporal analysis of mouse patterns
Low verbalisation	QUT, INTUI, Others	INTUI		QUT: Lack of verbalisation, grouping; Macaranas (2013)
Effectiveness	QUT, IUUI, GT	QUESI, INTUI	QUT/CHAI: correctness
Mental efficiency	IUUI, INTUI, Others	PENS, NASA TLX, QUESI, SMEQ/RSME, INTUI, TAM			IUUI: ECM; IntuiBeat
Satisfaction	IUUI	QUESI
Gut feeling	INTUI	INTUI
Magical Experience	INTUI	INTUI
Intuitiveness	INTUI, GT	INTUI, PENS, TAM
Metacognitive Feelings	GT	Feeling of Knowing, of Directness, of Progress
Locus of attention: system/task	Others		Macaranas (2013)

Figure 3. Relationship between levels of regulation and functions based on Hacker (1986).

Table 2. Alternative terms for intuitive and reflective processing, found in various two-process theories (cf. Horstmann, 2012; Stanovich et al., 2014).

Two-process theory	Type 1 process	Type 2 process
Bargh and Chartrand (1999)	Automatic processing	Conscious processing
Bazerman et al. (1998)	Want self	Should self
Bickerton (1995)	Online thinking	Offline thinking
Brainerd and Reyna (2001)	Gist processing	Analytic processing
Chen and Chaiken (1999)	Heuristic processing	Systematic processing
Epstein (1994)	Experiential	Rational
Evans (1984)	Heuristic processing	Analytic processing
Evans and Over (1996)	Tacit thought processes	Explicit thought processes
Evans and Wason (1976)	Type 1 processes	Type 2 processes
Fodor (1983)	Modular process	Central processes
Gawronski and Bodenhausen (2006)	Associative processes	Propositional processes
Haidt (2001)	Intuitive system	Reasoning system
Hammond (1993)	Intuitive	Analytical
Johnson-Laird (1983)	Implicit inferences	Explicit inferences
Kahneman and Frederick (2002)	Intuition	Reasoning
Kahneman (2003)	System 1	System 2
Klaczynski (2000)	Heuristic processing	Analytic processing
Lieberman (2003)	Reflexive system	Reflective system
Loewenstein (1996)	Visceral factors	Tastes
Metcalfe and Mischel (1999)	Hot system	Cool system
Norman and Shallice (1986)	Contention scheduling	Supervisory attentional system
Pollock (1989)	Quick and inflexible modules	Intellection
Posner and Snyder (2004)	Automatic activation	Conscious processing
Reber (1989)	Implicit cognition	Explicit learning
Shiffrin and Schneider (1977)	Automatic processing	Controlled processing
Sloman (1996)	Associative system	Rule-based system
Smith and DeCoster (2000)	Associative processing	Rule-based processing
Stanovich (2005)	Autonomous processes	Decoupled simulation
Strack and Deutsch (2004)	Impulsive system	Reflective system
Thaler and Shefrin (1981)	Doer	Planner
Thompson et al. (2011)	Heuristic processing	Analytic processing
Toates (2006)	Stimulus-bound	Higher order
Wilson (2004)	Adaptive unconscious	Conscious

Table 3. Characterising features of Type 1 (i.e., fully intuitive) and Type 2 (i.e., fully reflective) processes (cf. Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Horstmann, 2012).

Type 1 processes	Type 2 processes
Fast	Slow
Unconscious	Conscious
High processing capacity	Low processing capacity
Parallel	Sequential
Automatic	Controlled
Associative	Rule-based
Low demand on working memory	High demand on working memory
Contextual	Abstract
Affective	Non-affective
Independent of cognitive abilities	Dependent of cognitive abilities

Figure 4. Tripartite model of the mind according to Stanovich et al. (2014), supplemented with corresponding levels of regulation from Hacker’s (1986) action regulation theory. See text for a description of the processes involved.

Figure 5. Preattentive metacognitive processes in intuitive use following the double-response paradigm of the tripartite mind (see Ackerman & Thompson, 2017; Thompson et al., 2011) and the fluency-affect model of intuition (see Topolinski, 2011; Topolinski & Strack, 2009).

Table 4. Implications of the new measurement definition of intuitive use (overview).

	Implication	Insight/examples
1	Reduces the number of previously proposed measures of intuitive use to measures of the three defining characteristics.	High effectiveness, low cognitive effort and a strong metacognitive feeling of fluency
2	Allows to differentiate previously used measures into measures of defining features and typical correlates.	Temporal efficiency, verbalisability, many subsclaes of the QUESI or INTUI questionnaires, for example, are typical correlates, not defining features of intuitive use.
3	Allows to search for other operationalisations of the defining characteristics not used before in intuitive interaction research.	Physiological measures of cognitive effort, the Single Ease Question and other operationalisations in the literature on processing fluency come into view.
4	Differentiating the defining characteristics of intuitive use from typical correlates sheds new light on differences between research groups.	Differences often arise from looking at different conditions under which typical correlates of intuitive use operate.
5	Summative and formative evaluation is supported.	While quantitative measures allow for summative evaluation, their continuous measurement can identify points of failure during interaction which are important for formative evaluation.
6	Intuitive use varies on a continuum.	There is no pure intuitive or unintuitive use, neither in single operations nor in whole interaction sequences.
7	Clarification, integration and updating of underlying psychological theory.	Extending dual processes with the tripartite model of the mind. Inclusion of processing hierarchies in the model. Clarifying the role of processing fluency.

Table 5. Defining characteristics and correlates of intuitive use according to the new measurement definition of intuitive use.

Defining characteristics of intuitive use	Typical correlates of intuitive use
High effectiveness	--
Low cognitive effort	Predominantly unconscious cognitive information processing based on prior knowledge that is relevant to action
	Time-efficient cognitive information processing
	Low verbalisation of information processing
Strong metacognitive feeling of fluency	Perceived low mental demand of cognitive information processing
	Perceived high achievement of goals
	Perceived low temporal demand on cognitive information processing
	Perceived high familiarity
	Perceived low explicit verbalisability
	Perceived low effort of learning
	Perceived low error rate
	Feeling of Knowing, of Directness, of Progress
	Magical experience
	Gut feeling
	Intuitiveness

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