On Equality

ABSTRACT

Locke builds a world that has benefits and costs. While economics has illustrated the benefits, this work illustrates the costs, by contrasting Two Treatises of Civil Government to the work of Aristotle. Generally, the cost one must bear from entering the world that Locke built is a compression of human experience, where qualitative equality of all things is asserted to exist. More importantly, a trivialization of all the outcomes, which emanate from all human decisions, must accompany the equality that Locke asserts. Even though Locke provides the elementary operating system for modern economics, through his proposition of the principle of qualitative equality, this operating system effectively divorces man, not only from nature but also from the very thing with which man has always used to interpret the natural world; works of great literature. While great literature has little patience for the trivial outcomes of human existence, except to highlight the importance of non-trivial outcomes, this work suggests that economics, under the influence of Locke, is permanently incapacitated from ever considering non-trivial outcomes.

Notes

1. Whether equality is the idol of our age, as Lucas has observed, remains an interesting question that remains beyond the scope of this work (Lucas 1960, 1977, 255). However, the infatuation of modernity with the idea of equality remains readily apparent.

2. “Man” is used to indicate human existence; it does not have any relevance to the issue of gender in any way whatsoever.

3. While quantitative equality refers to equality of a quantitative value or variable, and variations of this variable, qualitative equality refers to equality, or at least some form of general equivalence, of variables in terms of type, or quality. Qualitative inequality, therefore, refers to differences of type, or kind, whereas quantitative inequality refers to differences in the quantity observed of a specific variable, among things that remain of the same kind, or type. Quantitative differences are generally referred to as differences of degree, whereas qualitative differences are usually referred to as differences of kind. Although science remains reticent to acknowledge qualitative distinctions, as it seeks to explain all things as quantitative variations of smaller building blocks, such an acknowledgment is argued to be essential to understand the things that are of interest to man. If science could demonstrate complete knowledge of all things, then qualitative difference may well become otiose.

4. Like Hegel's view of the march of history toward ever greater freedom, Marshall ([1890] 1961, [1919] 1920) depicts the evolution of economics as an ever-continuing drive toward greater freedom in enterprise and trade (Groenewegen 1990, 78; Flay 1984). While Groenewegen argues that while Marshall took his bearings from the Idealist philosophy of Hegel ([1821] 1967; [1837] 1956), he gradually reduces reliance upon it (Groenewegen 1990, 80; see also Hicks 1931). While Locke is already well known as an author who demonstrates the well-documented contrast, between the ancients and moderns, as elaborated by Strauss and others, modern economics remains largely uninterested and ambivalent on most subjects that relate to philosophy, and Locke is no exception (Vaughn 1978, 311). Specifically, modern economics does not accept that it needs any philosophical basis, because the tenets of economics are, apparently, self-evident. Apart from demonstrating ignorance about philosophy, such a refusal to even consider the importance of philosophy is a sign of how successful the modern philosophers have been in terms of promoting their once radical ideas (Friedman 1953). However, problems with modern economics remain ever-present and evergreen, as Summers, and others have pointed out, especially in times of crisis (Caballero 2010; Summers 2012; Tarullo 2009; Duhs 2006, 2008).

5. While it might be anticipated that economists will deny the existence of such qualitative equalities, this work gives examples of how and why these equalities exist and why the equalities are all very much consistent with Locke. While the authors may have failed to consider all the forms of qualitative equality that modern social science applies to the analysis of man, the selection made herein covers some of the arguably more important forms of equality that are apparent in modern social science. Specifically, the above does not represent an exhaustive list of forms of qualitative equality, and there may be others that are worthy of consideration and discussion.

6. Locke is featured in this work, because his contribution is crucial in terms of building a philosophical “bridge” between the early modern philosophers, such as Machiavelli and Hobbes, and those who are generally recognized to be the founders of modern economics, such as Adam Smith, and others (Nash and Rybak 2014; Mansfield 2007, para. 27).

7. However, it can be observed that the qualitative distinction should, logically, apply in the unimproved natural state.

8. Thumos is discussed extensively by Mansfield elsewhere, and a more detailed discussion ensues herein. However, the essential definition of thumos is that it is the part of the soul that defends what is unique about a man; it is the defense of inequality and the unequal natural capabilities, which are provided, by nature, to man. In other words, it is something that is completely foreign to modern philosophy, because it acknowledges worth, or value, provided by nature.

9. Modern social science, especially economics, is partially built on an interpretation of Smith and his Wealth of Nations ([1776] 1939), where Smith suggests that good things, or the things that society intends to be outcomes of the social procedures, can come from individual actions that are not intended to provide such benefits. While he initially indicated this idea in The Theory of Moral Sentiments ([1759] 1976, part 4, ch. 1), Smith proposes the idea again in The Wealth of Nations ([1776] 1939, book 4, ch. 2, para. 9), among other places. To many in the modern world, who remain ignorant of philosophy, this work argues that the hand who robs them of their very manliness is invisible; however, a knowledge of philosophy would identify a series of three main sets of “hands”: the hands of Machiavelli, the hands of Hobbes, and the hands of Locke (Bloom 1975, 1987, 1990a; Cropsey [1955] 1977; Mansfield 2006; Strauss 1952, 1953). A definition of manliness will be provided later in the work, and the reference to Smith is one that again brings to mind the central importance of equality to modern economics, as Smith argues that an invisible hand effectively distributes wealth, “had the earth been divided into equal portions among all its inhabitants” (Smith [1759] 1976, vol. 1, p. 184), as Smith indicates below:

The rich … consume little more than the poor, and in spite of their natural selfishness and rapacity, though they mean only their own conveniency, though the sole end which they propose from the labours of all the thousands whom they employ, be the gratification of their own vain and insatiable desires, they divide with the poor the produce of all their improvements. They are led by an invisible hand to make nearly the same distribution of the necessaries of life, which would have been made, had the earth been divided into equal portions among all its inhabitants, and thus without intending it, without knowing it, advance the interest of the society, and afford means to the multiplication of the species ([emphasis added] Smith [1759] 1976, vol. 1, p. 184).

Other modern philosophers of relevance to this work are, among others, as follows: (i) Machiavelli ([1513] 1985, [1517] 1996), (ii) Hobbes ([1651] 1950), (iii) Rousseau ([1762a] 1968, [1762b] 1991, [1770] 1964), (iv) Smith ([1759] 1976, [1776] 1939). Moreover, it can be noted that while the assertions of Smith about equality and the equivalence between self-interest and the public interest has a firm basis in modern philosophy, as it remains largely inconsistent with the philosophy of Aristotle, as recently interpreted by Strauss, and others. Within this interpretation, a generally coherent position is evident within ancient philosophy, with regard to the conception of both nature, and the relationship of man to nature (Strauss 1952, 1953, 1959b, 1964; Mansfield 2006, 2007). Specifically, the philosophy of Aristotle is seen by the authors to represent the main exemplar of ancient philosophy. “Nature” is defined as all that surrounds and supports man, from the subatomic level to the broader and infinite universe. A refusal to recognize several qualitative distinctions, within economics, is a refusal that is very much consistent with one of the main instigators of modern philosophy, such as Locke, among others. Specifically, Locke provides an important analysis, which develops the work of the prior modern philosophers, such as Machiavelli and Hobbes, to then provide a working philosophical position that would influence later modern philosophers, such as Adam Smith. Instead of being a medicine for man, the indiscriminate application of qualitative equality transforms the medicine, of equality, into a poison, as Shakespeare might say (Shakespeare ([1597] 2000, act 2, scene 3). It is important that this analysis is not opposed to equality as such, but it is opposed to the indiscriminate application of the idea to aspects of human experience, to which it remains, arguably, not well suited.

10. (Locke [1689] 1988, ch. 5, sec. 40). See also Filmer ([1652] 2000).

11. Such an interpretation of the ancient and modern idea of nature is provided by Strauss and others (Strauss [1936] 1963, 1952, 1953, [1959a] 1988, [1959b] 1989, 1964, 1970; Machiavelli [1513] 1985, [1517] 1996; Plato 1991; Aristotle 1885).

12. In dashing style the modern scientist might be, on a metaphorical level, seen as equivalent to the most famous numbered character of our time; “007”, a “James Bond” who can apparently control, minute by minute, what science refers to as the “environment” (Fleming [1953] 2012).

13. As Aristotle indicates:

Excellence, then, being of these two kinds, intellectual and moral intellectual excellence owes its birth and growth mainly to instruction, and so requires time and experience, while moral excellence is the result of habit or custom … (Aristotle 1893, book 2, part 1, para 1).

14. Strauss elaborates the important role of Machiavelli in terms of the development of modern philosophy, in some detail (Strauss [1959b] 1989, pp. 85–6; see also Strauss [1936] 1963, 1952, 1953, [1959a] 1988, [1959b] 1989, 1964, 1970; Machiavelli [1513] 1985, [1517] 1996; Plato 1991; Aristotle 1885).

15. (Locke [1689] 1988). Locke takes man from the destitution of nature, where man wastes labor on the uncertainty surrounding property rights, to a situation where all labor is effectively harnessed and uncertainty is effectively replaced with risk. Such effective harnessing of labor, free of the concern for uncertainty about property rights, then allows man to create a world that remains free from any dependence, whatsoever, on nature. Locke repeatedly refers to the term “uncertain” in the second treatise of Two Treatises of Government, and each reference cannot be fully elaborated in this work.

16. Knight [1921] 1985; see also, Knight (1913a, 1913b, 1915, 1916, 1920a, 1920b, 1926, 1932, 1935a, 1935b, 1940, 1940, 1943) and Weber [1927] 1950, [1948] 1968; Herbst [1965] 1972, 1995). A selection of the literature on Knight is as follows: Boudreaux and Holcombe (1989), Breit and Ransom (1982), Dewey D. (1990), Emmett (1989, 1994, 1999a, 1999b, 1999c), Gonce (1972, 1994), Gordon (1974), Graham (1947), Hammond (1991), Hands (2006), Herbst [1965] 1972, Johnson (1952), Kern ([1985] 1988, 1987), Le Roy and Singell (1987), Nash (2003), Nash and Rybak (2009, 2014), Razeen (1997), Runde (1998a, 1998b, 1998c), Schweikhardt (1988), Shils (1981), and Wick (1973). However, this alternative provides a much firmer foundation for uncertainty, when compared to Pragmatism (Nash and Rybak 2014). Even though Knight integrated Pragmatic philosophy with economics in an adequate fashion, the economics profession still fails to acknowledge this pioneering achievement, preferring instead to adopt, and applaud, inadequate interpretations of Knight, as provided by, among others, Coase (1937). For example, celebrated authors, such as Ronald Coase, have made academic careers out of inadequate interpretations of Knight, among other things. Specifically, given the fact that the existence of uncertainty underlies the proposition of transaction costs in the seminal article, The Nature of the Firm (NOF), it can be argued that the person making the argument for transaction costs would require at least a basic understanding of one of the proponents of uncertainty; Frank Knight. However, Coase freely admits that he lacked knowledge of either economics or philosophy, when he wrote NOF. An entire literature has now developed on the interpretation that Coase took of Knight in NOF (Coase 1960, 1991, 1994; Boudreaux and Holcome 1989; Champernowne 1969; Cowling and Sugden 1988; Demsetz 1997; Dugger 1983; Ellsberg 1961; Hardt 2009, Hart 1990, 1995, Hart and Holmström 1987; Hart and Moore 1990, 1999; Slater and Spencer 2000; and Williamson 1975, 1981, 1998, 2000). Pragmatism mainly represents, at least for the purposes of this work, the philosophy of John Dewey, William James, and C. S. Peirce (Dewey J. [1882–1888] 1967, 1891, [1895–1898a] 1967, [1895–1898b] 1967, [1903–1906] 1976, 1929; James [1890] 1981, 1897, 1909; Peirce 1868a, 1868b, 1958; see also Boisvert [1988] 1996; Platt 1908, 1909), and Rockefeller (1991). From Coase's extensive critique of Knight's work, RUP throughout NOF, it may be reasonable to infer that Coase is primarily basing the existence of “marketing costs” on Knightian uncertainty, rather than on the work of Keynes (1921, [1936] 1983). For an interesting analysis of Keynes see the following: Coates (1990), Fioretti (1998), O'Donnell (1989), and Greer (2001). Some of Knight's other works are also worthy of at least some attention ([1933] 1951, 1937). Even though Knight integrated Pragmatic philosophy within economics in an adequate fashion, the economics profession still fails to acknowledge this pioneering achievement, preferring instead to adopt, and applaud, inadequate interpretations of Knight.

17. A detailed discussion of thumos is provided by Mansfield (2007), and a full discussion of thumos is not feasible in this work (Bail 1981). Specifically, the modern social scientist now, at least metaphorically, re-imagines the sea that Fairweather floated on as an entirely safe sea; where the qualitatively distinct uncertainty Fairweather faced is nonexistent. Here, the modern scientist understands that Fairweather faced just an extreme form of risk. Metaphorically, at least, the modern social scientist grasps the world as one huge, one perfectly still sea of equality, where humanity is hypothesized to “normally” to float on a sea in eternal equilibrium. In many ways, the entire idea of “equilibrium” is just another transposition of the qualitative equality founded mainly by Locke. While equilibrium is something envisaged as being feasible by quantitative economics, as partly built on the work of Locke, it remains foreign to the understanding of the world, as provided by Aristotle.

18. (Brady 2005a, 2005b; Dziob 1993; Gay 1988; Koziak 1999; Mansfield, 2007). Opposition between Locke and Aristotle is nothing new to the scholarly community. For example, Brady describes how Locke opposes Aristotle in his essay entitled Some Thoughts Concerning Education, where Locke seeks to block the transformation that might occur in an Aristotelian education (Brady 2005b).

19. Here, it might be observed that, in some small way, Locke follows and civilizes the great work of Hobbes, who had described the life of man as ”solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.” Specifically, if man derives virtually nothing of value from nature, and if he creates society, not because of natural sociality but because society remains a vehicle that operationalizes an unbounded ambition that even extends to the control of nature itself, as Locke and others suggest, then the description of the life of man by Hobbes remains both relevant and revealing with regard to the discussion of thumos (Hobbes, T. (Chapter XIII, [1651] 1950; see also to Strauss [1936] 1963). There can be no discussion of thumos for Hobbes, or Locke, or the other modern philosophers in general, because thumos needs qualitative differentiation, as partly provided by nature, to either exist or to be recognized. However, such differentiation would mean that man relied on nature, and such reliance would be axiomatically inconsistent with modern philosophy, which, apart from other things, is concerned with independence from nature, not with reliance on it.

20. By way of contrast, warlike behavior, which Hobbes and Locke assert exists in “the state of nature,” effectively prevents the full expression of natural diversity, so the assertion of “the state of nature” remains a strategy aimed at presenting a fundamentally distorted conception of nature.

21. Locke follows, at least to some degree, Hobbes ([1651] 1950). However, Locke effectively substitutes the desire to eliminate uncertainty about property rights, as one of the main reasons for creating society, from what Hobbes suggests, among others; the fear of violent death. As Hobbes indicates, nature provides nothing to man but the promise of a ”nasty” existence and the fear of violent death. Man is better off in society, by seeking to escape a malevolent state of nature that leaves man in a poor “condition,” as Hobbes indicates:

In such condition [in the state of nature] there is no place for industry, because the fruit thereof is uncertain, and consequently, not culture of the earth, no navigation, nor the use of commodities that may be imported by sea, no commodious building, no instruments of moving and removing such things as require much force, no knowledge of the face of the earth, no account of time, no arts, no letters, no society, and which is worst of all, continual fear and danger of violent death, and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short [brackets added] (Hobbes [1651] 1950, 13, 9).

22. Some great literature generally reflects ancient philosophy, such as Shakespeare, generally supports the contention that men are very differently endowed by nature. While Shakespeare notes that nature is both a womb for man and a tomb for man, being the cause of life and ultimate death, nature bears very many different kinds of “children,” with important qualitative differences, as he suggests in Romeo and Juliet:

What is her burying grave that is her womb, And from her womb children of divers kind, We sucking on her natural bosom find, Many for many virtues excellent, None but for some and yet all different (Shakespeare [1597] 2000, act 2, scene 3).

23. (Aristotle 1885, book 10, part 9).

24. It is important that society is not conceived, by Aristotle, as a vehicle that transforms the uncertainty of nature into the risk of civil society. Rather, society is understood to be a reflection of a natural sociality, so that society has no covert role, other than to allow expression of natural sociality. Accordingly, Aristotle argues that it would be absurd for a man to even consider living alone (Dziob 1993, 781). Such an understanding of political association, as presented by modern philosophers such as Locke, means that society is founded on what Aristotle understood to be the “base” instinct of acquisitiveness. In contrast, Aristotle argued that society had been created to pursue what he understood as the “good,” given that nature was understood to be generous, although somewhat capricious and notoriously unreliable in terms of that generosity (Bloom 1990b, p. 327). Locke appears thoroughly modern, even “scientific,” in terms of the assertions regarding equality. As Mansfield remarks, science is all about the universal and not the particular, while literature is all about the particular, and not about the universal (Mansfield 2007; Fortin 1996). Contrast this interpretation by Mansfield to the modern interpretation of decision making by Arrow (1948, [1951a] 1963, [1951b] 1971, 1970) and to the much applauded interpreters of Arrow (Rawls 1972; Sen 1966, 1970, 1979, 1985, 1986, 1988, 1993, 1995, 1999, 2009). In addition, such an understanding does not prevent, constrain, or eliminate man improving technology and improving aspects of his more technical knowledge concerning an essentially unknowable nature.

25. “Manly” is used in the sense recently defined by Mansfield (2006) See also Strauss (1964, p. 42 and Mansfield (2006), where the discussion of manliness addresses decision making under uncertainty. Contrast this discussion with the following, among others: Nietzsche ([1884] 1956, [1886] 1993, [1887] 1996, 1910; Dannhauser [1963] 1987; Sartre 1956, Schopenhauer [1819] 1969, [1844] 1969). Mansfield provides a detailed description of manliness in his recent book on the topic (Mansfield 2006). Essentially manliness refers to, among other things, the ability to make decisions under conditions of uncertainty or chance, something that is generally otiose under modern philosophy. However, Mansfield indicates:

On the whole, however, I am quite critical of the scientific understanding of manliness, whether in social psychology or evolutionary biology. These sciences see manliness at its lowest as aggression and altogether fail to consider the phenomenon of manly assertiveness. A manly man asserts himself so that he and the justice he demands are not overlooked (Mansfield 2006, x; see also Cropsey [1963] 1987).

26. For example, while Romeo had rare natural gifts in Shakespeare's Romeo and Juliet, circumstance led him to make imprudent decisions, and he dramatically comprehends this imprudence at the very moment, where play turns from a comedy to a tragedy. Specifically, where Romeo admits to becoming “fortunes fool” (Shakespeare [1597] 2000, act 3, scene 1).

27. By way of contrast, the modern approach prefers to ignore and to trivialize these crucially important journeys; to effectively disfigure these journeys by homogenizing all natural capability, so that all natural capabilities equate a zero value, in terms of modern economics. For example, in the case of Fairweather, it can be argued that the naturally gifted Fairweather aspired to become a great painter. However, it can be asserted that Fairweather remains qualitatively removed from the common man, or what the economist refers to as the “economic actor.” Such a removal is mainly because Fairweather possessed a naturally derived capability for painting, which then, as a result of moral training and habituation, bore a natural ambition; to develop these naturally derived capabilities, to possibly become a great artist. All these qualitative differences, both as nature provided to Fairweather and as Fairweather developed, are human activities that remain, of course, necessarily outside the scope of social science and modern economics. However, if the aspiration to be great becomes trivialized, as modern economic asserts that it must be, then economics makes it less likely that man will be able to adequately nurture, or encourage the achievement of greatness; a thoroughly miserable outcome.

28. Given recent developments in mathematics and computer modeling, this intricacy should become more tractable than it has been in the past. Yet tractability does not mean a complete description can be created, as modern economics promises. Rather, it means that mathematical techniques have a significant challenge ahead and that mathematics can assist man to better understand the complexity of human action. Instead of being obsessed with the power of gadgets and mathematical techniques, as modern economics is, the man of the future may, hopefully, harness these gadgets and techniques in a more humble way: in a way that helps him moderate his ignorance, rather than denying that his ignorance exists, as modern social science does.

29. Great literature exhibits the ideas in Aristotle, among others, where, for example, works such as Shakespeare's Romeo and Juliet, show how imprudent decision making effectively prevents the two main characters from developing their respective natural talents (Shakespeare [1597] 2000).