On the Universal Qualitative Uniformity of Man in Locke

ABSTRACT

A problem with modern philosophy, as partly initiated by Locke, is that modern philosophy defines human knowledge as comprising exactly one uniform quality; a quality that is exclusively derived from the effort of man. Specifically, Locke makes the monumentally important assertion that human knowledge derives no qualitative diversity from what older philosophy identified as “nature.” However, this axiomatic assertion is developed in a careful, restrained, and staged manner. First, Locke asserts such uniformity exists in terms of the derivation of value, within The Two Treatises of Government ([1689] 1988). Second, Locke then radicalizes and generalizes this assertion in An Essay on Human Understanding ([1690] 1824), which has facilitated the creation of modern economics, as well as some other profound outcomes. Fortunately, alternatives to the problem posed by Locke are apparent, which are mainly evident in the philosophy of Aristotle, and these are also briefly considered.

Notes

1. This article is dedicated to the memory of Joan Estelle Rybak; 1929–2017.

2. By difference of quality, one refers to differences of kind, not differences of degree. Differences of kind are evident in the somewhat obvious form that refers to differences of species; between birds and dogs, for example. However, it can be asserted that a less obvious difference of kind exists, where nature provides disparate intellectual faculties to men, making them very different in kind. More specifically, differences of kind, between the natural intellectual faculties of men, refer to the observed fact that some men are, solely by nature, artists, and some men are, solely by nature, mathematicians, while others are naturally gifted in other areas of human endeavor. While a man can be both an artist, and a mathematician, solely by nature, it remains reasonable to observe that most men freely identify with being, by nature, one kind of man, or the other. These profound intellectual differences are asserted, in a similar way to Aristotle, to be freely given to man by nature, where these differences lead men to seek very different ends, or objectives, according to the kind, or quality, of man one might be. By way of contrast, differences of degree refer to differences in the quantity of one variable, which Locke typically ascribes to human labor, between things of a similar kind, or a similar quality (Aristotle 1885).

3. For a discussion on manliness, and a definition of manliness see Mansfield (2006), and for a reasonable interpretation of the role and nature of economics see Cropsey ([1955] 1977, [1963] 1987), Bloom ([1963] 1987, [1968] 1991, 1975, 1990a, 1993a, [1993b] 2000), and Bloom and Jaffa (1964).

4. “Man” is used in the classical sense and has no gender implication, whatsoever. While “nature” can be defined in many ways, the definition, by Mill, remains adequate for the purposes of this work. It is as follows,

It thus appears that we must recognize at least two principal meanings in the word Nature. In one sense, it means all the powers existing in either the outer or the inner world and everything which takes place by means of those powers. In another sense, it means, not everything which happens, but only what takes place without the agency, or without the voluntary and intentional agency, of man. This distinction is far from exhausting the ambiguities of the word; but it is the key to most of those on which important consequences depend (Mill [1874] 1985, 389). See also Mill ([1861] 1985).

5. (Smith [1776] 1904; Duhs 2006, 150, 2008).

6. Such an analytical architecture allows the unfettered use of quantitative techniques in the humanities; the feared application of the techniques used in the physical sciences to the humanities (Bloom 1987; Knight 1935b, 20). Man differs from animals through the application of labor to acquire techniques of thinking, and different men differ from each other according to the quantities of labor applied to gain different skill. Because nature provides virtually nothing of value to man, the equivalence on man to nature, though outrageous in design, settles around the presence, or otherwise, of quantities of labor being applied to virtually worthless natural products and other things provided by nature.

7. (Nash, Nash, and Rybak, forthcoming).

8. American pragmatism will be referred to as “pragmatism”. Even though most who read this piece will overlook this note, it must be emphasized that this piece is exploratory in nature; it is not definitive or final. Accordingly, the propositions provided remain incomplete and require further development. American Pragmatism mainly represents, at least for the purposes of this work, the philosophy of John Dewey, William James, and C. S. Peirce (Dewey J. [1882-1888] 1967, 1891, [1895-1898a] 1967, [1895-1898b] 1967, [1903-1906] 1976, 1929; James [1890] 1981, 1897, 1909; Peirce 1868a, 1868b, 1958; see also, Boisvert [1988] 1996; Platt 1908, 1909), and Rockefeller (1991). See also the interesting work of Taylor on this general subject of quality (1989), as well as the work of Platt (1908, 1909) and Wiley (2006). This response, of pragmatism, to critique of German Idealism, and other things, proved to be important, since pragmatism formed the basis of the proposition of uncertainty in what has become the “science” of economics by Knight ([1921] 1985), among other things. Pragmatism also underpinned some of the political developments in the United States, such as the New Deal, while it further radicalized the modern exclusion of nature, as initially promulgated by philosophers, such as Locke, among other things. (Mansfield 1993, 103). Knight is important to this study, because he shows the issues that emerge when one questions modern economics. A selection of the important literature on Knight is as follows: Boudreaux and Holcombe (1989), Breit and Ransom (1982), Dewey D. (1990), Emmett (1989, 1994, 1999a, 1999b, 1999c), Gonce (1972, 1994), Gordon (1974), Graham (1947), Hands (2006), Hammond (1991), Johnson (1952), Kern ([1985] 1988, 1987), Le Roy and Singell (1987), Nash (2003), Nash and Rybak (2009), 2014), Razeen (1997), Runde (1998a, 1998b, 1998c), Schweikhardt (1988), Shils (1981), and Wick (1973). The other great figure of twentieth-century economics was recognized uncertainty, yet upon a very different philosophical basis Keynes (1921), [1936] 1983), Champernowne (1969), Coates (1990), Fioretti (1998), Greer (2001), O'Donnell (1989). Uncertainty has been transformed into the discussion the “firm,” as initiated by the blissfully ignorant Coase (1937, 1960, [1988] 1991, 1994). Economics has now generated a large literature on the “firm.” Some of this work is as follows: Cowling and Sugden (1998), Williamson (1975, 1981, 1998, 2000), Hardt (2009), Hart (1990, 1995), Hart and Holmström (1987), Demstez (1997), and Alchian and Demsetz (1972), Dugger (1993), Hart and Moore (1990, 1999), Slater and Spencer (2000). Much has been made of Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit ([1921] 1985 in the literature, yet there are many other aspects and contributions of Knight that remain largely unread, and they show the struggles of an intelligent mind in the face of the destruction of western thought by a rampant social science movement (Knight 1913a, 1913b, 1915, 1920a, 1920b, [1993] 1951, 1935a, 1937, 1940, 1943), with intellectually repugnant authors such as Rawls (1972). Even though uncertainty is largely discredited, an treated as a subset of game theory (Nash 1951), given that it is inconsistent with Locke and social science, recent events indicate that a failure to integrate uncertainty into economics is perilous (Caballero 2010). This work, however, suggests that such an integration is logically impossible.

9. Nietzsche ([1887] 1996, 98, essay 3, para. 12), (1910), Bloom (1987, 195), Dannhauser ([1963] 1987: 845). Many famous critiques of Pragmatism have already been made. Nietzsche may not have originated the critique that led to American pragmatism. Rather, it can be argued that he takes the modern project of philosophy to its logical conclusion. While some have argued that Machiavelli originates this modern project (Strauss 1958), Hume ([1739] 1985) essentially begins the phase of modernity that is most important to Nietzsche (Mansfield [1991] 1993, 76). See also Schopenhaur ([1819] 1969, [1844] 1969), Heidegger (1971), and Satre (1956).

10. (Mansfield 1993, 103).

11. Knight ([1921] 1985) was marginalized for his contributions because of the following: (1) the idea of uncertainty remains logically inconsistent with modern philosophy, as it is designed to exclude reference to nature, and the uncertainty that emerges from nature, and (2) Knight was highly critical of the powerful and influential author, Dewey, in particular, and pragmatism is general. However, other criticisms of modern philosophy have been somewhat more successful, in terms of creating new insights, when compared to the irritable and rambunctious Knight (Strauss 1952; 1958; Bloom 1987). Summers, however, argues that uncertainty is still relevant, yet the rationale for uncertainty needs a solid philosophical basis that Summers does not provide (2012). See also Tarullo (2009).

12. The issues with pragmatism have been addressed elsewhere (Nash 2014), However some of the reservations about pragmatism are as follows:

Reservation 1: Social science is not a “positive” science as asserted by pragmatism: In general, because political philosophy, and the natural inequalities pertaining to both the relationship between man and nature, and the inequalities between men as provided by nature, both dominate and drive the understanding of human interaction (Strauss 1953; Knight 1935b, Bloom 1987),

Reservation 2: Social policy more than “positive” science as asserted by pragmatism: Pragmatism, while critical of modern philosophy, ends up supporting the outcomes of modern philosophy, by seeing social policy as equivalent to the physical sciences, where “value judgment” has no place (Bloom 1987, 29, 56; Knight 1916, 174, 1935b), and

Reservation 3: Social control impossible, unlike what is asserted by pragmatism: If, according to the underlying philosophical view of the world, where man is separable from nature, then the idea that social outcomes can be controlled, perfected, manipulated, or engineered, effectively implies that man can control nature as a whole (Knight 1935b, 20; Strauss [1959b] 1989, 98).

13. This is not an accidental or haphazard outcome; it occurs because man acquires virtually nothing of value from nature. Importantly, this outcome is one of the central axioms of the work of Locke; an axiom hidden from the many but shown to the few. Others have also considered the integration of TTOG and ECHU (Mabbot (1973). See also Brady (2005a, 2005b) and Vaughn (1978), Walsh (2014).

14. Such an exclusively quantitative approach remains somehow, self-evident to the new missionary of modern times; the evangelist economist. All everyone needs to do, according to the economist, is act in what the economist defines in a “rational” manner (Samuelson 1947, 1976; Arrow [1951a] 1963; Ellsberg 1961; Freidman 1953). While the economist attempts to engineer social outcomes, he generally has virtually no knowledge of where the axiomatic ideas that he tries to apply, have emerged from. It is as if the axioms are self-evident and that no man created them. Unfortunately for the largely naïve economist, man did create them, and that man is largely Locke. Specifically, without the universal qualitative equality of Locke the social sciences would find a much more complex and intricate world to engage with. In other words, modern social science might improve immensely if it had at least some idea of how the contribution of Locke has shaped the premises, from which modern man creates his most popular analysis; economics.

15. Plato (1921).

16. Locke ([1689] 1988, ch. 5, sec. 40).

17. (Locke [1690] 1824, vol. 1, book 2, ch.1, para. 2). See also Filmer ([1652] 2000).

18. There can be no Turner, no Fairweather, or no Caravaggio, for Locke, or those who possess a qualitatively distinct, natural endowed, capability to perceive hue and tone in a qualitatively different sense to all other men (Bail 1981). According to the logic of Locke, these artists acquired their extreme talents through labor directed at the acquisition of property. Such an explanation would not only be fiercely ridiculed by the artists themselves, but by scholars of art.

19. (Locke [1690] 1824, vol. 1, book 3, ch. 6, para. 36). For example, artists typically have exceptional, and naturally derived, abilities to perceive and experience hue and tone, and they remain, through common sense observation, somewhat rare within the community. Others, who are not artists, by virtue of a latent qualitative distinction provided by nature, do not perceive hue and tone in the qualitative distinct manner of an artist. Rather, these non-artists, most probably, possess different qualities of perception, not to mention qualities of reflective knowledge, which are provided to them, partly by nature, as Aristotle would argue. In explaining all the great breakthroughs of modern and ancient art, one needs to refer to the presence of exceptional, naturally derived, capability. Labor is, of course evident, yet the qualitative changes that these artists created cannot be adequately explained in terms of applications of quantities of labor (Bail 1981).  If all the other arts and sciences are included, and all these groups are seeking to realize natural development, then the complexity of human development becomes somewhat apparent. Instead of all men seeking to acquire property, as Locke suggests, Aristotle would suggest that all men seek to develop natural talents; each different from the rest, without the equality of importance maintained by modern philosophy (Faure 2013).  Moreover, if nature did provide something of value to man, then all minds might be pregnant with the disparate fruits of a benevolent nature; every mind would be naturally different, at the point of natural conception and thereon, from every other mind. Variations in natural talent would then, after initial conception, serve to increase these qualitative differences between minds, as a life is lived, where these natural abilities are either enhanced, degraded, or completely destroyed, by the activity of man.

20. However, the mind cannot be completely white because it would not exist without involuntary activities given to man from nature, such as breathing. While modern psychology screams for attention to be given to the subconscious, Locke fails to consider the involuntary mechanisms of the mind in any way (James [1890] 1981). Locke, must, therefore, be referring to the mind in terms of voluntary thoughts and ideas, with no account of the relationship between voluntary or conscious thought, and involuntary or unconscious thought.

21. Logically, there could not be any philosophers, according to Locke, as nature provides virtually nothing of value to man, and the philosopher possesses a unique quality of human knowledge, as given to him, by nature. Even those enthralled in science might need to acknowledge natural gifts in terms of “innovators” like Einstein. In other words, taken to its logical extreme, modern philosophy, as proposed by Locke, exhibits many self-contradictory issues. All exceptional men, according to Locke, must be exceptional only because of an exceptional desire to acquire property, which then leads to the development of exceptional capabilities.

22. This is the case, unless one makes the laughable and ridiculous case, that, according to Locke, all these philosophers possessed an exceptional desire to acquire property and, as a result, they labored to create their skills for philosophy, as a means of acquiring property. Such a situation is completely logical, according to Locke's argument in TTOG and as radicalized within ECHU.

23. For Locke, variations in the desire to acquire valuable property drive variations in effort, and the consequent acquisition of the acquired skills, which then allow the acquisition of property and leisure time. Here, there are no qualitative distinctions that pose a challenge to the mechanisms of formal economics. Rather, there are only differences in degree, explained completely by variations in the applications of human labor to worthless natural objects; nature plays no role. Such a conception of man and nature then allows the unrestricted application of formal mathematical techniques to the decision making of all human beings at all times, and in all places. Such an explanation of variations in desire driving variations in the acquisition in property, should sound very familiar to a formal economist, and it remains a pity that formal economics operates on a basis that it knows virtually nothing about. Formal economics remains, in effect, the child of parents; parents that the child does not know.

24. (Locke [1690] 1824, vol. 2, book 4, ch. 20, para. 2).

25. Nature provides virtually nothing of value to man, as Locke indicates,

… the one of these being the food and raiment which unassisted nature furnishes us with; the other, provisions which our industry and pains prepare for us, which how much they exceed the other in value, when any one hath computed, he will then see how much labour makes the far greatest part of the value of things we enjoy in this world: and the ground which produces the materials, is scarce to be reckoned in, as any, or at most, but a very small part of it; so little, that even amongst us, land that is left wholly to nature, that hath no improvement of pasturage, tillage, or planting, is called (Locke [1689] 1988, Ch. 5, sec. 42).

26. Before the modern philosophers, a difference of kind existed between man and nature, and that difference was created by nature, not man. However, after Machiavelli, and especially after Locke, all that changed. Subsequent to Locke, the distinction between man and animal becomes one of degree, not kind. Also, man, not nature, controls the difference between man and animal. Moreover, it can be observed that it took the wheels of science over a hundred and fifty years, mainly with the common sense observations of nature, by Darwin, to prove what Locke forcefully asserts, in An Essay on Human Understanding, by providing some initial evidence that the distinction, between man and animal, is merely one of degree, and not one of kind, although the underlying cause of genetic mutation remains unresolved, but now generally attributed to fortune, or chance (Darwin 1859). However, it appears that the lack of a qualitative distinction between man and animal is now accepted almost universally, with dispute only on the extreme fringes of society, just like the universal uniformity of qualitative equality as proposed by Locke.

27. The work of Xenophon is also typical of the subtle wording of the ancient philosophers (Xenophon 1994).

28. See also the important work of Smith ([1759] 1976).

29. Rousseau ([1754] 1913, [1762a] 1968, [1762b] 1991, [1770] 1964). (Nash, Nash, and Rybak, forthcoming). Here, the scope for human freedom, as Yaffe describes, is limited to his desire for the acquisition of scarce property (Yaffe 2000). See also Chappell (1994, 2007) and Magri (2000).

30. Here, the objective of society is not “GDP growth” or “stable inflation”, or “low unemployment”, but how well natural abilities are developed. In other words, ancient philosophy recognized that men seek many different goals all at once, and the measure of success of society is the degree to which enhancement to natural ability is afforded by society. While this is a difficult measurement to make, addressing this challenge maybe a worthy goal of mathematics. With Locke, however, all these goals and aspirations change forever, since natural parsimony is assumed not to provide anyone with any natural capability. Here, men must have the same desire to acquire property, where the skills that are developed are mere reflections, or the outcomes, of that desire, so that they can all be described as one type of human being, as Marshall does so well; the notorious “economic actor” (Marshall [1890] 1961).

31. Marshall illustrates his modern view of the relationship between man and nature in the epigraph to The Principles of Economics, “Natura non facit saltum,” or “nature does not make leaps” (Marshall [1890] 1961). By way of contrast, the ancients understood that nature does make leaps, and those leaps are apparent in the large variations in natural quality that apparent in different men. While nature is benevolent for the ancient philosophers like Aristotle, it remains parsimonious for the moderns.

32. (Mansfield 2006).

33. The relativism that the modern philosopher is so familiar with effectively starts with the exclusion of qualitative distinctions in Locke (Mathewson 2006). See also Schneewind (1994), Aaron (1973), Walsh (2014), Lolordo (2012), and Rickless (2013).

34. In other words, this is probably the most damaging outcome of a thoroughgoing absence of qualitative distinction in the life of man. If man provides all things of value, then there is no room for nature to provide what common sense tells us it provides; natural qualitative diversity. This natural diversity, freely provided by the hand of nature, allows for the promise of recapturing the meaning of qualitative distinctions in the life of man, for without these providential gifts of nature, the moral realm immediately collapses, by Locke, and others, into differences of degree; not differences of kind or quality. Accordingly, Locke explains human knowledge, in terms of differences in the “degree” in ECHU.  Moreover, one only has to refer to the “trash,” as Bellow calls it, of the discussion on “values” for a description of how the collapse of the moral sphere has slowly and painfully transpired (Bellow 1987, 15), as assisted by authors such as Weber, who Knight translates into English (Weber [1927] 1950, [1948] 1968). If “good” and “bad” are only differences of degree, borne of a philosophy that deliberately excludes nature, and not differences of kind, as Locke effectively engineers, then one must, necessarily, become doomed to reading this “trash” of modernity, as all qualitative difference emanates from human labor, not nature. (Locke [1690] 1824, vol. 2, book 4, ch. 2). Machiavelli, it appears, through the work of Locke, can now enjoy his revenge on the cruel world that he experienced in his lifetime, as it is principally his political philosophy, deftly translated and adapted by Locke, when combined with some insights from Hobbes, which effectively collapses the moral realm (Strauss [1936] 1963, 1964, 1970). Importantly, it is this collapse that now effectively prevents the modern reader from entering the exalted world that so completely enthralled the mature Machiavelli, as he describes below,

When evening comes, I return home and enter my study; on the threshold I take off my workday clothes, covered with mud and dirt, and put on the garments of court and palace. Fitted out appropriately, I step inside the venerable courts of the ancients, where, solicitously received by them, I nourish myself on that food that alone is mine and for which I was born; where I am unashamed to converse with them and to question them about the motives for their actions, and they, out of their human kindness, answer me. And for four hours at a time I feel no boredom, I forget all my troubles, I do not dread poverty, and I am not terrified by death. I absorb myself into them completely. And because Dante says that no one understands anything unless he retains what he has understood, I have jotted down what I have profited from in their conversation and composed a short study, De principatibus, in which I delve as deeply as I can into the ideas concerning this topic, discussing the definition of a princedom, the categories of princedoms, how they are acquired, how they are retained, and why they are lost (Machiavelli [1513b], 1996, 262-5).  In other words, despite the efforts of Bellow (1987), Bloom (1987), and some others, the modern world cannot pull itself out of the great quagmire created by the absence of qualitative variation in Locke. While intellectual power is frantically being applied by some thoughtful contributors, and while the gears needed to pull are engaged, those wheels of society just keep spinning; no traction can be found, for the reasons described herein, if one continues to accept the universal qualitative equality proposed by Locke.

35. Hemingway gruffly attempts to impose manliness back on the world that Locke built; however, there is no place for manliness in this world; all the way from Shakespeare through to Hemingway (Roe 2002; Strier 2004).

36. Metaphorically, one need not to just passively spectate, as the sharks, or the social scientist defenders of Locke's universal qualitative uniformity, rip apart the gift of nature that Hemingway refers to as the marlin caught by the old man, and as tied to the side of the old man's boat, as depicted in The Old Man and the Sea (Hemingway 1952). Rather, one can actively engage with the debate; to more adequately celebrate the marvels of natural diversity.

37. Such irony is not the preserve of the ancient philosophers. Even for the great modern critic of Plato, Machiavelli, is forced, due to the natural diversity of man, to resort to irony throughout his works, such as The Prince (Machiavelli [[1513a] 1985). In addition, Locke, the founder of universal qualitative equality, is also forced to use irony, as noted above.

38. Hegel ([1821] 1967, [1837] 1956), Marshall ([1890] 1961, [1919] 1920), Groenewegen (1990), Herbst ([1965] 1972, 1995), Darwall (1995). See also work on Kant ([1787] 1929, [1790] 1997) by Hassner ([1963a] 1987, [1963b] 1987).

39. There have been some who have noted how Nietzsche looked forward toward the new movements in philosophy, such as pragmatism. For example, Rorty argues that not only did Nietzsche anticipate pragmatism but that many others have also noticed this aspect in Nietzsche. As Rorty indicates,

Berthelot was probably the first to call Nietzsche “a German Pragmatist,” and the first to emphasize the resemblance between Nietzsche's perspectivism and the pragmatic theory of truth. This resemblance, [has been] frequently noted since (Rorty [1998] 1999, 21, brackets added)

In turn, pragmatism was used by Knight to establish his explanation his uncertainty, even though Knightian uncertainty is now largely discredited, or ignored, by the modern science of economics. Given that Weber was an important influence on Knight, then the importance of Nietzsche for those interested in the thought of Weber, like the young Knight, should become apparent (Bloom 1987, 115; Knight 1926). Knight becomes absorbed in the same questions as Weber, who learns from Nietzsche, “that religion, or the sacred, is the most important human phenomenon, and his [Weber's] further study of it was made from Nietzsche's unorthodox perspective” [brackets added] (Bloom 1987, 195). In this regard, one should be careful not to underestimate the importance of a critical struggle with religious belief for Knight (Nash 1998; Emmett 1994). This is not to imply that Knight was uncritical of Dewey. As Knight was later to note in an essay entitled Pragmatism and Social Action,

Professor Dewey's pragmatism always strikes me as fundamentally ambiguous, oscillating between a conception of knowledge as “technique,” essentially a biological function, and some vague mystical conception of it in terms of “shared life” or “shared experience” … And no more can I find, in the fairly large sample of Professor Dewey's writings known to me, any successful or even real attempt to build a bridge between these two conceptions of intelligence (Knight 1947, 36–7).

Nietzsche may not have originated the critique that led to Pragmatism. Rather, it can be argued that he takes the modern project of philosophy to its logical conclusion. While some have argued that Machiavelli originates this modern project (Strauss 1958), Hume essentially begins the phase of modernity that is most important to Nietzsche (Machiavelli [1517] 1996). As Mansfield summarizes,

From Hume onwards, the power of reason to grasp Nature is doubted, so that leaving Nature to its own devices of the Invisible Hand became an acceptable premise from which to order a civil society. Nietzsche only completes this procedure of doubt; he radicalizes it to the degree that it becomes recognizable (Mansfield [1991] 1993, 76). See also Nietzsche ([1887] 1996: 98, essay 3, para. 12, [1884] 1956, [1886] 1993); Bloom (1987, 195); Dannhauser ([1963] 1987, 845).

40. Locke follows, at least to some degree, Hobbes ([1651] 1950). However, Locke effectively substitutes the desire to eliminate uncertainty about property rights, as one of the main reasons for creating society, from what Hobbes suggests; the fear of violent death. As Hobbes indicates, nature provides nothing to man but the promise of a “nasty” existence and the fear of violent death. Man is better off in society, by seeking to escape a malevolent state of nature that leaves man in a poor “condition”, as Hobbes indicates,

In such condition [in the state of nature] there is no place for industry, because the fruit thereof is uncertain, and consequently, not culture of the earth, no navigation, nor the use of commodities that may be imported by sea, no commodious building, no instruments of moving and removing such things as require much force, no knowledge of the face of the earth, no account of time, no arts, no letters, no society, and which is worst of all, continual fear and danger of violent death, and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short [brackets added] (Hobbes [1651] 1950, 13, 9).

41. (Aristotle 1893, book 1, 103).

42. (Strauss [1959b] 1989, 85, [1959a] 1998; Aristotle 1893, book 3, part 5, 64).

43. (Hemingway 1952; Aristotle 1885, book 10, part 9). Importantly, society is not conceived, by ancient political philosophy, as a vehicle that transforms the uncertainty of nature into the risk of civil society. Rather, society is understood to be a reflection of a natural sociality, so that society has no covert role, other than to allow expression of natural sociality. Aristotle argues that it would be absurd for a man to even consider living alone (Dziob 1993, 781). Such an understanding of political association means that society is not founded on what the ancients understood were “base” instincts, of acquisitiveness. In contrast, the ancient philosophers argued that society had been created to pursue what they defined as the “good,” given that nature was understood to be generous, although somewhat capricious in that generosity (Bloom 1990b, 327). Locke appears thoroughly modern, even “scientific,” in terms of the assertions regarding equality. As Mansfield remarks, science is all about the universal and not the particular, while literature is all about the particular, and not about the universal (Mansfield 2007; Fortin 1996). Contrast this interpretation, by Mansfield to the modern interpretation of decision-making by Arrow (1948, 1950, [1951a] 1963, [1951b] 1971, 1970) and to the much applauded interpreters of Arrow (Rawls 1972; Sen 1966, 1970, 1979a, 1979b, 1985, 1986, 1988, 1993, 1995, 1999, 2009). In addition, such an understanding does not prevent, constrain, or eliminate, man improving technology, and improving aspects of his more technical knowledge, concerning an essentially unknowable nature.

44. (Aristotle 1893, book 6, part 5, 136).

45. For example, while Romeo had superior natural gifts, in Shakespeare's Romeo and Juliet, circumstance led him to make imprudent decisions, and he realizes this imprudence at the moment the play turns from a comedy to a tragedy, where Romeo admits to becoming “fortune's fool” (Shakespeare [1597] 2000, act 3, scene 1, 132-6). If Romeo was “fortune's fool,” then this work suggests that modern man is Locke's fool. See also Shakespeare ([1603] 2002, and [1606] 2005). See also Olters (2012), and Mansfield (2006).

46. (Aristotle 1893, book 1, part 5, 15; 1893, book 4, part 1, 82).

47. As opposed to Locke, Aristotle sees excessive acquisitiveness as something that enslaves man and that “household management” is an art, as opposed to what economics terms, the science of modern economics. While Locke sees property as a means of liberation from the poverty of nature, Aristotle sees excessive acquisitiveness as a form of slavery that diverts the concerns of man toward inanimate property and away from the concerns of men (Aristotle 1893, book 1, 109).

48. (Aristotle 1893, book 9, part 9; 1893, book 8, part 1).

49. (Mansfield 2007, para. 23). Given recent developments in mathematics and computer modeling, this intricacy should become more tractable than it has been in the past (Suárez 2006). Yet tractability does not mean a complete description can be created, as modern science complacently takes for granted. Rather, it means that mathematical techniques have a significant challenge ahead, and that mathematics can assist man to better understand the complexity of human action, and the intricate nature of the relationship between man and nature. Instead of being obsessed with the power of gadgets, and mathematical techniques, as modern economics is, the man of the future may, hopefully, harness these gadgets and techniques in a more humble way; in a way that helps him moderate his ignorance, rather than denying that his ignorance exists, as modern social science does (Koziak 1999; Gay 1988). Apart from other things, the qualitative diversity between men, as delivered by nature, means that these differences are not capable of adequate articulation, expression, or analysis, through the use of a range of quantitative values, because the objectives that each qualitatively distinct man seeks remain disparate; they remain qualitatively distinct. However, all men, despite whatever they obtain from nature, need to nurture that capability throughout life (Aristotle 1893, book 10, part 9, 248). See the discussion of Lucas on equality and inequality (1960, 1977) and Gosepath (2011). In psychology, “latent” variables are used to explain things that modern philosophy has no explanation for; things that are given to man from nature, like “intelligence.” Although the authors disagree with definition of “intelligence” that is used by modern social sciences, and the selection of a great scientist as a person of intelligence, the following passage gives an indication that even the modern social sciences are beginning to consider latency (Borsboom, Mellenbergh, and van Heerden 2003, 203). By way of contrast, in quantum mechanics, difficulties that arise from measurement of particles are commonly understood under the Heisenberg uncertainty principle, which, among other things, indicates that limitations to the precision, with measuring certain pairs of physical properties exist, as a result of the act of measurement ([1927] 1983). Some have explained the Heisenberg principle in different ways, and some, like Margeneau (1954), have argued that the tendencies of latent observables assume different measured values within different experimental contexts (Suárez 2006, 4).

50. (Marshall [1890] 1961; Duhs 2006, 150).

51. If the social sciences come to terms with such complexity, then that might constitute an adequate transformation of the social sciences, from their current deficient state, a state that Locke has enabled to develop.