A Fluctuating Capacity to Mentalize: Affect Scripts and Self-State Systems as (not so) “Strange Attractors”: A Discussion of Margy Sperry's “Putting our Heads Together: Mentalizing Systems”

Abstract

Margy Sperry identified the potential for interpersonal and intersubjective dimensions of experience to explain observed fluctuations of a capacity for mentalization and reflective function, and she illustrated this with a pertinent case that contained an enactment. Additional exploration of her premise and the case reveals the potential to understand some aspects of a more universal fluctuating capacity for mentalization as a function of unconscious or implicit affect scripts (in this case, containing shame) as well as the related naturalistic shifting of self-states in a clinical dyad. Persistent childhood styles of thinking such as psychic equivalence, pretend, and teleological modes (Fonagy et al., 2003) may predict some fluctuation as the capacity for mentalization is achieved. Additional factors to consider might also be shifting self-states and activation of related toxic affects and the secondary protective modes of behavior that help to create the safety of distance in the context of deep narcissistic wounding (Lansky, 1992) and fears of annihilation (Hurvich, 2003;Kohut, 1971) in both patient and therapist.

Acknowledgments

I use the term “strange attractors” in the title to describe how in the midst of apparent clinical chaos and complexity there are certain elements in the mix that emerge over time as organizers of the experience and cause a modicum of repetition that can be noticed after long contemplation.

Notes

¹Yes, I too noticed the phenotypic linguistic reference to a dissociative disorder. However, the protocol does not lend itself well to an exploration of that potential. Nevertheless, it may be useful to note that unless a clinician follows such an observation with open curiosity regarding the presence of depersonalization, derealization, amnesia outside the range of normal human experience, or stays alert for evidence of identity confusion or alteration, then that clinician is likely going to miss a dissociative disorder diagnosis that could inform a modified treatment approach. People do not regularly volunteer they experience depersonalization. To many people this means they are “crazy and will be locked up.” Clinicians need to ask about these experiences or they may remain invisible.

²We are not privileged to know if the consultation Sperry sought and received was able to focus on exploring and recovering from the intense shaming she experienced. It is my personal experience that acknowledging feeling ashamed of my behavior in a clinical setting is a humbling and freeing experience. I wish that I had always been capable of that kind of effort. One size does not fit all, and this kind of disclosure has many variations that may be effective and useful for both members of the clinical dyad.