State Legitimacy and Counterinsurgency: A Comparative Perspective

Abstract

This article addresses the overlooked aspect of state legitimacy in counterinsurgency, emphasizing its crucial connection. Through comparative case studies of Afghanistan, the Philippines, and Bolivia, it highlights the challenges and importance of legitimacy building in different contexts. Moreover, it argues that by fulfilling the basic needs of ordinary people, governments can enhance legitimacy, proposing a new framework centered on regime performance. Ultimately, it advocates for a holistic approach that prioritizes state performance through the provision of core statehood services i.e., security, judiciary, and governance to effectively combat insurgencies.

Disclosure Statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

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