Human sacrifice and natural law in Las Casas’s Apologia

Abstract

This study examines how Bartolomé de las Casas argues that Spain is not justified in waging war in the Americas to save the innocent victims of human sacrifice. It focuses on his three main lines of reasoning in this area and on how they relate to one another structurally and logically. These arguments are: (1) that the wars of conquest were a worse evil than human sacrifice; (2) that the practice of human sacrifice was an excusable error that almost all societies had committed at some point in their history; and (3) that this practice did not violate natural law. It also considers Domingo de Soto's treatment of the subject in his De iustitia et iure (1556), as well as his summary of the Valladolid debate between Las Casas and Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda (1552), where Soto seems reluctant to convey the full scope of Las Casas's more radical assertions.

Notes on Contributor

Glen Carman is Associate Professor of Modern Languages at DePaul University. He is the author of Rhetorical Conquests: Cortés, Gómara, and Renaissance Imperialism (2006). His current research focuses on the sixteenth-century theories of ‘just war,’ in particular as they relate to the debates over the wars of conquest.

Notes

1 As Soto explains: ‘Empero, estos señores [ … ] han tractado y disputado esta cuestión, conviene a saber: si es lícita a Su Magestad hacer guerra a aquellos indios antes que se les predique la fe para subjectallos a su Imperio, y que después de subjectados puedan más fácil y cómodamente ser enseñados y alumbrados por la doctrina evangélica del conoscimiento de sus errores y de la verdad cristiana’ (Las Casas 1992c, 105).

2 Rolena Adorno has described in a similar way the polemic of the colonial texts that she analyzes: ‘Even when implicit, that polemic always centered on the rights of conquest and the treatment of the Amerindians’ (2007, 6). In theory the encomienda may have promised the American Indians protection and instruction in the Catholic faith in exchange for tribute, but in practice it often deprived them of basic freedoms as well as control of their land. See, for example, Simpson 1982, xiii; and Gibson 1966, 48–67.

3 The clause ‘que tiene sobre cient pliegos de papel en latín y algunos más en romance’ gives the impression that most of the version that Las Casas read in Valladolid was in Latin. The present tense of the verb ‘tiene,’ however, may indicate that he is describing the extant version, not the one he read at Valladolid. There is some disagreement about whether the Apologia that Las Casas read at Valladolid was written in Latin or Spanish. See, for example, Zavala and Losada 1977, 137–38.

4 For results of debate in Valladolid, see Hanke 1959, 74; Losada 1970, 285–88; and Muñoz Machado 2012, 336–43. Manuel Giménez Fernández argues that Las Casas did prevail (1962, xxxv, lxviii–lxix).

5 For Soto's general agreement with Las Casas on the question of the wars of conquest, see, for example, Beltrán de Heredia 1961, 262–65; Abril Castelló 1982, 496–501; and Cárdenas Bunsen 2011, 369–79. For the more favorable reaction of the next generation of the School of Salamanca to the arguments of Las Casas on the question of human sacrifice, see Abril Castelló 1982, 510.

6 Thomas Gilby's discussion of the classification of law in the Summa Theologiae has been helpful here (Aquinas 1963, 162–74).

7 Losada speculates that Las Casas may have only pretended not to have seen the Democrates secundus (1988, 670n7), and Jaime Brufau Prats says that Las Casas got his hands on the dialogue as early as 1547 (Sepúlveda 1997, xxii). Gutiérrez, however, makes the point that if Las Casas had had access to the Democrates secundus, he could have strengthened his case by remarking on the virulent language that Sepúlveda uses in the dialogue (1992, 246n53).

8 For a detailed study of the sequence of events and texts, see Zavala 1977. On the panel of judges at the second meeting in Valladolid, Pedro de la Gasca (having returned from Peru) and Pedro Ponce de León (the bishop of Ciudad Rodrigo) replaced Melchor Cano and Bartolomé de Miranda, who had been sent to the Council of Trent (Hanke 2002, 119; Giménez Fernández 1962, xxxiv).

9 It is hard to determine when Las Casas started writing the Apologética. Abril Castelló believes that the origin of the work stems from the 1550–1551 debate (Las Casas 1992a, 1:30), and, according to O’Gorman, Las Casas started writing it around 1555 (1967, xxxv). See also Hanke 2002, 123; and 1974, 173–75.

10 The scholarship on the history of the debate and its impact on imperial policy is substantial. Hanke (1959; 1974; 2002), Wagner and Parish (1967, 170–82), and Losada (1971) provide excellent introductions to the topic. Some important recent studies include Pagden 1982; González Rodríguez 1984; Abril Castelló 1984 and 1992; Brading 1991, 58–101; Gutiérrez 1992; Dumont 1995; Andújar 1997; Alvira and Cruz 1997; Adorno 2007, 61–124; and Tubau 2011. Helpful for pedagogical purposes is Jáuregui and Restrepo 2008.

11 The partial outline that follows is adapted from Losada's edition of the Apologia (Losada 1988, 713–22).

12 Here my heading differs slightly from the corresponding heading in Losada's outline. For this point he has, ‘Perecerán más inocentes que los que se trata de liberar. Además, por un estrictísimo precepto negativo, se nos prohíbe en todo caso dar muerte al inocente’ (1988, 718).

13 I am using Stafford Poole's translation of Las Casas's Apologia and Abril Castelló's edition of the original (Las Casas 2000, 212).

14 In Abril Castelló's edition (Las Casas 2000), these page numbers are: 187; ch. 28[bis]. 199; ch. 30. 205; ch. 32. 217, 220; ch. 33.

15 As for the actual extent of human sacrifice among the Mesoamericans, scholars tend to agree that these sacrifices took place on a large scale, but they also tend to avoid giving even rough estimates. According to Nigel Davies, ‘To make even the most approximate calculation of Aztec sacrifice is almost impossible’ (1984, 221). See also Davies 1981, 217–19, 239–40; Ingham 1984; Clendinnen 1991, 2, 78, 91–92; Read 1998, 177–78, 183; and Carrasco 1999, 73–78, 81–85. For a discussion of human sacrifice in Peru, see MacCormack 2000.

16 The final clause in the original is: ‘ita quod fiat euidentia eiusmodi mala legi naturae aduersari’ (2000, 217; ch. 33).

17 There is some dispute over whether Jephthah did sacrifice his daughter, but the Latin of the Vulgate is less ambiguous on this point than the Hebrew, and for both Las Casas and Sepúlveda there seems to be no doubt that a sacrifice was meant and carried out. On the interpretation of this biblical story, especially useful is Gunn (2005, 133–69).

18 Las Casas seems to be paraphrasing here, as his wording does not match that of any of the published Latin translations of the Rhetoric that might have been available to him (those of William of Moerbeke, George of Trebizond, Ermolao Barbaro, and Marcantonio Maioragio). Elsewhere (2000, 24; ch. 2), however, he seems to be using George of Trebizond's translation (1534, 53), with minor changes. Here he diverges most significantly from the other versions (and from the original) by having Aristotle say that the opinion of even just one (‘etiam si sit unus’) of the most prudent must be preferred (2000, 211). George Kennedy's rendering of the original is: ‘And what the wise—either all or many or the most authoritative—would judge or have judged the greater good are necessarily so regarded, either absolutely or in terms of the practical wisdom by which they made their judgment’ (Aristotle 1991, 71; 1364b). For information on early modern printings of Aristotle's Rhetoric, see Brandes 1989, 42–160.

19 In Sepúlveda's Democrates secundus, when Democrates describes Mesoamerican religion, he says: ‘What can I say about their unholy religion and unspeakable sacrifices? When they worshipped the devil as God, they thought no sacrifices were enough to appease him, and offered him human hearts’ (1997, 67–68; my translation). Francisco López de Gómara, in his Historia de la conquista de México, will likewise depict the devil as demanding sacrifices, and even speaking with Moctezuma (1979, 105; ch. 63). For an analysis of diabolism in colonial Mexico, see Cervantes 1994.

20 As Rives observes, however, the practice was not as widespread as these sources would have us believe: ‘Some ancient peoples did engage in the practice, including the Punic cities of the western Mediterranean, various German tribes, and perhaps some Celtic tribes as well. On the other hand, the extent to which Greeks and Italians ever did so remains controversial; certainly in historical times human sacrifice did not regularly feature in either Greek or Roman religion’ (1995, 66).

21 ‘Yea, in the western parts of India itself there is a certain country, where strangers, when they enter it, are taken and slaughtered and eaten’ (Clement [psuedo] 1926, 187; bk. 9, ch. 20).

22 I have supplied the bracketed clause, which is missing in Gilby's translation. The original is: ‘quasi lumen rationis naturalis, quo discernimus quid sit bonum et quid malum, quod pertinet ad naturalem legem, nihil aliud sit quam impressio luminis divini in nobis’ (1963, 23; 1a2ae, 91,2).

23 ‘Y fray Domingo de Soto, quando summó el libro, viendo y rehuyendo la mala doctrina, yva colorando y remendando aquellos lugares; “sed irrita opera nam in morbo incurabili parum proficit medicorum diligentia praesertim cum egrotantis caeca temeritas morbi indulgens artis medicinae praecepta contemnit” [but such endeavors are useless, because the diligence of doctors is of little help against an incurable disease, especially when the blind rashness of the patient, favoring the disease, disdains the directives of the healer's art]’ (1879, 558; my translation).

24 The original is in Las Casas 2000, 226; ch. 35.

25 The original is in Las Casas 2000, 234; ch. 36.

26 ‘Ergo vides, lector, aliquam esse probabilem rationem naturalem qua homines induci possunt ad immolandum homines Deo’ (2000, 239; ch. 36).

27 Here I modify Poole's translation of the last sentence in order to highlight the key terms. He has: ‘For this error can owe its origin to a plausible proof developed by human reasoning’ (1992b, 242; ch. 37). The original reads: ‘neque immolare homines etiam innocentes pro salute totius reipublicae adeo aduersatur rationi naturali ut quasi res naturae dictamini contraria statim abominanda sit. Potest enim hic error a probabili ratione naturali originem ducere’ (2000, 242; ch. 37).

28 He clarifies this point in his Apologética, where he says that the more men realized the perfections of God, the more they felt obligated to offer him costlier sacrifices: ‘No es contra esto si se dijere que el demonio les movía e incitaba por los oráculos a que tan crueles sacrificios sacrificasem [sic], como los de tanta sangre humana, porque no los incitaba el demonio sino haciéndoles entender que a los dioses se les debía aquello y muncho más, y así, so color y especie de merecimiento y deidad’ (1992a, 3:1232; ch. 186). Ramón Valdivia Giménez says that Las Casas blames the devil in order to take the responsibility away from the American Indians, an argument that seems to apply more to the case of cannibalism than human sacrifice (2010, 240–41).

29 ‘Nam homicidium non quamcunque occisionem significat, sed iniustam’ (1967, 118; II 3,8).

30 Vitoria also considers the case of Genesis 22 when addressing the practice of human sacrifice in the New World, but he only offers Augustine's conjectures about how it might be justified and then concludes: ‘But the very fact that God finally prevented Abraham from carrying out the command, says Augustine, shows his displeasure at such sacrifices’ (1991, 216).