THE EUROPEAN UNION'S EVOLVING ENGAGEMENT WITH IRAN

Abstract

In 2003, the “E3”—Germany, France, and the United Kingdom—engaged Iran in talks over Tehran's nuclear program and were joined in negotiations the next year by the European Union (EU). Given the dim prospects of success for these talks, why did the E3/EU pursue nuclear negotiations with Iran? This article's three-track analysis attempts to answer that question by examining the emergence of the EU nonproliferation policy prior to the E3/EU-Iran talks, analyzing the European-Iranian relationship as it pertains to cooperation and negotiations over nonproliferation and other issues, and considering contemporary influences on the E3/EU. The European Union was ultimately unsuccessful in its negotiations with Tehran, but its efforts were worthwhile. In the future, the organization can play a vital nonproliferation role; today, the circumstances that hampered previous European efforts to resolve the Iranian nuclear standoff have improved and could be capitalized on by the European Union and the international community.

Keywords:

• Nuclear weapons
• European Union
• Iran
• negotiations
• international organizations

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The author wishes to thank Drs. Gale Mattox, Dieter Dettke, and Chen Kane, as well as Alexander Bollfrass, Kingston Reif, and Michael Clark who read early drafts of this article and offered valuable input. Richard Sabatini provided valuable research and editing assistance. Two anonymous reviewers also provided important critiques. The author is in debt to those individuals who agreed to be interviewed throughout the research process. Stephen Schwartz deserves thanks for encouraging the progress of this article.

Notes

1. “Statement by Germany, United Kingdom, France and the EU High Representative on the Iranian Nuclear Issue,” S008/06, January 12, 2006.

2. The E3/EU talks with Iran delayed any efforts on behalf of the IAEA to report Iran's breaches of its Safeguards Agreement to the UN Security Council, where Tehran risked being subject to another sanctions resolution.

3. The United States initially opposed the E3/EU-Iran negotiations, but by 2005, according to Solana, the United States was “fully supportive of a negotiated agreement along the lines proposed by the EU.” See “HR Solana Interview for Adevarul (Romania),” EU documents, April 3, 2008, < www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/sghr_int/99717.pdf>. It was not until July 2008 that a U.S. diplomat, Undersecretary of State William J. Burns, joined other countries’ envoys to meet with top Iranian nuclear negotiators. Glenn Kessler, “Iran Nuclear Talks End Without Agreement,” Washington Post, July 19, 2008, <www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/07/19/AR2008071900540.html>.

4. Oliver Meier, “Interview with Annalisa Giannella, Personal Representative on Nonproliferation of WMD to EU High Representative Javier Solana,” Arms Control Today, September 2005. The January 12, 2006 statement from Germany et al. said similarly that the talks were launched “because we wanted to offer an opportunity to Iran to address international concerns [over its nuclear program]. Our objective was to give Iran a means to build international confidence that its nuclear programme was for exclusively peaceful purposes.”

5. Avis Bohlen, former assistant secretary of state for arms control and ambassador to Bulgaria, e-mail correspondence with author, November 9, 2009. It also would have been helpful to have other key players on board, including Russia and China.

6. In November 2009, one top EU diplomat with insider knowledge of the negotiation proceedings did not think that Iran had been negotiating in good faith. Senior EU official (name withheld by request), telephone interview with author, November 2009; Johan Bergenäs, “Seven Questions: Hans Blix,” Foreign Policy, April 29, 2009, <www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/04/28/seven_questions_hans_blix>.

7. Chen Kane, “Nuclear Decision-Making in Iran: A Rare Glimpse,” Middle East Brief No. 5, Crown Center for Middle East Studies, May 2006, p. 4.

8. Treaty of Rome, January 1, 1958. Article 223 exempts all commodities related to national security from EEC regulations.

9. Harald Müller, “European Nuclear Non-proliferation after the NPT Extension: Achievements, Shortcomings and Needs,” in Paul Cornish, Peter van Ham, and Joachim Krause, eds., Europe and the Challenge of Proliferation, Chaillot Paper No. 24 (Paris: Western European Union Institute for Security Studies, 1996), p. 26.

10. European Council, “Declaration of Common Policy on the Consequences of the Adoption of the London Guidelines by the Ten Member States of the Community,” November 20, 1984.

11. Müller, p. 28.

12. A “Joint Action” refers to measures to be taken by EU member states in connection to an issue of common interest. Member states are obligated to subordinate their national policies to the issue defined in the Joint Action, with a view to contribute to successful completion of the work described therein. Maastricht Treaty, November 1, 1993, Title V, Article J3.

13. UN Security Council Presidential Statement, s/23500, January 31, 1992.

14. Müller, p. 30.

15. Partnership and Co-operation Agreement Between the European Communities and Their Member States and Ukraine, March 23, 1994, p. 5.

16. Partnership and Co-operation Agreement Between the European Communities and Their Member States and Ukraine, March 23, 1994, p. 5.

17. European Council, “Common Position Defined by the Council on the Basis of Article J.2 of the Treaty on European Union on the Objectives and Priorities of the European Union towards Ukraine,” 94/779/CFSP, November 28, 1994; EU Action Plan, “Action Plan for Ukraine,” (COM96) 593 Final, November 20, 1996.

18. European Council at Corfu, Presidency Conclusions, June 24–25, 1994, Chapter II, Section L.

19. Camille Grand, The European Union and the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Chaillot Paper No. 37 (Paris: Western European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2000), p. 14.

20. Camille Grand, The European Union and the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Chaillot Paper No. 37 (Paris: Western European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2000), p. 16.

21. Article III of the NPT concerns IAEA safeguard agreements, and Article IV of the NPT concerns the right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

22. The G-11 refers to a group of states—Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Norway, Hungary, Denmark, Austria, Finland, Ireland, the Netherlands, and Sweden—that in 1980 began preparing joint positions in advance of NPT Review Conferences. Müller, p. 33.

23. “Statement by Ingvar Carlsson, Swedish Prime Minister,” press release, June 14, 1995. Other EU protests and condemnations included Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Austria, and Belgium.

24. “Security Council Condemns Nuclear Tests by India and Pakistan,” UN Security Council press release SC/6528, June 6, 1998.

25. “Security Council Condemns Nuclear Tests by India and Pakistan,” UN Security Council press release SC/6528, June 6, 1998.

26. Grand, The European Union and the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, p. 25.

27. The New Agenda Coalition was launched in 1998 by the foreign ministers of eight non-nuclear nations—Ireland, Brazil, Egypt, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa, Slovenia, and Sweden—with the purpose of pressuring the nuclear weapon states to fulfill the obligation they undertook in NPT Article VI to eliminate nuclear arsenals.

28. The “Thirteen Practical Steps” are from the 2000 NPT Review Conference Final Document, providing a set of “practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to implement Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.”

29. The Bush administration, nullified the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2002 and rejected negotiations in connection to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty.

30. Tom Sauer, “Coercive Diplomacy by the EU: The Iranian Nuclear Weapons Crisis,” Third World Quarterly 28 (2007), p. 617.

31. The German proposal was made in 2006, after the E3/EU format had ceded the lead role in the negotiations. The lack of synchronization is nevertheless apparent.

32. Harald Müller, executive director, Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, e-mail correspondence with author, November 9, 2009.

33. Monika Tocha, “The EU and Iran's Nuclear Programme: Testing the Limits of Coercive Diplomacy,” EU Diplomacy Papers No. 1 (2009), p. 11.

34. Sauer, “Coercive Diplomacy by the EU,” p. 624.

35. Grzegorz M. Poznanski, quoted in Oliver Meier, “The EU's Nonproliferation Efforts: Limited Success,” Arms Control Today, May 2008, <www.armscontrol.org/act/2008_05/OliverFeature>.

36. Ziba Moshaver, “Revolution, Theocratic Leadership and Iran's Foreign Policy: Implications for Iran-EU Relations,” Review of International Affairs 3 (Winter 2003), p. 292.

37. This section is based on Moshaver's section on “Cold Peace,” pp. 292–93.

38. Moshaver, “Revolution, Theocratic Leadership and Iran's Foreign Policy,” p. 297.

39. European Council, Conclusions of the Presidency, December 12, 1992, Articles 15–17.

40. Moshaver, “Revolution, Theocratic Leadership and Iran's Foreign Policy,” p. 295.

41. Moshaver, “Revolution, Theocratic Leadership and Iran's Foreign Policy,”, p. 294.

42. Moshaver, “Revolution, Theocratic Leadership and Iran's Foreign Policy,”, p. 294.

43. The killings took place at a restaurant in Berlin named Mykonos, and the incident became known by that venue.

44. Moshaver, “Revolution, Theocratic Leadership and Iran's Foreign Policy,” p. 295.

45. Walter Posch, “The EU and Iran: A Tangled Web of Negotiations,” in Walter Posch, ed., Iranian Challenges, Chaillot Paper No. 89 (Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2006), p. 100.

46. Walter Posch, “The EU and Iran: A Tangled Web of Negotiations,” in Walter Posch, ed., Iranian Challenges, Chaillot Paper No. 89 (Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2006), p. 101.

47. Sahar Arfazadeh Roudsari, “Talking Away the Crisis: The E3/EU-Iran Negotiations on Nuclear Issues,” EU Diplomacy Papers No. 6 (2007), p. 6.

48. Hassan Rohani, “Beyond the Challenges Facing Iran and the IAEA Concerning the Nuclear Dossier,” Rahbord (in Persian), text of speech by Supreme National Security Council Secretary Hassan Rohani to the Supreme Cultural Revolution Council, September 30, 2005, p. 38, FBIS-IAP20060113336001. For an analysis of this speech, see Chen Kane, “Nuclear Decision-Making in Iran: A Rare Glimpse,” Middle East Brief No. 5, Crown Center for Middle East Studies, May 2006.

49. Johannes Reissner, “EU-Iran Relations: Options for Future Dialogue,” in Posch, ed., Iranian Challenges, p. 119.

50. Johannes Reissner, “EU-Iran Relations: Options for Future Dialogue,” in Posch, ed., Iranian Challenges, p. 121.

51. Hassan, “Beyond the Challenges Facing Iran and the IAEA Concerning the Nuclear Dossier,” pp. 19, 29.

52. Posch, “The EU and Iran,” p. 99.

53. Many analysts and observers have concluded that security concerns, fear of a military attack, or fear of regime change are at the heart of Iran's alleged nuclear weapons proliferation. See for example Wyn Q. Bowen and Joanna Kidd, “The Iranian Nuclear Challenge,” International Affairs 80 (2004), p. 625; Frank G. Wisner, “Prepared Statement of Hon. Frank G. Wisner, Former U.S. Ambassador to Zambia, Egypt, the Philippines, and India, New York, NY,” and Karim Sadjapour, “Prepared Statement of Karim Sadjadpour, Associate, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, DC,” Hearing before the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 111th Cong., 1st sess., S-Hrg. 111-84, March 3, 2009.

54. Burkard Schmitt, “Conclusions,” in Gustav Lindstrom and Burkard Schmitt, eds., Fighting Proliferation: European Perspectives, Chaillot Paper No. 66 (Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2003), p. 91.

55. Senior EU official (name withheld by request), telephone interview with author, November 2009; Harald Müller has also argued that any “package would remain incomplete” without U.S. security assurances. Harald Müller, “Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy and the Stability of the Non-Proliferation Regime,” in Burkard Schmitt, eds., Effective Non-proliferation: The European Union and the 2005 NPT Review, Chaillot Paper No. 77 (Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2005), pp. 59–60.

56. Christoph Bertram, Rethinking Iran: From Confrontation to Cooperation, Chaillot Paper No. 110 (Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2008), p. 31.

57. For example, in his 2002 State of the Union Address, President George W. Bush included Iran in the “axis of evil.”

58. “EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction,” Introduction, para. 2, December 12, 2003.

59. Annalisa Giannella, personal representative on nonproliferation of WMD to the EU High Representative Javier Solana, telephone interview with author, November 10, 2009.

60. “EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction,” ch. 1, para. 6, December 12, 2003.

61. Bruno Tertrais, “Europe and Nuclear Proliferation,” in Lindstrom and Schmitt, eds., Fighting Proliferation, p. 49.

62. Oliver Meier and Gerrard Quille, “Testing Time for Europe's Nonproliferation Strategy,” Arms Control Today, May 2005.

63. Bertram, p. 17.

64. Glenn Frankel, “Iran Vows to Curb Nuclear Activities,” Washington Post, October 22, 2003.

65. Sauer, “Coercive Diplomacy by the EU,” p. 613.

66. Senior EU official (name withheld by request), telephone interview with author, November 2009.

67. Müller, e-mail correspondence with author, November 9, 2009.

68. European Council, “Council Common Position … Relating to the 2008 Review Conference of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction (CWC),” 2007/469/CFSP, June 28, 2007; European Council, “Council Common Position … Relating to the 2006 Review Conference of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC),” 2006/242/CFSP, March 20, 2006; European Council, “Council Common Position … on the Universalisation and Reinforcement of Multilateral Agreements in the Field of Non-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Means of Delivery,” 2003/805/CFSP, November 17, 2003.

69. European Council, “Council Decision … Implementing Common Position 1999/533/CFSP Relating to the European Union's Contribution to the Promotion of the Early Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT),” 2003/567/CFSP, July 21, 2003; European Council, “Council Decision … on Support for OPCW Activities in the Framework of the Implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction,” 2009/569/CFSP, July 27, 2009; European Council, “Council Decision … in Support of the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation in the Framework of the Implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction,” 2008/974/CFSP, December 18, 2008.

70. European Council, “Joint Action … in Support of Chemical Weapons Destruction in the Russian Federation in the Framework of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction,” 2007/178/CFSP, March 19, 2007. Under said Joint Action, the European Union committed _3,145,000 toward the construction of the Shchuch'ye chemical weapons destruction facility in Russia; European Council, “Joint Action … for the Support of the Physical Protection of a Nuclear Site in the Russian Federation,” 2004/796/CFSP, November 22, 2004.

71. “Mainstreaming Non-proliferation Policies into the EU's Wider Relations with Third Countries: ‘Non-proliferation Clause’ to be Included in Agreements with Third Countries,” EU Statement, document no. 14997/03, November 19, 2003.

72. “Keynote Speech by Annalisa Giannella on Behalf of the EU: Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI),” Regional Proliferation Security Initiative Meeting, Sopot, Poland, June 22, 2009.

73. It is difficult to determine the exact impact of the European Union, but it should not be discounted that EU financial support and capacity-building initiatives in third countries have played a role in increasing the number of CWC member states or improved implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1540. Also, as noted above, EU countries contributed financially to the destruction of chemical and nuclear materials.

74. Giannella, telephone interview with author, November 10, 2009.

75. CTBTO, World Map of International Monitoring System, <www.ctbto.org/map/>.

76. EU General Secretariat, “Six-Monthly Progress Report on the Implementation of the EU Strategy against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (2009/I),” 11490/09, June 26, 2009.

77. European Council, “New Lines for Action by the European Union in Combating the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Their Delivery,” December 18, 2008.

78. The Lisbon Treaty entered into force after ratification by the twenty-seven member states and marks significant changes to EU governance. The treaty includes the institution of president of the European Council and the post assumed by Lady Ashton, which combines and replaces the posts of high representative for common foreign and security policy (previously held by Javier Solana) and the European commissioner for external relations. The new position gives Ashton wide-ranging policy-making powers, a large annual budget, and, in the future, an international staff in the form of a European diplomatic corps. For a comprehensive review of Ashton's WMD initiatives during her first six months in office, see Johan Bergenäs, “What Role for WMD Nonproliferation under the EU's New Foreign Policy Chief: A Six Month Review and Analysis of Lady Ashton's Tenure,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, Issue Brief, June 18, 2010, <www.nti.org/e_research/e3_eu_lady_ashton.html>.

79. “Speech by Catherine Ashton on Behalf of the European Union,” 2010 NPT Review Conference, New York, May 3, 2010.

80. “Iran's Nuclear Chief Could Meet EU's Ashton in Turkey,” Agence-France Presse, May 11, 2010.

81. The final four paragraphs of this paper reflect themes and ideas covered recently by the author. See Johan Bergenäs, “Ashton Seeks to Revive EU Role in Iran Nuclear Talks,” World Politics Review, July 15, 2010, <www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/6040/ashton-seeks-to-revive-eu-role-in-iran-nuclear-talks>; Johan Bergenäs, “Nuclear Talks with Iran: Will New EU and U.S. Roles Make a Difference?” Henry L. Stimson Center, Spotlight Analysis, August 2, 2010, <www.stimson.org/pub.cfm?ID=994>.

82. As this article went to the publisher in mid-August, no date had yet been officially set for negotiations, although September 2010 had been mentioned.

83. Jay Deshmukh, “Iran Admits Sanctions ‘May Slow Down’ Nuclear Work,” Agence-France Presse, July 7, 2010.

84. “Iran Ready to Reconsider 20% Enrichment,” Tehran Times, July 31, 2010.