A Doctrine without Dogma

ABSTRACT

In No Use: Nuclear Weapons and U.S. National Security Policy, Thomas M. Nichols calls for a constructive rethinking about the history of nuclear weapons and the attitudes that have grown up around them. Despite dramatic reductions since the end of the Cold War, the United States still maintains a robust nuclear triad that far exceeds the needs of realistic deterrence in the twenty-first century. Nichols advocates a new strategy of minimum deterrence that includes deep unilateral reductions to the US nuclear arsenal, a no-first-use pledge, withdrawing US tactical nuclear weapons from Europe, and ending extended nuclear deterrence for allies. The weakest part of his argument eschews nuclear retaliation against small nuclear states that attack the United States, opting instead to use only conventional weapons to guarantee regime change. He admits this will entail enormous cost and sacrifice, but cites the “immorality” of retaliating against a smaller power with few targets worthy of nuclear weaponry, which totally ignores the massive underground facilities constructed to shield military facilities in many of these states. Despite this, Nichols's thoughtful approach to post-Cold War deterrence deserves thoughtful consideration.

KEYWORDS:

• United States
• national security
• nuclear deterrence
• no-first-use

Notes

1. George Perkovich, Do Unto Others: Toward a Defensible Nuclear Doctrine (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2013), pp. 9–26.

2. Paul Bracken, The Second Nuclear Age (New York: Times Books, 2012), p. 262.

3. James M. Acton, Low Numbers: A Practical Path of Deep Nuclear Reductions (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2011).

4. Walter S. Poole, Adapting to Flexible Response, 1960-1968 (Washington, DC: Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2013), <http://history.defense.gov/resources/OSDHO-Acquisition-Series-Vol2.pdf>.

5. In a moment of frustration, one NATO commander, General Lyman Lemnitzer, laid out the dilemma succinctly: “We are dead if they use nuclear weapons and we are postured to fight with conventional weapons; we are also dead if we are not allowed to use nuclear weapons and we are postured to use them, because they will then use conventional weapons.” For a more complete discussion of the issue, see David O. Smith, “The US Experience with Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Lessons for South Asia,” Stimson Center, March 4, 2013, <www.stimson.org/summaries/smith-on-tactical-nuclear-weapons-in-south-asia-/>.

6. “Final Decision on MC 14/3, A Report by the Military Committee to the Defence Planning Committee on Overall Strategic Concept for the Defense of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Area,” January 16, 1968, p. 16, <www.nato.int/docu/stratdoc/eng/a680116a.pdf>.

7. Robert Jervis, “Psychology and Security: Enduring Questions, Different Answers,” Yale Journal of International Affairs 7 (Summer 2012), pp. 12–13, <http://yalejournal.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/irscholarsforum/Robert%20Jervis.pdf>.

8. Jeffrey Lewis, “North Korea's Underground Facilities,” Arms Control Wonk, January 13, 2005, <http://lewis.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/621/north-koreas-underground-facilities>. See also Robert W. Nelson, “Low-Yield Earth-Penetrating Nuclear Weapons,” Federation of American Scientists Public Interest Report 54 (January/February 2001), <http://fas.org/faspir/2001/v54n1/weapons.htm>.