The Power of the NPT: International Norms and Ukraine's Nuclear Disarmament

ABSTRACT

There is a lingering disagreement among scholars on how the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) affects nonproliferation and disarmament outcomes. Drawing on constructivist scholarship on international norms, this article examines the extent of the NPT's effect in the case of Ukraine's nuclear disarmament. In the wake of the Soviet Union's collapse, Ukraine found itself host to the world's third largest nuclear arsenal. Despite Ukraine's initial commitment to become a non-nuclear state, it proceeded along a difficult path toward NPT accession. Most controversial and directly at odds with the NPT was Ukraine's claim to ownership of its nuclear inheritance as a successor state of the Soviet Union. This article argues that, while much domestic discourse about the fate of these nuclear weapons was embedded in the negotiation of Ukraine's new identity as a sovereign state vis-à-vis Russia and the West, the NPT played an important, structural role by outlining a separate normative space for nuclear weapons and providing the grammar of denuclearization with which Ukraine's decision makers had to grapple.

KEYWORDS:

• nuclear nonproliferation
• Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)
• disarmament
• Soviet Union
• international norms
• Ukraine
• Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START I)

Acknowledgments

I thank the two anonymous reviewers of the Nonproliferation Review for their invaluable comments and suggestions. I am also indebted to Paul Roe, David Holloway, Nina Tannenwald, Christine Leah, Ward Wilson, Lyndon Burford, and the participants of the Nuclear Studies Research Initiative 2015 for their generous feedback on the draft at various stages.

Notes

1. Some of the ideas and empirical findings presented in this article had previously appeared in Mariana Budjeryn, “The Breach: Ukraine's Territorial Integrity and the Budapest Memorandum,” Woodrow Wilson Center NPIHP, September 2014, <www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Issue%20Brief%20No%203--The%20Breach--Final4.pdf>; and Mariana Budjeryn, “Looking Back: Ukraine's Nuclear Predicament and the Nonproliferation Regime,” Arms Control Today 44 (December 2014), pp. 35–40.

2. The cases of suspected or confirmed pursuit of nuclear programs in violation of the NPT include South Korea, North Korea, Libya, Iraq, Yugoslavia, Romania, Taiwan, Iran, and Syria. See Scott D Sagan, “Nuclear Power, Nuclear Proliferation and the NPT,” in 2010 American Political Science Association Meeting, August 9, 2010, pp. 8–9.

3. Kenneth N. Waltz, “Nuclear Myth and Political Realities,” American Political Science Review 84 (1990), pp. 731–45; Etel Solingen, Nuclear Logics: Contrasting Paths of East Asia and the Middle East Princeton, NJ: (Princeton University Press, 2007); Jacques E. C. Hymans, The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation: Identity, Emotions, and Foreign Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

4. Matthew Fuhrmann, “Spreading Temptation: Proliferation and Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation Agreements,” International Security 53 (2009), pp. 7–41; Dong-Joon Jo and Erik Gartzke, “Determinants of Nuclear Weapons Proliferation,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 51 (2007), pp. 167–94.

5. Maria Rost Rublee, Nonproliferation Norms: Why States Choose Nuclear Restraint (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 2009).

6. See Martin J. DeWing, “The Ukrainian Nuclear Arsenal: Problems of Command, Control and Maintenance,” Working paper no. 3, (Monterey, CA: Monterey Institute of International Studies, October 1993); William Potter, The Politics of Nuclear Renunciation: The Cases of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine, Occasional Paper (Washington, DC: Henry L. Stimson Center, April 1995), <http://cns.miis.edu/reports/pdfs/1995_potter_politics_of_nuclear_renunciation.pdf>; Steven Pifer, The Trilateral Process: The United States, Ukraine, Russia and Nuclear Weapons, Arms Control Series (Brookings, May 2011), <www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2011/5/trilateral%20process%20pifer/05_trilateral_process_pifer.pdf>. The use of the term “tactical” in reference to low-yield battlefield nuclear arms has been largely discredited, since it is understood that the use of any nuclear weapons would be “strategic” in terms of its consequences. Nevertheless, I choose to preserve this taxonomy here as it was employed in the political discourse at the time.

7. Scott D Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?: Three Models in Search of a Bomb,” International Security 21 (1996), p. 80; also see Mitchell Reiss, Bridled Ambition: Why Countries Constrain Their Nuclear Capabilities (Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1995). In international diplomatic circles, see Ambassador Jacek Bylica, address at the EU Nonproliferation and Disarmament conference, September 2013, Brussels, Belgium, <www.iiss.org/en/events/eu%20conference/sections/eu-conference-2013-ca57/first-plenary-session-b1bf/jacek-bylica-5d24>.

8. For earlier excellent accounts of Ukraine's denuclearization, see Potter, The Politics of Nuclear Renunciation; Sherman Garnett, “Ukraine's Decision to Join the NPT,” Arms Control Today 25 (January 1995), pp. 3–15; Sidney D. Drell and James E. Goodby, The Gravest Danger: Nuclear Weapons (Hoover Institution Press Publication no. 524, 2003); Steven Miller, “The Former Soviet Union,” in Mitchell Reiss and Robert Litwak, eds., Nuclear Proliferation after the Cold War, (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1994); Bohdan Nahaylo, “The Shaping of Ukrainian Attitudes toward Nuclear Arms,” RFL/RE Research Report 2, no. 8 (February 1993), pp. 21–45; Reiss, Bridled Ambition.

9. Friedrich Kratochwil and John G Ruggie, “International Organization: A State of the Art on an Art of the State,” International Organization 40 (1986), p. 769; Ronald Jepperson, Alexander Wendt, and Peter Katzenstein, “Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security,” in The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identities in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), p. 54.

10. Anne Florini, “The Evolution of International Norms,” International Studies Quarterly 40 (1996), pp. 364–65.

11. Preamble, Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968, <http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Nuclear/NPTtext.shtml>.

12. Ibid.

13. John J. Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions,” International Security 19 (1994), pp. 5–49; Susan Strange, “Cave! Hic Dragones: A Critique of Regime Analysis,” in Stephen D. Krasner, ed., International Regimes (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983); Brian C. Rathbun, “The ‘Magnificent Fraud’: Trust, International Cooperation, and the Hidden Domestic Politics of American Multilateralism after World War II,” International Studies Quarterly 55 (March 2011), pp. 1–21.

14. Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions,” p. 9.

15. Ibid., pp. 7, 13.

16. Ibid., p. 49; also see Strange, “Cave! Hic Dragones; Rathbun, “The ‘Magnificent Fraud’: Trust, International Cooperation, and the Hidden Domestic Politics of American Multilateralism after World War II.”

17. Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons (New York: W W Norton & Company, 1995).

18. For a comprehensive critique of the realist approaches to nonproliferation, see Tanya Ogilvie-White, “Is There a Theory of Nuclear Proliferation? An Analysis of the Contemporary Debate,” Nonproliferation Review 4 (1996), pp. 43–60.

19. Stephen D. Krasner, International Regimes (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983), p. 5; Robert O. Keohane, “The Demand for International Regimes,” in Krasner, International Regimes, pp. 89–92.

20. Charles Lipson, “International Cooperation in Economic and Security Affairs,” World Politics 37 (October 1984), p. 5.

21. T.V. Paul, Power versus Prudence: Why Nations Forgo Nuclear Weapons (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2000), p. 8.

22. Solingen, Nuclear Logics.

23. Ibid., pp. 40–47.

24. Hymans, The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation, p. 8.

25. Rublee, Nonproliferation, pp. 16–21.

26. Ibid., pp. 27–28.

27. Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Peter Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); Friedrich Kratochwil, “How Do Norms Matter?,” in The Role of Law in International Politics, ed. Michael Byers (Oxford: Oxford University Press, USA, 2000); Kratochwil and Ruggie, “International Organization: A State of the Art on an Art of the State.”

28. James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics (New York, NY: Free Press, 1989).

29. Katzenstein, The Culture of National Security.

30. Jeffrey W. Legro, “Which Norms Matter? Revisiting the Failure of Internationalism,” International Organization 51 (1997), pp. 31–63.

31. Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” International Organization 52 (1998), p. 891.

32. Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein, “Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security;” Jeffrey Checkel, “International Institutions and Socialization in Europe: Introduction and Framework,” International Organization 59 (2005), pp. 801–26; Martha Finnemore, “Norms, Culture, and World Politics: Insights from Sociology's Institutionalism,” International Organization 50 (1996), pp. 325–47; Thomas Risse and Kathryn Sikkink, “The Socialization of International Human Rights Norms into Domestic Practices: Introduction,” in Thomas Risse, Stephen Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink, eds., The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

33. See Jeffrey W. Knopf, “Dilemmas in Enforcement of Nonproliferation and Disarmament Norms,” presented at the Workshop on “Nuclear Norms,” Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey, 2014).

34. Friedrich V. Kratochwil, Rules, Norms, and Decisions: On the Conditions of Practical and Legal Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Affairs (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); Nicholas Onuf, World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1989); John G. Ruggie, “What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-Utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge,” International Organization 52 (1998), pp. 855–85.

35. Andrew Wilson, Ukrainian Nationalism in the 1990s: A Minority Faith (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 24.

36. Arguably, when the committee seats were doled out in May 1990, the committees dealing with foreign relations and defense issues in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR) were least significant since all of the foreign and defense policy was decided in Moscow. This suddenly changed after Ukraine became independent in August 1991 and allowed the national democrats a voice in these policy areas disproportionate to the number of their seats in the Rada. For a detailed discussion of Ukraine's institutional decision-making dynamics on the nuclear issue, see Nadiya V. Kravets, “Domestic Sources of Ukraine's Foreign Policy: Examining Key Cases of Policy towards Russia, 1991–2009,” Unpublished PhD Dissertation (University of Oxford, 2012), “Chapter 2. Nuclear Weapons.”

37. Wilson, Ukrainian Nationalism in the 1990s, pp. 149–50; Marta Dyczok, Movement without Change, Change without Movement (Amsterdam: Hardwood Academic Publishers, 2000), p. 112.

38. Wilson, Ukrainian Nationalism in the 1990s, p. 22.

39. Jane Dawson, Eco-Nationalism: Anti-Nuclear Activism and National Identity in Russia, Lithuania, and Ukraine (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1996), p. 78.

40. Dyczok, Movement without Change, Change without Movement, p. 114.

41. Yuriy Matseiko, “Do We Need Nuclear Weapons?,” Literaturna Ukraiina, (October 31, 1991), p. 1.

42. Boris Tarasiuk, interview by Mariana Budjeryn, Budapest, Hungary, November 14, 2012. Boris Tarasiuk served as Ukrainian deputy foreign minister in 1992–95 and, during this tenure, headed the interagency National Committee of Ukraine on Disarmament.

43. John Lloyd and Chrystia Freeland, “A Painful Birth,” Financial Times, February 25, 1992, p. 18; Ukraine's Foreign Minister Anatoliy Zlenko later recalled similar reasoning in his memoir Anatoliy Zlenko, Dyplomatiia I Polityka. Ukraiina v Protsesi Dynamichnykh Heopolitychnykh Zmin [Diplomacy and Politics. Ukraine in the Process of Dynamic Geopolitical Changes] (Kharkiv: Folio, 2003), p. 339. Unless otherwise noted, all translations from Ukrainian and Russian are author's own.

44. Verkhovna Rada of the Ukrainian SSR, “Stenohrama Plenarnoho Zasidannia. Zasidannia Shistdesiat P'iate. [Transcript of the Plenary Session. Session Sixty Five],” July 13, 1990, pp. 4–39, <http://iportal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/4408.html>; Verkhovna Rada of the Ukrainian SSR, “Deklaratsiia pro derzhavnii suverenitet Ukraiiny [Declaration of State Sovereignty of Ukraine],” 55-XII, July 16, 1990, <http://zakon1.rada.gov.ua/cgi-bin/laws/main.cgi?nreg=55-12>.

45. Verkhovna Rada of the Ukrainian SSR, “Deklaratsiia pro derzhavnii suverenitet Ukraiiny [Declaration of State Sovereignty of Ukraine],” 55-XI.

46. Verkhovna Rada of the Ukrainian SSR, “Stenohrama Plenarnoho Zasidannia. Zasidannia Shistdesiat P'iate. [Transcript of the Plenary Session. Session Sixty Five],” p. 40; Verkhovna Rada of the Ukrainian SSR, “Stenohrama Plenarnoho Zasidannia. Zasidannia Shistdesiat Shoste. [Transcript of the Plenary Session. Session Sixty Six],” July 13, 1990, pp. 26–7, <http://iportal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/4409.html>.

47. Ivan Drach, interview by Mariana Budjeryn, Kyiv, Ukraine, May 22, 2013. There is somewhat of a mystery surrounding Drach's seemingly sudden proposal of the nonnuclear clause. In my interview with him, he stated that it was another Rukh leader, Vyacheslav Chornovil, who approached him to propose the non-nuclear clause during the break in deliberations of the Declaration. Yuri Kostenko, also a member of Rukh, who would become a significant personage in Ukraine's denuclearization story, maintains that it was Rukh MP Serhiy Holovatyy who masterminded the inclusion of the clause in the Declaration. In either case, the idea came from the national-democratic camp. See Yuriy Kostenko, “10 Mifiv pro Iaderne Rozzbroiennia Ukraiiny. Mif 1. ‘Iaderne Rozzbroiennia - Initsiatyva Ukraiinskoho Narodu’ [10 Myths about the Nuclear Disarmament of Ukraine. Myth 1. ‘Nuclear Disarmament - the Initiative of the Ukrainian People’],” Radio Svoboda, January 14, 2014, <www.radiosvoboda.org/content/article/25229484.html>.

48. The attempt was made jointly with Belarus.

49. Victor Batiouk, Ukraine's Non-Nuclear Option (New York: UN Institute for Disarmament Research, 1992), pp. 3, 6. Batiouk served as a representative of Ukrainian SSR to UN institutions in Geneva in 1978–84 and then as Ukraine's permanent representative to UN in New York in 1992–94.

50. Potter, The Politics of Nuclear Renunciation, p. 13.

51. “Zapys Besidy Ministra Zakordonnykh Sprav URSR Z Zastupnykom Sekretaria Derzhdepartamenta SShA C. Kammenom v New Yorku Pid Chas 45ii Sesii Heneral'noii Asambleii OON [Transcript of the Meeting of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of U[krainian]SSR with US Assistant Secretary of State C. Kamman in New York during the 45th Session of UN General Assembly],” October 2, 1990, Fond 1, Delo 6763, Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine.

52. Keith Bradsher, “Noting Soviet Eclipse, Baker Sees Arms Risks,” New York Times, December 9, 1991, <www.nytimes.com/1991/12/09/world/noting-soviet-eclipse-baker-sees-arms-risks.html>.

53. Serhiy Holovaty, “The Peaceful Disintegration of the USSR as a Guarantee of Security and Freedom in Europe,” presented at the Franz-Josef Strauss Symposium, Munich, 1990; in Nahaylo, “The Shaping of Ukrainian Attitudes toward Nuclear Arms,” p. 22.

54. President George H.W. Bush, “Remarks to the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Kiev, Ukraine, USSR,” August 1, 1991, <http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/briefing/dispatch/1991/html/Dispatchv2no32.html> Bush's speech had been dubbed “Chicken Kiev” by American journalist and commentator William Saffire.

55. “Rukh Leaders on US Attitude towards Ukrainian Independence,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, August 7, 1991, Lexis Nexis Academic.

56. Taras Kuzio, Ukraine under Kuchma (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997), p. 220.

57. Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, “Akt proholoshennia nezalezhnosti Ukraiiny [Act of Declaration of Independence of Ukraine], 1427-XII,” August 24, 1991, <http://zakon.rada.gov.ua/cgi-bin/laws/main.cgi?nreg=1427-12>.

58. The loyalty of the top officers of the Ukrainian republican division of the KGB to Kyiv authorities under Kravchuk and their refusal to comply with the putschist demand to declare marshal law in Ukraine precipitated the failure of the coup.

59. Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, “Postanova pro viis’kovi formuvannia na Ukraiini [Resolution on the Military Units in Ukraine] 1434-XII,” August 24, 1991, <http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1431-12>.

60. Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, “Zakon Ukraiiny pro Pidpryiemstva, Ustanovy Ta Orhanizatsii Soiuznoho Pidporiadruvannia, Roztashovani Na Terytorii Ukraiiny [Law of Ukraine on Enterprises, Institutions and Organizations of Union Subordination on the Territory of Ukraine], 1540-XII,” September 10, 1991, <http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1540-12>.

61. Michael Dobbs, “Yeltsin Promises Russia Will Not Dominate Union,” Washington Post, September 4, 1991, <www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1991/09/04/yeltsin-promises-russia-will-not-dominate-union/7e205e10-7793-42ed-8419-c1784a41f9a8/>.

62. “Russian-Ukrainian Communiqué on Bilateral Relations,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, August 30, 1991, Lexis Nexis Academic.

63. “Yeltsin Offers to Transfer Nukes from the Ukraine to Russia,” Jerusalem Post, August 29, 1991, p. 2.

64. “Protokol no. 7. Zasidannia komisii Verkhovnoii Rady Ukraiiny z pytan’ natsionalnoii bezpeky i oborony [Protocol no 7. Meeting of the Defense and Security Committee of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine],” October 21, 1991, Fond 1-P, Opis 1, Delo 2179, Central State Archive of Ukraine. On September 27, 1991, President Bush declared unilateral withdrawal of US tactical weapons from overseas bases to central storage facilities, allegedly to give Gorbachev firmer grounds to continue the withdrawal from the non-Russian republics.

65. “Vyacheslav Chornovil pro bez'iadernyi status Ukraiiny [Vyacheslav Chornovil on the Non-Nuclear Status of Ukraine],” Molod Ukrajiny, September 12, 1991, p.1.

66. Ibid.

67. Ibid.

68. Jonathan Steele, “Ukraine May Backtrack on Nuclear Arms,” Guardian, September 30, 1991, Lexis Nexis Academic.

69. Radio Kyiv, September 12, 1991, in Nahaylo, “The Shaping of Ukrainian Attitudes toward Nuclear Arms,” p. 26.

70. “Letter of British Prime Minister John Major to the Speaker of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine Leonid Kravchuk,” October 12, 1991, Fond 1-P, Opis 1, Delo 2102, Central State Archive of Ukraine. Ukrainian translation by the Office of the President.

71. James A. Baker, III, and Thomas M. DeFrank, The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War and Peace, 1989–1992 (New York: G.P. Putman and Sons, 1995), p. 560.

72. Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, “Zaiava pro Bez'iadernyi Status Ukraiiny [Statement on the Non-nuclear Status of Ukraine],” 1697-XII, October 24, 1991, <http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1697-12>.

73. Ibid.

74. Ibid.

75. Ibid.

76. Ibid.

77. Martin Walker, “US Issues Calls for Summit on Soviet Breakup,” Guardian, December 13, 1991, Lexis Nexis Academic.

78. “Resheniie Soveta Glav Gosudarstv Sodruzhestva Nezavisimykh Gosudarstv [Decision of the Council of the Heads of State of the Commonwealth of Independent States]” (Iedinyi reiests pravovykh aktov i drugikh dokumentov Sodruzhestva Nezavisimykh Gosudarstv [Single Register of the Legal Acts and Other Documents of the Commonwealth of Independent States], signed in Almaty, December 21, 1991), <www.cis.minsk.by/reestr/ru/index.html#reestr/view/text?doc=5>. The document was signed by all eleven members of the CIS: all former Soviet Republics, less the three Baltic states and Georgia, which joined the CIS only in 1993.

79. “Soglasheniie o sovmestnykh merakh v otnoshenii iadernogo oruzhiia. [Agreement On Joint Measures on Nuclear Weapons]” (Iedinyi reiests pravovykh aktov i drugikh dokumentov Sodruzhestva Nezavisimykh Gosudarstv [Single Register of the Legal Acts and Other Documents of the Commonwealth of Independent States], signed in Almaty, December 21, 1991), <http://cis.minsk.by/reestr/ru/index.html#reestr/view/text?doc=3>.

80. “Agreement between Member-States of the Commonwealth of Independent States on Strategic Forces, Minsk” (Iedinyi reiests pravovykh aktov i drugikh dokumentov Sodruzhestva Nezavisimykh Gosudarstv [Single Register of the Legal Acts and Other Documents of the Commonwealth of Independend States], singed in Minsk, December 30, 1991), <http://cis.minsk.by/reestr/ru/index.html#reestr/view/text?doc=9>.

81. “Soglasheniie o sovmestnykh merakh v otnoshenii iadernogo oruzhiia. [Agreement On Joint Measures on Nuclear Weapons].”

82. Ibid., Article 2 and Article 5, paragraph 2, respectively.

83. John Lepingwell, “Ukraine, Russia, and Nuclear Weapons: A Chronology,” RFL/RE Research Report 3, no. 4 (January 28, 1994), p. 6.

84. Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, “Postanova pro Ratyfikaciiu Uhody pro Stvorennia Spivdruzhnosti Nezalezhnykh Derzhav [Resolution on Ratification of Agreement on Establishment of the Commonwealth of Independent States],” 1958-XII, December 10, 1991, <http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1958-12>.

85. Article 7 of the Almaty agreement “On Joint Measures on Nuclear Weapons” stipulated that the agreement enters into force only after the ratification of signatories’ legislatures and the exchange of ratification instruments. The subsequent CIS agreements tried to avoid this pitfall by stipulating their validity from the moment of signing.

86. “Protokol no. 7. Zasidannia komisii Verkhovnoii Rady Ukraiiny z pytan’ natsionalnoii bezpeky i oborony [Protocol no 7. Meeting of the Defense and Security Committee of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine].”

87. Ibid.

88. Ibid.

89. Ibid.

90. Ibid.

91. “Telegram of President L. Kravchuk to President B. Yeltsin,” February 17, 1992, Fond 5233, Opis 1, Delo 76, Central State Archive of Ukraine.

92. “Letter of President L. Kravchuk to General Commander of the Armed Forces of the CIS Marshal E. Shaposhnikov,” February 1, 1992, Fond 5233, Opis 1, Delo 76, Central State Archive of Ukraine.

93. Serge Schmemann, “Ukraine Halting A-Arms Shift to Russia,” New York Times, March 13, 1992, p. A3.

94. President of Ukraine, “Ukaz pro nevidkladni zakhody po budivnytstvu Zbroinykh Syl Ukraiiny [Decree On Urgent Measures regarding the Establishment of the Armed Forces of Ukraine], No. 209,” April 5, 1992, <http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/209/92>.

95. “Telegram of President L. Kravchuk to the Heads of Commonwealth States,” April 5, 1992, Fond 5233, Opis 1, Delo 42, Central State Archive of Ukraine.

96. Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, “Postanova Pro Dodatkovi Zakhody Shchodo Zabezpechennia Nabuttia Ukraiinoiu Bez'iadernoho Statusu [Resolution On Additional Measures for Ensuring Ukraine's Attainment of Nonnuclear Status],” 2264-XII, April 9, 1992, <http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2264-12>.

97. Ibid.

98. The transfer of tactical nuclear weapons was almost exclusively controlled by the Russian military, and there are doubts whether Kravchuk had any capacity to impede the transfer at all. The transfer was completed by May 6, 1992, ahead of the June 1, 1992, deadline stipulated in the Almaty agreement. The Russian announcement about the completion of the transfer was timed to coincide with the visit of President Kravchuk to Washington. It came as a complete surprise to Kravchuk, who learned about it from journalists’ questions after the opening ceremony of the Ukrainian Embassy in D, embarrassing him and underscoring how little control Ukraine still had over military affairs on its territory.

99. Kazakhstan's leadership also lobbied to become a party to START I, while Belarus was ambivalent on the issue.

100. “‘Discrepancy’ in Ukraine's Claim Eyed,” Radio Mayak in FBIS-SOV-92-071, April 12, 1992.

101. “Trip Report: A Visit to the Commonwealth of Independent States by Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA), Senator Richard Lugar (R-IN), Senator John Warner (R-VA), and Senator Jeff Brignaman (D-NM),” March 6, 1992, 15, pp. 18–19, National Security Archive, <www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB447/1992-03-6%20through%2010%20Trip%20Report,%20A%20Visit%20to%20the%20Commonwealth%20of%20Independent%20States.PDF>.

102. Ibid., p. 3.

103. “Protocol to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms” (Lisbon, May 23, 1992), <www.state.gov/documents/organization/27389.pdf>.

104. Ibid.

105. “Letter of President L. Kravchuk to President G. Bush,” May 5, 1992, Fond 5233, Opis 1, Delo 76, Central State Archive of Ukraine. This last reference to the Rada statement was not insignificant since it contained the vision of denuclearization as a two-tier process.

106. The content of the note was described by the chief of the MFA disarmament department, Valeriy Kuchinsky, “Za Bezpeku Bez Konfrontacii [For Security without Confrontation],” Polityka i Chas, no. 9–10 (October 1992), pp. 36–8.

107. “Written Statement by the Russian Side at the Signing of the Protocol to the START Treaty on 23 May 1992 in Lisbon” (Arms Control Today, June 1992), p. 36.

108. “Resheniie Ob Uchastii Gosudarstv-Uchastnikov Sodruzhestva v Dogovore O Nerasprostratenii Iadernogo Oruzhia [Decision on Accession of Member-States of the Commonwealth to the Treaty on Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons]” (Iedinyi reiests pravovykh aktov i drugikh dokumentov Sodruzhestva Nezavisimykh Gosudarstv [Single Register of the Legal Acts and Other Documents of the Commonwealth of Independent States], singed in Moscow, July 6, 1992), <www.cis.minsk.by/reestr/ru/index.html#reestr/view/text?doc=120>.

109. “Letter of US President George H.W. Bush to Ukrainian President L. Kravchuk,” June 23, 1992, Fond 5233, Opis 1, Delo 12, Central State Archive of Ukraine.

110. “Draft Joint US-Russia Statement on security assurances for Ukraine,” December 10, 1992, Fond 5233, Opis 1, Delo 12, Central State Archive of Ukraine.

111. “Report of the Meeting of Ukrainian Deputy Foreign Minister B. Tarasiuk with US Ambassador R. Popadiuk,” January 13, 1993, Fond 1, Delo 7039, Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine.

112. Drell and Goodby, The Gravest Danger: Nuclear Weapons, p. 73. The Cooperative Threat Reduction Act sponsored by Senators Sam Nunn (D-Ga.) and Richard Lugar (R-Ind.) was passed in November 1991 and made technical assistance funds available for the support of nuclear disarmament in post-Soviet states, of which Ukraine eventually received $175 million.

113. Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, “Postanova Pro Zaiavu Verkhovnoii Rady Ukraiiny Stosovno Rishen’ Verkhovnoii Rady Rosiii Z Pytannia pro Krym [Resolution on the Statement of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine Regarding Decisions of the Verkhovny Soviet of Russia on the Issue of Crimea],” 2399-XII, June 2, 1992, <http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2399-12>.

114. “Zapys Besidy Zastupnyka Ministra Zakordonnykh Sprav Ukraiiny B. Tarasiuka Z Poslom Z оsoblyvykh Doruchen’ Ministersva Zarordonnykh Sprav RF M. Strel'tsovym. [Report of a Meeting of Ukrainian Deputy Foreign Minister B. Tarasiuk with Ambassador-at-Large of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation M. Streltsov],” January 12, 1993, Fond 1, Delo 7039, Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine.

115. Lepingwell, “Ukraine, Russia, and Nuclear Weapons: A Chronology,” p. 8. The program became known as “Megatons to Megawatts” and ran until December 2013. Under the program, the US purchased some 500 metric tons of HEU released from former Soviet warheads dismantled under START, diluted it into LEU and then sold it as fuel to American nuclear power stations. For more on this, see in this issue, Greg Dwyer and William Wanderer, “Reflections on Transparency and Monitoring under the 1993 United States-Russian Federation Highly Enriched Uranium Purchase Agreement,” Nonproliferation Review 22 (June 2015), pp. 165–183. -Ed.

116. Mark D. Skootsky, “An Annotated Chronology of Post-Soviet Nuclear Disarmament 1991–1994,” Nonproliferation Review 2 (Spring-Summer 1995), p. 64.

117. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, “Memorandum Ministerstva Zakordonnykh Sprav Ukraiiny [Memorandum of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine],” December 11, 1992, Fond 1, Delo 6857, List 241–246, Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine.

118. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, “Pro Kompleksne Vyrishennia Shyrokoho Kola Pytan’, Pov'iazanykh Z Roztashovanoiu Na Terytorii Ukraiiny Stratehichnoiu Iadernoiu Zbroieiu I Taktychnymy Iadernymy Boiezariadamy, Vyvedenymy Vesnoiu 1992 Roku P Ukraiiny Dlia Iikh Rozukompledtuvannia I Znyshchennia [On the Comprehensive Resolution of the Wide Range of Issues Related to the Strategic Nuclear Weapons Located on the Territory of Ukraine and Tactical Nuclear Warheads, Removed from Ukraine in Spring of 1992 for Their Dismantlement and Elimination],” March 1993, Fond 1, Delo 7057, List 23–25, Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine.

119. Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, “Postanova Pro Pryiednannia Ukraiiny Do Videns'koii Konventsii pro Pravonastupnytstvo Derzhav Shchodo Derzhavnoii Vlasnosti, Derzhavnykh Arkhiviv I Derzhavnykh Borhiv [Resolution on Accession of Ukraine to the Vienna Convention on the Succession of States in Respect of Sate Property, Archives and Debts], 2784-XII,” November 17, 1992, <http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2784-12>.

120. “Zapys Zasidiannia Rady Natsional'noii Bezpeky Ukraiiny [Transcript of the Meeting of the National Security Council of Ukraine],” November 27, 1992, Fond 5233, Opis 1, Delo 139, Central State Archive of Ukraine.

121. National Security Advisor to the President of Ukraine V. Selivanov, “Poiasniuval'na Zapyska Do Dyrektyv Delehatsii Ukraiiny Na Perehovorakh Z Rosiyskoiu Federatsieiu Z Pytan’ Iadernoii Bezpeky Ta Statusu Stratehichnykh Iadernykh Syl, Likvidatsiii Stratehichnykh Nastupal'nykh Ozbroien’, Roztashovanykh Na Terytoriii Ukraiiny [Explanatory Note to the Directives to the Delegation of Ukraine in the Negotiations with the Russian Federation on Questions of Nuclear Security and the Status of Strategic Nuclear Forces, Liquidation of Strategic Offensive Arms Located on the Territory of Ukraine,” November 27, 1992, Fond 5233, Opis 1, Delo 139, Central State Archive of Ukraine.

122. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, “Memorandum Ministerstva Zakordonnykh Sprav Ukraiiny [Memorandum of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine].” December 11, 1992.

123. Ibid.

124. Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, “Stenohrama Plenarnoho Zasidannia. Zasidannia P'iatdesiate. [Transcript of the Plenary Session. Session Fifty],” June 3, 1993, p. 44, <http://iportal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/4864.html>.

125. “People's Deputies Advocate Country's Nuclear Status,” Molod Ukrajiny in FBIS-SOV-93-082, April 27, 1993.

126. Dmytro Pavlychko, Holosy Moho Zhyattia. Statti, Vystupy, Interv'iu. Dokumenty [The Voices of My Life. Articles, Speeches, Interviews. Documents] (Kyiv: Osnovy, 2013), p. 419.

127. Ibid., p. 421.

128. Ibid., p. 420.

129. “Ukraine: A Nuclear State,” Economist, June 12, 1993, p. 57. After his election as Ukraine's second president in June 1994, however, Kuchma softened his stance and continued Ukraine's course toward denuclearization.

130. Pavlychko, Holosy Moho Zhyattia, p. 421.

131. Ukrainian decision makers also considered keeping the forty-six SS-24 missiles permanently and arming them with conventional warheads. According to MFA analysis, while this would technically be in compliance with the NPT, ICBMs as delivery vehicles remained both “strategic” and “offensive” even without the nuclear warhead, and retaining them would encounter many of the same international political repercussions as declaring Ukraine a nuclear state. The MFA analysis taps into a question that persists to this day, namely that “strategic” armaments are not easily reducible to “nuclear” armaments. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, “Analitychna Dovidka ‘Mozhlyvi Naslidky Al'ternatyvnykh Pidkhodiv Ukraiiny Do Zdiysnennia Iadernoii Polityky’ [Analytical Note ‘Possible Consequences of Alternative Approaches of Ukraine to Carrying out Nuclear Policy’],” February 3, 1993, Fond 1, Delo 7045, List 1–7, Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine.

132. Pavlychko, Holosy Moho Zhyattia, p. 420–1. Pavlychko quoted former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger as saying to President Kravchuk that if Russia invaded Estonia, the entire world would come to Estonia's defense, but if Russia invaded Ukraine, the latter would have to fend for itself.

133. Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, “Stenohrama Plenarnoho Zasidannia. Zasidannia P'iatdesiate. [Transcript of the Plenary Session. Session Fifty],” p. 73.

134. Tolubko was the nephew of the former Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces commander and himself a former commander of the 46^th Rocket Division, a unit associated with the ICBMs in Pervomaisk, Ukraine. Since 1990, he headed Kharkiv military university.

135. Volodymyr Tolubko, “V Interesakh Bezpeky Chy Nazad Do Falanhy? [In the Interests of Security or Back to the Phalanx?],” Holos Ukraiiny, November 10, 20, 21, 1992.

136. Volodymyr Tolubko, “Iadernoie Oruzhiie, Kosmos, Flot: Resheniie Voprosov Ne Terpit Promedleniia [Nuclear Weapons, Space and Navy: Decisions of the Issues Cannot Be Delayed],” July 1, 1993, Fond 1, Delo 7058, List 99–106, Archive of the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

137. Skootsky, “An Annotated Chronology of Post-Soviet Nuclear Disarmament 1991–1994,” pp. 72, 75 also see DeWing, “The Ukrainian Nuclear Arsenal.” Later, it became known that Ukraine still possessed over 230 kg of HEU at various research facilities in Kyiv and Kharkiv, enough to make a dozen simple nuclear bombs. This HEU was removed from Ukraine in 2010–12, following the agreement between Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych and US President Barak Obama at the 2010 Nuclear Security Summit. See Office of the Press Secretary of the White House, “Fact Sheet: Ukraine Highly Enriched Uranium Removal,” March 17, 2012, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/03/27/fact-sheet-ukraine-highly-enriched-uranium-removal>.

138. Tolubko, “Iadernoie Oruzhiie, Kosmos, Flot: Resheniie Voprosov Ne Terpit Promedleniia [Nuclear Weapons, Space and Navy: Decisions of the Issues Cannot Be Delayed].”

139. Ibid.

140. Tarasiuk, personal interview.

141. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, “Memorandum 21–830 Pershoho Zastupnyka Ministra Zakordonnykh Sprav M.P. Makarevycha Vitse-Prem'ier-Ministru Ukraiiny V.M. Shmarovu [Memorandum 21–830 of First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs M.P. Makarevych to Vice-Prime-Minister V.M. Shmarov],” July 27, 1993, Fond 1, Delo 7058, Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine.

142. Ibid.

143. Ibid.

144. The original Rada request is not available, but the nature of the MFA response suggests that the request came from Rada Deputy Speaker and member of the Presidium Vasyl’ Durdynets, and asked to specifically discuss Ukraine's nuclear option. The request came after the MFA submitted a more general analysis of the costs and benefits of three nuclear options: nuclear, non-nuclear, and non-nuclear with the retention of a portion of ICBMs. See footnote 138.

145. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, “Dodatkova Informatsiia Shchodo Mozhlyvykh Naslidkiv Al'ternatyvnykh Pidkhodiv Ukraiiny Do Zdiisnennia Iadernoii Polityky [Additional Information Regarding the Possible Consequences of Alternative Approaches to Carrying out Ukraine's Nuclear Policy],” February 19, 1993, Fond 1, Delo 7057, List 78–83, Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine. Interestingly, neither the MFA, nor the Rada referenced the CIS agreement signed by Kravchuk in July 1992, recognizing Russia's inheritance of the NWS status under the NPT.

146. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, “Analitychna Dovidka ‘Mozhlyvi Naslidky Al'ternatyvnykh Pidkhodiv Ukraiiny Do Zdiysnennia Iadernoii Polityky’ [Analytical Note ‘Possible Consequences of Alternative Approaches of Ukraine to Carrying out Nuclear Policy’].”

147. Ibid.

148. Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, “Postanova pro Ratyfikatsiiu Dohovoru pro Zvychaini Zbroini Syly v Ievropi Ta Uhody pro Pryntsypy I Poriadok Ioho Vykonannia" [Resolution on Ratification of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and the Agreement on Principals and Process of Its Implementation], 2526-XII,” July 1, 1992, <http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2526-12>.

149. Steven Pifer, “Personal Interview,” interview by Mariana Budjeryn, March 24, 2015.

150. “Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of State Property, Archives and Debts,” Vienna, April 8, 1983, United Nations Treaty Collection, <https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=III-12&chapter=3&lang=en>.

151. An interesting comparison here is India and Pakistan, which, a few years later, managed to create and sustain a space outside the regime that is regarded increasingly as an exception, rather than an aberration of the nonproliferation regime. India further succeeded in legitimizing its nuclear possession with the 2005 US-India Nuclear Cooperation deal that was also endorsed by the Nuclear Suppliers Group.

152. Drell and Goodby, The Gravest Danger, pp. 78–80.

153. “Letter of Foreign Minister of Ukraine A. Zlenko to President L. Kravchuk,” June 3, 1993, Fond 5233, Opis 1, Delo 280, Central State Archive of Ukraine.

154. “Draft Treaty on National Security Guarantees for Ukraine in connection with her accession to the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty,” June 3, 1993, Article 6, Fond 5233, Opis 1, Delo 280, Central State Archive of Ukraine.

155. “Letter of Foreign Minister of Ukraine A. Zlenko to President L. Kravchuk.”

156. On one occasion, Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, who was well connected with the Bill Clinton administration and State Department explained this very clearly to Ukraine's Ambassador to the US Oleh Bilorus. Office of the Ambassador of Ukraine in Washington, D, “Zapys Besidy Posla Ukraiiny v SShA O. Bilorusa Z Dr. Zbigniewom Brzezinskim [Report of the Meeting of Ukrainian Ambassador to US O. Bilorus with Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski],” May 26, 1993, Fond 1, Delo 7039, Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine.

157. Drell and Goodby, The Gravest Danger, p. 80.

158. Yuri Dubinin, “Ukraine's Nuclear Ambitions: Reminiscences of the Past,” Russia in Global Affairs, April 13, 2004, <http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/n_2913>.

159. Verkhovna Rada of “Ukraine, Postanova pro Osnovni Napriamy Zovnishnioii Polityky Ukraiiny [Resolution on the Main Principles of the Foreign Policy of Ukraine], 3360-XII,” July 2, 1993, <http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/3360-12>.

160. Verkhovny Sovyet of the Russian Federation, “Postanovleniie “O Statuse Goroda Sevastopolya” [Resolution on the Status of the City of Sevastopol],” July 9, 1993, <http://pravo.gov.ru/proxy/ips/?docbody=&nd=102024769&intelsearch=%D1%E5%E2%E0%F1%F2%EE%EF%EE%EB%FF+5359+1993>.

161. Office of the President of the Russian Federation, “Pismo Presidentu Ukrainy L.M. Kravchuku [Letter to the President of Ukraine L.M. Kravchuk],” April 30, 1993, Fond 1, Delo 7063, List 120–123, Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine.

162. The text of the protocol with the different wording is available in John Lepingwell, “Negotiations over Nuclear Weapons: The Past as Prologue?,” RFL/RE Research Report 3, no. 4 (January 28, 1994), p. 6.

163. For a detailed account of what happened in Massandra, see Reiss, Bridled Ambition, pp. 108–9.

164. Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, “Postanova pro ratyficatsiiu Dohovoru mizh Soiuzom Radianskykh Sotsialistychnykh Respublik i Spoluchenymy Shtatamy Ameryky pro skorochennia i obmezhennia stratehichnykh nastupal'nykh ozbroien’, pidpysanoho u Moskvi 31 lypnia 1991 roku, i Protokolu do nioho, pidpysanoho u Lisaboni vid imeni Ukrainy 23 travnia 1992 roku [Resolution on Ratification of the Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on Strategic Arms Reductions and Limitations Signed in Moscow on July 31, 1991 and its Protocol Signed in Lisbon on Behalf of Ukraine on May 23, 1992, 3624-XII,” November 18, 1993, <http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/3624-12>.

165. Ibid. Points 2 and 6.

166. Office of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, “Terminovo. Memorandum Poslam, Postpredam Ta Henkonsulam Ukraiiny Za Kordonom [Urgent. Memorandum to Ambassadors, Permanent Representative and Consul Generals of Ukraine Abroad],” November 18, 1993, Fond 1, Delo 6949, Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine.

167. Military Attache of Ukraine in the US Colonel I.P. Smeshko, “Informatsiia pro Besidu Iz Pomichnykom Ministra Oborony SShA, Nachal'nykom Viddilu Rosiii, Ukraiiny I Ievrazii U Ofisi Ministra Oborony SShA d-rom Shermanom Garnettom [Information about the Meeting with Assistant Secretary of Defense, Head of the Russia, Ukraine and Eurasia Department of the US Department of Defense Dr. Sherman Garnett],” December 6, 1993, Fond 1, Delo 6950, Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine.

168. “Trilateral Statement of the Presidents of Ukraine, US and Russia,” January 14, 1994, <http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/998_300>; English text of the Trilateral Statement is available in Pifer, The Trilateral Process, Appendix I. Compensation for the HEU contained in the tactical nuclear weapons transferred in the period from September 1991 to May 1992 was recorded in a separate confidential letter which the parties agreed not to publicize in order to avoid domestic opposition to the settlement in Russia. Personal interview with Steven Pifer, March 24, 2015.

169. Office of the President of Ukraine, “Lyst Holovi Verkhovnoii Rady Ukraiiny I. S. Plyushchu [Letter to the Speaker of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine I. S. Plyushch],” January 24, 1994, Fond 1, Opis 16, Delo 4964, Central State Archive of Ukraine.

170. Ibid.

171. “Protocol No. 99 of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Verkhovna Rada,” January 26, 1994, Fond 1-P, Opis 1, Delo 2104, Central State Archive of Ukraine.

172. Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, “Stenohrama Plenarnoho Zasidannia. Zasidannia P'iatnadtsiate [Transcript of the Plenary Session. Session Fifteen],” February 3, 1994, pp. 91–119, <http://iportal.rada.gov.ua/meeting/stenogr/show/4261.html>; Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, “Postanova Pro vykonannia Prezydentom Ukraiiny ta Uriadom Ukraiiny rekomendatsiy, shcho mistiat'sia v punkti 11 Postanovy Verkhovnoii Rady Ukraiiny "Pro Ratyfikaciiu Dohovoru mizh Soiuzom Radians'kykh Sotsialistychnykh Respublik i Spoluchenymy Shtatamy Ameryky pro skorochennia i obmezhennia stratehichnykh nastupal'nykh ozbroien’, pidpysanoho u Moskvi 31 lypnia 1991 roku, i Protokolu do nioho, pidpysanoho u Lisaboni vid imeni Ukraiiny 23 travnia 1992 roku [Resolution On Fulfillment by the President of Ukraine and Government of Ukraine of the Verkhovna Rada Recommendations contained in point 11 of the Resolution of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on the Ratification of the Treaty between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms, signed in Moscow on July 31, 1991, and its Protocol signed in Lisbon on behalf of Ukraine on May 23, 1991], 3919-XII,” February 3, 1994, <http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/3919-12>.

173. Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, “Zakon Ukraiiny pro Pryiednannia Ukraiiny Do Dohovoru pro Nerozpovsiudzhennia Iadernoii Zbroii Vid 1 Lypnia 1968 Roku [Law of Ukraine on Accession to the Treaty on Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons of July 1, 1968], 248/94-VR,” November 16, 1994, <http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/248/94-вр>. The ten-month-long delay between unconditional ratification of START I/Lisbon and the NPT was primarily due to the change in government in Kyiv with early parliamentary and presidential elections taking place in March and June 1994 respectively.

174. Ibid.

175. “Memorandum on Security Assurances in Connection with Ukraine's Accession to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” December 5, 1994, <http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/998_158>; English version available in Pifer, The Trilateral Process. France and China provided similar assurances in separate statements.

176. “Kiev Scorns NPT Exchange Deal,” Moscow Times, December 8, 1994, <www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/kiev-scorns-npt-exchange-deal/345274.html>.

177. Office of the Spokesperson, US Department of State, “US/UK/Ukraine Press Statement on the Budapest Memorandum Meeting,” March 5, 2014, <www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/03/222949.htm>.