Diplomatic strategies for eliminating WMD

ABSTRACT

The involvement of multiple parties makes diplomacy indispensable to the elimination of nuclear, chemical, biological and other unconventional weapons and related materials. Diplomacy is required in any attempt to address the problems of indirect control of WMD, conflicting objectives between states, conflicting priorities within states, and sometimes also the need to work in non-permissive environments. Appeals to self-interest, offers of incentives, and threats of disincentives have all been used to advance multinational efforts to manage or dispose of WMD, including elimination work.

KEYWORDS:

• Diplomacy
• weapons of mass destruction
• nuclear security

Notes

1. Although the collective phrase “weapons of mass destruction” (WMD) can be misleading—since the various armaments included in the term vary widely in their effects and means of proliferation—the term is employed here for brevity.

2. All details not otherwise sourced in this article are drawn from the recollections of a former US official personally involved in WMD diplomacy.

3. “Bratislava Nuclear Security Initiative,” Defense Threat Reduction Agency and US Stratcom Center for Combating WMD & Standing Joint Force Headquarters-Elimination, <www.dtra.mil/Missions/Partnering/BratislavaNuclearSecurityInitiative.aspx>.

4. Where not otherwise indicated, this article is based upon the personal recollections of the original author, a former US government official, who was not able to complete it.

5. Private conversation with participant in the “WMD Elimination Workshop,” James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Washington, DC, November 9-10, 2015, <www.nonproliferation.org/elimination-of-weapons-of-mass-destruction-wmd-lessons-learned/>.

6. Matthew Bunn, Martin B. Malin, Nickolas Roth, and William H. Tobey, “Advancing Nuclear Security: Evaluating Progress and Setting New Goals,” Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University, March 2014, <http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/advancingnuclearsecurity.pdf>

7. Matthew Bunn and Eben Harrell, “Consolidation: Thwarting Nuclear Theft,” Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University, March 2012, <http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Consolidation_Thwarting_Nuclear_Theft_corrected.pdf>, p. 13.

8. William H. Tobey, “Planning for Success at the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit,” Stanley Foundation Policy Analysis Brief, December 2013, <www.stanleyfoundation.org/publications/pab/TobeyPAB1213a.pdf>, p. 3.

9. Miles A. Pomper and Philippe Mauger, “Crossing the Finish Line: Ending the Civilian Use of Highly Enriched Uranium,” Stanley Foundation Policy Analysis Brief, May 2014, <www.stanleyfoundation.org/publications/PomperPAB514.pdf>, p. 4.

10. Terri Lukach, “Russian Defense Minister Cites Importance of Controlling WMDs,” Armed Forces Information Service, January 12, 2005, <www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2005/01/mil-050112-afps04.htm>.

11. Ibid.

12. Stephen J. Hadley, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, private interview with contributor, June 1, 2009.

13. The White House, “Joint Statement by President Bush and President Putin on Nuclear Security Cooperation,” February 24, 2005, <www.georgebush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2005/2/20050224-8.html>.

14. Alexander Konovalov, “A Summit of Overturned Expectations,” RIA Novosti, February 28, 2005, <www.russialist.org/archives/9071-8.php>.

15. William C. Potter, “The Politics of Nuclear Renunciation: The Cases of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine,” The Henry L. Stimson Center Occasional Paper No. 22, April 1995, p. 8.

16. Ibid., pp. 19-20.

17. Ibid., pp. 21-22.

18. Ibid., pp. 22.

19. Ibid., p. 23-25. See, too, Mariana Budjeryn, “The Power of the NPT: International Norms and Ukraine's Nuclear Disarmament,” Nonproliferation Review 22 (June 2015), pp. 203-38.

20. United Nations, “Letter dated 7 December 1994 from the Permanent Representatives of the Russian Federation, Ukraine, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the Security Council,” December 19, 1994, <www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/49/765>.

21. William Tobey, “A message from Tripoli, Part 1: How Libya gave up its WMD,” Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, December 3, 2014, <http://thebulletin.org/message-tripoli-how-libya-gave-its-wmd7834>.

22. William Tobey, “A message from Tripoli, Part 5: How Libya gave up its WMD,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, December 8, 2014, <http://thebulletin.org/message-tripoli-how-libya-gave-its-wmd7848>.

23. Ibid.

24. The White House, “Press Background Briefing by Senior Administration Officials,” December 19, 2003, <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/12/20031219-14.html>.