Eliminating Libya’s WMD programs: creating a cooperative situation

ABSTRACT

Libya proved to be a unique example of WMD elimination. Unlike other WMD elimination cases, which arose out of an armed conflict that resulted in an opportunity to access and destroy a WMD program, Libya began as a cooperative WMD elimination effort that took a turn after violence erupted. The first phases of elimination arose from a combination of diplomacy, economic sanctions, and fears by the Libyan government of possible military action. This phase effectively reversed Muammar Qaddafi's attempt to develop a nuclear program and prevented the Libyan government from having access to chemical weapons when the “Arab Spring” reached Libya. The ensuing civil war brought new challenges to elimination: a breakdown in security, increased risk of chemical-weapons proliferation to violent extremists, and the discovery of a previously unknown stockpile of filled chemical munitions. Following Qaddafi's death, the second phase restarted the chemical-weapons elimination and presented new challenges still. These included the need for rapid action to complete the destruction, negotiating with an interim government, and assisting destruction without US personnel on the ground in Libya.

KEYWORDS:

• Libya
• chemical weapons
• nuclear program
• Cooperative Threat Reduction

Disclaimer

The views expressed are the authors' and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or positions of the National Defense University, Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Department of Defense, or US government.

Notes

1. Assertions made in this article that are not specifically sourced are based on the lead author's personal involvement in the bilateral meetings with Libyan and US officials, as well as various coordination meetings within the US government and its communiqués.

2. Joseph Cirincione, Jon B. Wolfsthal, and Miriam Rajkumar, Deadly Arsenals: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Threats, 2nd Edition (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment, 2005), pp. 316, 322-23.

3. Ibid., pp. 322.

4. Ibid.

5. Robert G. Joseph, Countering WMD: The Libyan Experience (Fairfax, VA: National Institute Press, 2009), pp. 76.

6. Christopher M. Blanchard, “Libya: Background and U.S. Relations,” Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2008, pp. 9.

7. Bruce W. Jentleson and Christopher A. Whytock, “Who ‘Won’ Libya? The Force-Diplomacy Debate and Its Implications for Theory and Policy,” International Security 30 (Winter 2005-06), p. 63.

8. Joseph, Countering WMD, pp. 6-7; Sharon A. Squassoni and Andrew Feickert, “Disarming Libya: Weapons of Mass Destruction,” Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2004, <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/32007.pdf>; William Tobey, “A Message from Tripoli Part 1: How Libya Gave up its WMD,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, December 3, 2014, <http://thebulletin.org/message-tripoli-how-libya-gave-its-wmd7834>.

9. Paula A. DeSutter, “Weapons of Mass Destruction, Terrorism, Human Rights and the Future of U.S.-Libyan Relations, Testimony Before the House International Relations Committee,” 180th Cong., 2nd sess., March 10, 2004, <http://2001-2009.state.gov/t/vci/rls/rm/2004/30347.htm>.

10. Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, “Libya: Facts and Figures,” n.d., <www.opcw.org/opcw-archive/the-opcw-and-libya/libya-facts-and-figures>; William Tobey, “A Message from Tripoli Part 2: How Libya Gave up its WMD,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, December 3, 2014, <http://thebulletin.org/message-tripoli-how-libya-gave-its-wmd7839>.

11. William Tobey, “A Message from Tripoli, Part 3: How Libya Gave up its WMD,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, December 5, 2014, < http://thebulletin.org/message-tripoli-part-3-how-libya-gave-its-wmd7843>.

12. US Department of State, “Condition (10) (C) Report: Compliance With The Convention On The Prohibition Of The Development, Production, Stockpiling And Use Of Chemical Weapons And On Their Destruction,” 2012, <www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/rpt/197222.htm>.

13. US Department of State, “Compliance With the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction Condition 10(C) Report,” 2014, <www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/rpt/2014/229921.htm>.

14. OPCW, “Libya: Facts and Figures.”

15. US Department of State, “National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction,” 2002, p. 1. <www.state.gov/documents/organization/16092.pdf>; US Department of Defense, “National Military Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction,” February 13, 2006, p. 9, <http://archive.defense.gov/pdf/NMS-CWMD2006.pdf>.

16. Security Council Resolution 1973, S/RES/1973 (2011), March 17, 2011, <www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1973(2011)>.

17. Pam Benson, “Libyan chaos raises worries over CW stockpile,” CNN, February 25, 2011, <www.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/africa/02/24/libya.mustard.gas/>.

18. US Army Chemical Materials Agency, “Explosive Destruction System Overview Fact Sheet,” September 6, 2012, <www.cma.army.mil/fndocumentviewer.aspx?docid=003674354>.

19. Ibid.

20. Dynasafe, “Static Detonation Chamber,” 2015, <www.dynasafe.com/demil-systems/safe-large-scale-munitions-destruction/static-detonation-chamber>; Committee to Review Assembled Chemical Weapons Alternatives Program Detonation Technologies, “Assessment of Explosive Destruction Technologies for Specific Munitions at the Blue Grass and Pueblo Chemical Agent Destruction Pilot Plants,” (Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, 2009), pp. 19-21.

21. Joseph, Countering WMD, pp. 16–17.